California v. Hodari D.

Last updated
California v. Hodari D.
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Argued January 14, 1991
Decided April 23, 1991
Full case nameCalifornia v. Hodari D.
Docket no. 89-1632
Citations499 U.S. 621 ( more )
111 S. Ct. 1547; 113 L. Ed. 2d 690; 1991 U.S. LEXIS 2397; 59 U.S.L.W. 4335; 91 Cal. Daily Op. Service 2893; 91 Daily Journal DAR 4665
Argument Oral argument
Case history
PriorCertiorari to the Court of Appeal of California, First Appellate District
Holding
During police pursuits, a fleeing suspect is not seized unless (1) pursuing officers apply physical force to the suspect or (2) the suspect submits to shows of authority
Court membership
Chief Justice
William Rehnquist
Associate Justices
Byron White  · Thurgood Marshall
Harry Blackmun  · John P. Stevens
Sandra Day O'Connor  · Antonin Scalia
Anthony Kennedy  · David Souter
Case opinions
MajorityScalia, joined by Rehnquist, White, Blackmun, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter
DissentStevens, joined by Marshall
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amend. IV

California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991), was a United States Supreme Court case where the Court held that a fleeing suspect is not "seized" under the terms of the Fourth Amendment unless the pursuing officers apply physical force to the suspect or the suspect submits to officers' demands to halt. [1] Consequently, evidence that is discarded by a fleeing suspect prior to the point in time at which they are seized is not subject to the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule. [2]

Contents

Background

In April 1988, police officers on patrol [fn 1] in Oakland, California encountered "four or five youths huddled around a small red car." [3] When the youths saw the officers' car approaching, the youths "panicked" and ran down the street. [4] Hodari D. and a companion ran west through an alley, while the others fled south. [5] One of the officers chased Hodari D. on foot down an adjoining street, while the other officer chased another youth in the car on a different street. [5] Although Hodari D. "[looked] behind as he ran," he did not see the officer until the officer "was almost upon him, whereupon he tossed away what appeared to be a small rock." [5] A moment later, the officer tackled and handcuffed Hodari D. and placed a radio call for assistance. [5] The rock Hodari D. discarded was later found to be crack cocaine. [5]

Juvenile court proceedings

During proceedings in juvenile court, Hodari D. moved to suppress the rock of cocaine. [5] He argued that officers conducted an unlawful seizure when officers began running toward him and that the evidence was inadmissible because it was obtained in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. [5] The juvenile court denied the motion but on appeal, the California Court of Appeal ruled in favor of Hodari D., concluding that Hodari D. was unlawfully seized at the moment officers began the chase. [5] The California Supreme Court denied California's petition for review, but the Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari on October 1, 1990. [6]

Opinion of the Court

Writing for a 7-2 majority, Justice Antonin Scalia held that the discarded rock of crack cocaine was admissible because Hodari D. was not seized until he was tackled by officers, and he discarded the contraband before he was seized by officers. [1] Justice Scalia concluded that under the Fourth Amendment, seizure traditionally meant "taking possession" of the person or thing being seized. [7] He noted that "at common law, the word connoted not merely grasping, or applying physical force to, the animate or inanimate object in question, but actually bringing it within physical control." [8] Consequently, he held that a seizure does not occur unless officers apply force to a fleeing suspect or the fleeing suspect yields to an officer's "show of authority" in which the officer orders the fleeing suspect to halt. [9] In other words, a seizure occurs upon the application of physical force by officers or a submission to an officer's assertion of authority. [9] Justice Scalia ruled that Hodari D. was not seized until he was tackled, and the rock of cocaine was therefore "abandoned" property that was not obtained as a result of an unlawful seizure. [10]

Dissenting opinion of Justice Stevens

Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion in which he criticized the majority's "narrow construction" of seizures under the Fourth Amendment. [11] Additionally, Justice Stevens criticized the potential consequences of the majority's opinion, writing that the majority "assumes, without acknowledging, that a police officer may now fire his weapon at an innocent citizen and not implicate the Fourth Amendment—as long as he misses his target." [12] He argued that the majority's interpretation of the word "seizure" was a radical departure from the Court's earlier Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and that the officers' demands to halt "adequately conveyed the message that respondent was not free to leave." [13]

See also

Notes

  1. The officers drove in an unmarked car in street clothes, but wore jackets embossed with the word "Police" on the front and back. [3]

Related Research Articles

Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006), is a case in which the U.S. Supreme Court held that without a search warrant, police had no constitutional right to search a house where one resident consents to the search while another resident objects. The Court distinguished this case from the "co-occupant consent rule" established in United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974), which permitted one resident to consent in absence of the co-occupant.

Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006), is a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that a violation of the Fourth Amendment requirement that police officers knock, announce their presence, and wait a reasonable amount of time before entering a private residence does not require suppression of the evidence obtained in the ensuing search.

Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991), was a United States Supreme Court case that overturned a per se rule imposed by the Florida Supreme Court that held consensual searches of passengers on buses were always unreasonable. The Court ruled that the fact that the search takes place on a bus is one factor in determining whether a suspect feels free to decline the search and walk away from the officers.

Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 U.S. 1 (1984), was a United States Supreme Court case concerning the Fourth Amendment rights of protection from search and seizure. The case involved defendant Damasco Vincente Rodriguez against the State of Florida. After the Florida State Court and the District Court of Appeal of Florida both judged in favor of the defendant, the State of Florida appealed for a writ of Certiorari. The Supreme Court sided with the State of Florida, overturning the decision of the Florida state courts.

Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993), was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States. The Court unanimously held that, when a police officer who is conducting a lawful patdown search for weapons feels something that plainly is contraband, the object may be seized even though it is not a weapon. By a 6-to-3 vote, however, the court held that the officer in this case had gone beyond the limits of a lawful patdown search before he could determine that the object was contraband, making the search and the subsequent seizure unlawful under the Fourth Amendment.

Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978), is a United States Supreme Court case from 1978 in which The Stanford Daily, a student newspaper at Stanford University, was searched by police who had suspected the paper to be in possession of photographs of a demonstration that took place at the university's hospital in April 1971. The Stanford Daily filed a suit claiming that under the protection of the First and Fourth Amendments of the Constitution, the warrants were unconstitutional and that the searches should have fallen under the context of subpoenas. The Supreme Court ruled against The Stanford Daily; however, Congress later passed the Privacy Protection Act of 1980, which provides additional protections against searches and seizures to the press and individuals who disseminate information to the public, unless the individual is suspected of a crime or a life-threatening situation is present.

Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), was a landmark United States Supreme Court case in which the Court clarified the application of the Fourth Amendment's protection against warrantless searches and the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination for searches that intrude into the human body. Until Schmerber, the Supreme Court had not yet clarified whether state police officers must procure a search warrant before taking blood samples from criminal suspects. Likewise, the Court had not yet clarified whether blood evidence taken against the wishes of a criminal suspect may be used against that suspect in the course of a criminal prosecution.

<i>Commonwealth v. Matos</i>

Commonwealth v. Matos, 672 A.2d 769 (1996), is a Pennsylvania State Supreme Court case which further developed Pennsylvania Constitutional Law as affording greater privacy protections than those guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Specifically, where police possess neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion, contraband discarded by a person fleeing a police officer are the fruits of an illegal seizure. The case departs from the ruling of California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991), which held that fleeing suspects cannot be considered seized for purposes of the U.S. Constitution. It is a part of a family of state case law concerning the phenomenon of "new judicial federalism." Pennsylvania criminal defense attorneys may cite the case as part of a motion to suppress physical evidence where the defendant discards drugs, weapons, or other contraband while fleeing police.

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), was a unanimous United States Supreme Court decision that "declared that any traffic offense committed by a driver was a legitimate legal basis for a stop."

Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the warrantless seizure of evidence which is in plain view. The discovery of the evidence does not have to be inadvertent, although that is a characteristic of most legitimate plain-view seizures. The opinion clarified the plain view doctrine of the Court's Fourth Amendment analysis.

Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011), was a decision by the US Supreme Court, which held that warrantless searches conducted in police-created exigent circumstances do not violate the Fourth Amendment as long as the police did not create the exigency by violating or threatening to violate the Fourth Amendment.

Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984), was a United States Supreme Court decision on the limits of worksite enforcement by immigration agents. Specifically, the Court ruled that factory raids by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) were not illegal seizures under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991), was a United States Supreme Court case which involved the question of within what period of time must a suspect arrested without a warrant be brought into court to determine if there is probable cause for holding the suspect in custody. The majority held that suspects must generally be granted a probable cause determination within 48 hours of arrest. The dissent believed that probable cause hearings should generally be provided much sooner, as soon as the police complete the administrative steps incident to arrest.

Bailey v. United States, 568 U.S. 186 (2013), was a United States Supreme Court case concerning search and seizure. A 6–3 decision reversed the weapons conviction of a Long Island man who had been detained when police followed his vehicle after he left his apartment just before it was to be searched. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the majority opinion, and Antonin Scalia filed a concurrence. Stephen Breyer dissented.

<i>Florida v. Jardines</i> 2013 United States Supreme Court case

Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013), was a United States Supreme Court case which resulted in the decision that police use of a trained detection dog to sniff for narcotics on the front porch of a private home is a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and therefore, without consent, requires both probable cause and a search warrant.

United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002), was a case in which the United States Supreme Court clarified the applicability of Fourth Amendment protections to searches and seizures that occur on buses, as well as the function of consent during searches by law enforcement. During a scheduled stop in Tallahassee, Florida, police officers boarded a Greyhound bus as part of a drug interdiction effort and interviewed passengers. After talking to two of the passengers and asking if they could "check [their] person", officers discovered the two passengers had taped several packages of cocaine to their legs. At trial, the passengers argued that officers violated their Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures because the police engaged in coercive behavior and never informed them that their participation in the drug interdiction efforts was voluntary.

Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393 (2014), was a case in which the United States Supreme Court clarified when police officers may make arrests or conduct temporary detentions based on information provided by anonymous tips. In 2008, police in California received a 911 call that a pickup truck was driving recklessly along a rural highway. Officers spotted a truck matching the description provided in the 911 call and followed the truck for five minutes, but did not observe any suspicious behavior. Nevertheless, officers conducted a traffic stop and discovered 30 pounds (14 kg) of marijuana in the truck. At trial, the occupants of the car argued that the traffic stop violated the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, because the tip was unreliable, and officers did not personally observe criminal activity. Writing for a majority of the Court, Justice Clarence Thomas held that the 911 call was reliable, and that officers need not personally observe criminal activity when acting upon information provided by an anonymous 911 call.

Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. ___ (2015), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that a police officer who shot a suspect during a police pursuit was entitled to qualified immunity. In a per curiam opinion, the Court held that prior precedent did not establish "beyond debate" that the officer's actions were objectively unreasonable.

Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948), was a significant United States Supreme Court decision addressing search warrants and the Fourth Amendment. In this case, where federal agents had probable cause to search a hotel room but did not obtain a warrant, the Court declared the search was "unreasonable."

Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. ___ (2021), was a United States Supreme Court case based on what constitutes a "seizure" in the context of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, in the immediate case, in the situation where law enforcement had attempted to use physical force to stop a suspect but failed to do so. The Court ruled in a 5–3 decision that the use of physical force with the intent to restrain a person, even if that fails to restrain the person, is considered a seizure.

References

  1. 1 2 California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 629 (1991).
  2. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 624, 627-29.
  3. 1 2 California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 622.
  4. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 622-23.
  5. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 623.
  6. California v. Hodari D., 498 U.S. 807 (1990) (granting certiorari).
  7. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 624 (citing 2 N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language 67 (1828); 2 J. Bouvier, A Law Dictionary 510 (6th ed. 1856); Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2057 (1981)).
  8. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 624 (1991).
  9. 1 2 California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 625-27.
  10. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 624, 629.
  11. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 629-30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
  12. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 630 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
  13. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 635-43 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

Further reading