Dunaway v. New York | |
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Argued March 21, 1979 Decided June 5, 1979 | |
Full case name | Irving Jerome Dunaway v. State of New York |
Citations | 442 U.S. 200 ( more ) 99 S. Ct. 224; 860 L. Ed. 2d 824 |
Case history | |
Prior | People v. Dunaway, 42 A.D.2d 689, 346 N.Y.S.2d 779 (1973); aff'd, 35 N.Y.2d 741, 320 N.E.2d 646 (1974); vacated sub nom. Dunaway v. New York, 422 U.S. 1053, 95 S. Ct. 2674, 45 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1975); on remand 38 N.Y.2d 812, 813, 345 N.E.2d 583, 583 (1975); appeal after remand, 61 A.D.2d 299, 402 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1978). |
Holding | |
(1) Defendant was “seized” for Fourth Amendment purposes when he was arrested and taken to the police station for questioning; (2) Seizure without probable cause violated the Fourth Amendment, and (3) Confession given following the seizure and interrogation was inadmissible. | |
Court membership | |
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Case opinions | |
Majority | Brennan, joined by Stewart, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens |
Concurrence | White |
Concurrence | Stevens |
Dissent | Rehnquist, joined by Burger |
Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. |
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979), was a United States Supreme Court case that held a subsequent Miranda warning is not sufficient to cure the taint of an unlawful arrest, when the unlawful arrest led to a coerced confession.
Dunaway was picked up by Rochester police and taken to the police station for questioning in regards to an attempted robbery and homicide at a pizza parlor. The police did not have probable cause to arrest Dunaway, but had he tried to leave, they would have used force to prevent it. Dunaway was read his rights under Miranda and subsequently confessed. [1]
Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. He stated that the police violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments when they arrested Dunaway without probable cause and took him to the police station for interrogation. This type of detention was determined to intrude on interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. It is therefore necessary to safeguard against illegal arrest. Proper Miranda warnings did not attenuate the misconduct of the police and the confession should have been suppressed. [1]
In the United States, the Miranda warning is a type of notification customarily given by police to criminal suspects in police custody advising them of their right to silence and, in effect, protection from self-incrimination; that is, their right to refuse to answer questions or provide information to law enforcement or other officials. Named for the U.S. Supreme Court's 1966 decision Miranda v. Arizona, these rights are often referred to as Miranda rights. The purpose of such notification is to preserve the admissibility of their statements made during custodial interrogation in later criminal proceedings. The idea came from law professor Yale Kamisar, who subsequently was dubbed "the father of Miranda."
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is part of the Bill of Rights. It prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures and sets requirements for issuing warrants: warrants must be issued by a judge or magistrate, justified by probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
In United States criminal law, probable cause is the legal standard by which police authorities have reason to obtain a warrant for the arrest of a suspected criminal and for a court's issuing of a search warrant. One definition of the standard derives from the U.S. Supreme Court decision in the case of Beck v. Ohio (1964), that probable cause exists when “whether at [the moment of arrest] the facts and circumstances within [the] knowledge [of the police], and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information, [are] sufficient to warrant a prudent [person] in believing that [a suspect] had committed or was committing an offense.”
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), was a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in which the Court ruled that law enforcement in the United States must warn a person of their constitutional rights before interrogating them, or else the person's statements cannot be used as evidence at their trial. Specifically, the Court held that under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the government cannot use a person's statements made in response to an interrogation while in police custody as evidence at the person's criminal trial unless they can show that the person was informed of the right to consult with a lawyer before and during questioning, and of the right against self-incrimination before police questioning, and that the defendant not only understood these rights but also voluntarily waived them before answering questions.
Ernesto Arturo Miranda was an American laborer whose criminal conviction was set aside in the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case Miranda v. Arizona, which ruled that criminal suspects must be informed of their right against self-incrimination and their right to consult with an attorney before being questioned by police. This warning is known as a Miranda warning. Miranda had been convicted of kidnapping, rape, and armed robbery charges based on his confession under police interrogation.
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In the United States, the exclusionary rule is a legal rule, based on constitutional law, that prevents evidence collected or analyzed in violation of the defendant's constitutional rights from being used in a court of law. This may be considered an example of a prophylactic rule formulated by the judiciary in order to protect a constitutional right. The exclusionary rule may also, in some circumstances at least, be considered to follow directly from the constitutional language, such as the Fifth Amendment's command that no person "shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself" and that no person "shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law."
In criminal law, self-incrimination is the act of making a statement that exposes oneself to an accusation of criminal liability or prosecution. Self-incrimination can occur either directly or indirectly: directly, by means of interrogation where information of a self-incriminatory nature is disclosed; or indirectly, when information of a self-incriminatory nature is disclosed voluntarily without pressure from another person.
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Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004), is a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States that struck down the police practice of first obtaining an inadmissible confession without giving Miranda warnings, then issuing the warnings, and then obtaining a second confession. Justice David Souter announced the judgment of the Court and wrote for a plurality of four justices that the second confession was admissible only if the intermediate Miranda warnings were "effective enough to accomplish their object." Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote in a concurring opinion that the second confession should be inadmissible only if "the two-step interrogation technique was used in a calculated way to undermine the Miranda warning."
United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004), was a United States Supreme Court case relating to Miranda warnings.
Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003), was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court unanimously upheld the arrest of three passengers in an automobile where drugs were found. The case regards the reasonableness of the arrest of a passenger in an automobile.
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), is a United States Supreme Court decision excluding the presentation of verbal evidence and recovered narcotics where they were both fruits of an illegal entry. Narcotics agents unlawfully entered Toy's laundry at which point Toy indicated that Jonny was selling narcotics. The drug agents then went to Jonny and found the narcotics. Jonny made a deal to give up his supplier, Wong Sun. The agents then arrested Wong Sun. All were arraigned and released on their own recognizance. Several days later, Wong Sun voluntarily returned to the police station to make a statement, during the process of which he confessed.
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010), is a landmark decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court considered the position of a suspect who understands their right to remain silent under Miranda v. Arizona and is aware that they have the right to remain silent, but does not explicitly invoke or waive the right.
Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court upheld a murder conviction notwithstanding a challenge that the evidence upon which guilt was based was obtained in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. The court held that in view of the station-house detention upon probable cause, the very limited intrusion of scraping the defendant's fingernails for blood and other material, undertaken to preserve highly evanescent evidence, did not violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments.
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), was a United States Supreme Court case that determined "seizure" occurs when an officer uses displays of authority to detain a person.
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976), was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States that decided that a warrantless arrest in public and consenting to a vehicle search did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002), was a case in which the United States Supreme Court clarified the applicability of Fourth Amendment protections to searches and seizures that occur on buses, as well as the function of consent during searches by law enforcement. During a scheduled stop in Tallahassee, Florida, police officers boarded a Greyhound bus as part of a drug interdiction effort and interviewed passengers. After talking to two of the passengers and asking if they could "check [their] person", officers discovered the two passengers had taped several packages of cocaine to their legs. At trial, the passengers argued that officers violated their Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable searches and seizures because the police engaged in coercive behavior and never informed them that their participation in the drug interdiction efforts was voluntary.
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United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675 (1985), was a legal case in which the Supreme Court of the United States clarified how long police are permitted to stop vehicles as part of an investigatory stop before it violates the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.