Maryland v. Buie

Maryland v. Buie
Maryland v. Buie
	Supreme Court of the United States
Argued December 4, 1989; Decided February 28, 1990
Full case name	Maryland v. Buie
Citations	494 U.S. 325 ( more ) 110 S. Ct. 1093; 108 L. Ed. 2d 276
Argument	Oral argument
Holding
	The Fourth Amendment permits a properly limited protective sweep in conjunction with an in-home arrest when the searching officer possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene. Court of Appeals of Maryland vacated and remanded.
Court membership
	Chief Justice William Rehnquist Associate Justices William J. Brennan Jr. · Byron White ; Thurgood Marshall · Harry Blackmun ; John P. Stevens · Sandra Day O'Connor ; Antonin Scalia · Anthony Kennedy
Case opinions
Majority	White, joined by Rehnquist, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy
Concurrence	Stevens
Concurrence	Kennedy
Dissent	Brennan, joined by Marshall
Laws applied
	U.S. Const. amend. IV

Last updated October 04, 2023

Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990), was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States handed down in 1990. In the case, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment permits a properly limited protective sweep in conjunction with an in-home arrest when the searching officer possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.

Facts

Following an armed robbery of a Godfather's Pizza restaurant during which one of the robbers wore a red running suit, police officers in Prince George's County, Maryland obtained arrest warrants for Jerome Edward Buie and Lloyd Allen. While executing the arrest warrant, the officers fanned out through the first and second floors.

During this same time, one of the officers executing the arrest warrant twice shouted into the basement, ordering anyone down there to come out. A voice inquired who was calling, to which the officer responded "this is the police, show me your hands." Buie emerged from the basement. He was arrested, searched, and handcuffed by Rozar. Thereafter, another officer entered the basement to check whether there was someone else down there. He noticed a red running suit lying in plain view on a stack of clothing and seized it.

At issue in this case was the plain view doctrine of the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, the plain view doctrine allows a police officer to seize contraband or evidence in plain view without first obtaining a warrant provided that (1) he or she was lawfully located in the area where the evidence was observed and (2) the incriminating nature of the evidence was immediately apparent. Because the description of the robber included a red running suit, the "immediately apparent" prong was satisfied. The only question was whether the officer that made the observation was lawfully in the basement when he made the observation.

While Buie sought to suppress the running suit before trial for failing to satisfy the first prong, the trial court denied Buie's motion to suppress the running suit and the Maryland Court of Special Appeals affirmed. By a 4-3 vote, the Maryland Court of Appeals, (the state supreme court), reversed. The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari.

Opinion of the Court

In upholding the legality of the entry into the basement and subsequent seizure of the running suit, Justice White relied on Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (permitting officers to conduct frisk of individual upon reasonable, articulable suspicion that person was armed and dangerous), and Michigan v. Long , 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (permitting protective pat-down of motor vehicle for officer safety).

Utilizing the balancing test set forth in those opinions (need for officer security v. nature of intrusion), Justice White reasoned that the "arresting officers are permitted in such circumstances to take reasonable steps to ensure their safety after, and while making, the arrest." According to Justice White, "That interest [officer safety] is sufficient to outweigh the intrusion such procedures may entail."

Justice White set forth a two-part holding:

As an incident to the arrest officers may, as a precautionary matter and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, look in closets and other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched. This portion of the holding has been called into question.^[1]
If an officer wishes to conduct a sweep of the premises, there must be articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.

Justice White distinguished the case of Chimel v. California , 395 U.S. 752 (1969), which held that in the absence of a search warrant, justifiable searches incident to a lawful arrest could not extend beyond the arrestee's person and the area from within which the arrestee might have obtained a weapon. First, Justice White explained that the search in Chimel was a full-blown search of the entire house. Moreover, the search was conducted for the purpose of finding evidence of the crime for which the arrest was made. In contrast, the officers in Buie were not looking for contraband.

Second, Justice White explained that the possible threat was different. White stated, "The justification for the search incident to arrest considered in Chimel was the threat posed by the arrestee, not the safety threat posed by the house, or more properly by unseen third parties in the house." The type of search authorized by the court in Buie is far removed from the top-to-bottom search involved in Chimel. It is not automatically permitted, and is only properly conducted only when justified by a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the house is harboring a person posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.

Justice Brennan's dissent

Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, took issue with extending the doctrines of Terry and Long to a private residence. According to Justice Brennan, physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed. He argued that essentially, because Terry and Long involved situations where criminal defendants were in locations which are afforded significantly less protection than the inside of a private residence, extending the doctrine in the manner that the majority did was inappropriate.

Related Research Articles

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is part of the Bill of Rights. It prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and sets requirements for issuing warrants: warrants must be issued by a judge or magistrate, justified by probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), was a landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision in which the court ruled that it is constitutional for American police to "stop and frisk" a person they reasonably suspect to be armed and involved in a crime. Specifically, the decision held that a police officer does not violate the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution's prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures when questioning someone even though the officer lacks probable cause to arrest the person, so long as the police officer has a reasonable suspicion that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime. The court also ruled that the police officer may perform a quick surface search of the person's outer clothing for weapons if they have reasonable suspicion that the person stopped is "armed and presently dangerous." This reasonable suspicion must be based on "specific and articulable facts," and not merely upon an officer's hunch.

Atwater v. Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001), was a United States Supreme Court decision which held that a person's Fourth Amendment rights are not violated when the subject is arrested for driving without a seatbelt. The court ruled that such an arrest for a misdemeanor that is punishable only by a fine does not constitute an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.

"Stop and identify" statutes are laws in several U.S. states that authorize police to lawfully order people whom they reasonably suspect of committing a crime to state their name. If there is not reasonable suspicion that a person has committed a crime, is committing a crime, or is about to commit a crime, the person is not required to identify himself or herself, even in these states.

Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), was a 1969 United States Supreme Court case in which the court held that police officers arresting a person at his home could not search the entire home without a search warrant, but that police may search the area within immediate reach of the person without a warrant. The rule on searches incident to a lawful arrest within the home is now known as the Chimel rule.

Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court affirmed the California Court of Appeal's ruling that suspicionless searches of parolees are lawful under California law and that the search in this case was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution because it was not arbitrary, capricious, or harassing.

Search incident to a lawful arrest, commonly known as search incident to arrest (SITA) or the Chimel rule, is a U.S. legal principle that allows police to perform a warrantless search of an arrested person, and the area within the arrestee’s immediate control, in the interest of officer safety, the prevention of escape, and the preservation of evidence.

Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court that upheld the warrantless searches of an automobile, which is known as the automobile exception. The case has also been cited as widening the scope of search.

Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), was a United States Supreme Court decision holding that the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires law-enforcement officers to demonstrate an actual and continuing threat to their safety posed by an arrestee, or a need to preserve evidence related to the crime of arrest from tampering by the arrestee, in order to justify a warrantless vehicular search incident to arrest conducted after the vehicle's recent occupants have been arrested and secured.

New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that when a police officer has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, the officer may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile. Therefore, Belton extended the so-called "Chimel rule" of searches incident to a lawful arrest, established in Chimel v. California (1969), to vehicles. The Supreme Court sought to establish bright line rules to govern vehicle search incident to eliminate some confusion in the cases.

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Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), was a United States Supreme Court case holding that the search of an automobile by the United States Border Patrol without a warrant or probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment. The vehicle was stopped and searched for illegal aliens twenty-five miles (40 km) from the Mexican border. The Court approached the search from four views: automobile search, administrative inspection, heavily regulated industry inspection, and border search. As to the validity of the search under the automobile exception, the Court found no justification for the search under the Carroll doctrine because there was no probable cause. As to the validity of the search under various administrative inspection doctrines, the Court found that the officers lacked an area warrant. As to the validity of the heavily regulated industry inspection, the Court found that the doctrine is not applicable to traveling on a state highway. As to the validity of a border search, the Court found that the site of the stop and the entirety of the road on which the stop occurred was too far from the border to be considered a border search.

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Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the warrantless seizure of evidence which is in plain view. The discovery of the evidence does not have to be inadvertent, although that is a characteristic of most legitimate plain-view seizures. The opinion clarified the plain view doctrine of the Court's Fourth Amendment analysis.

Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court upheld a murder conviction notwithstanding a challenge that the evidence upon which guilt was based was obtained in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. The court held that in view of the station-house detention upon probable cause, the very limited intrusion of scraping the defendant's fingernails for blood and other material, undertaken to preserve highly evanescent evidence, did not violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.

Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011), was a decision by the US Supreme Court, which held that warrantless searches conducted in police-created exigent circumstances do not violate the Fourth Amendment as long as the police did not create the exigency by violating or threatening to violate the Fourth Amendment.

Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318 (2012), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that officials may strip-search individuals who have been arrested for any crime before admitting the individuals to jail, even if there is no reason to suspect that the individual is carrying contraband.

Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435 (2013), was a decision of the United States Supreme Court which held that a cheek swab of an arrestee's DNA is comparable to fingerprinting and therefore, a legal police booking procedure that is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.

Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014), is a landmark United States Supreme Court case in which the court ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of the digital contents of a cell phone during an arrest is unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.

R v Stairs, 2022 SCC 11 is a constitutional rights decision of the Supreme Court of Canada. The Court established new standards for searches of a person's home after they have been arrested. At issue in the case was whether the traditional common law power of Search Incident to Arrest, which allows police officers to engage in warrantless searches of lawfully arrested persons, was compliant with section 8 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms as it related to searches of the home.

References

↑ Professor Colin Miller of the John Marshall School of law argues that this portion of the holding is in fact dictum. Moreover, Professor Miller argues that the more recent decision of Arizona v. Gant , 129 S.Ct. 1710 (2009) should operate to bar the liberty with which officers use this holding in practice. As Miller explains, "courts unequivocally have treated Buie's dictum as gospel and universally found that it authorizes suspicionless searches of sufficiently large spaces not only in arrest rooms, but also in rooms immediately abutting arrest rooms and connected to arrest rooms by hallways." According to Miller's article, "defendants and appellants should be able to raise both the Arizona v. Gant opinion and the reasoning within it to argue that the reaffirmation of Chimel and the destruction of the Belton fiction together invalidate the type of search authorized in Buie’s dictum." See Collin Miller, Stranger Than Dictum: Why Arizona v. Gant Compels the Conclusion that Suspicionless Buie Searches Incident to Lawful Arrests Are Unconstitutional (2010) available online at https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1888&context=law_facpub.

Unless otherwise indicated, this entire article is derived from the Supreme Court's opinion. The full text of the opinion is available online at http://supreme.justia.com/us/494/325/case.html. Additionally, audio of the oral argument is available online at https://www.oyez.org/cases/1980-1989/1989/1989_88_1369.

External links

Works related to Maryland v. Buie at Wikisource
Text of Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325(1990) is available from: Findlaw Justia Library of Congress Oyez (oral argument audio)

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[1] Professor Colin Miller of the John Marshall School of law argues that this portion of the holding is in fact dictum. Moreover, Professor Miller argues that the more recent decision of Arizona v. Gant , 129 S.Ct. 1710 (2009) should operate to bar the liberty with which officers use this holding in practice. As Miller explains, "courts unequivocally have treated Buie's dictum as gospel and universally found that it authorizes suspicionless searches of sufficiently large spaces not only in arrest rooms, but also in rooms immediately abutting arrest rooms and connected to arrest rooms by hallways." According to Miller's article, "defendants and appellants should be able to raise both the Arizona v. Gant opinion and the reasoning within it to argue that the reaffirmation of Chimel and the destruction of the Belton fiction together invalidate the type of search authorized in Buie’s dictum." See Collin Miller, Stranger Than Dictum: Why Arizona v. Gant Compels the Conclusion that Suspicionless Buie Searches Incident to Lawful Arrests Are Unconstitutional (2010) available online at https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1888&context=law_facpub.

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