Dunaway v. New York

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Dunaway v. New York
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Argued March 21, 1979
Decided June 5, 1979
Full case nameIrving Jerome Dunaway v. State of New York
Citations442 U.S. 200 ( more )
99 S. Ct. 224; 860 L. Ed. 2d 824
Case history
PriorPeople v. Dunaway, 42 A.D.2d 689, 346 N.Y.S.2d 779 (1973); aff'd, 35 N.Y.2d 741, 320 N.E.2d 646 (1974); vacated sub nom. Dunaway v. New York, 422 U.S. 1053, 95 S. Ct. 2674, 45 L. Ed. 2d 705 (1975); on remand 38 N.Y.2d 812, 813, 345 N.E.2d 583, 583 (1975); appeal after remand, 61 A.D.2d 299, 402 N.Y.S.2d 490 (1978).
Holding
(1) Defendant was “seized” for Fourth Amendment purposes when he was arrested and taken to the police station for questioning; (2) Seizure without probable cause violated the Fourth Amendment, and (3) Confession given following the seizure and interrogation was inadmissible.
Court membership
Chief Justice
Warren E. Burger
Associate Justices
William J. Brennan Jr.  · Potter Stewart
Byron White  · Thurgood Marshall
Harry Blackmun  · Lewis F. Powell Jr.
William Rehnquist  · John P. Stevens
Case opinions
MajorityBrennan, joined by Stewart, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens
ConcurrenceWhite
ConcurrenceStevens
DissentRehnquist, joined by Burger
Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.

Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979), was a United States Supreme Court case that held a subsequent Miranda warning is not sufficient to cure the taint of an unlawful arrest, when the unlawful arrest led to a coerced confession.

Contents

Background

Dunaway was picked up by Rochester police and taken to the police station for questioning in regards to an attempted robbery and homicide at a pizza parlor. The police did not have probable cause to arrest Dunaway, but had he tried to leave, they would have used force to prevent it. Dunaway was read his rights under Miranda and subsequently confessed. [1]

Supreme Court

Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court. He stated that the police violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments when they arrested Dunaway without probable cause and took him to the police station for interrogation. This type of detention was determined to intrude on interests protected by the Fourth Amendment. It is therefore necessary to safeguard against illegal arrest. Proper Miranda warnings did not attenuate the misconduct of the police and the confession should have been suppressed. [1]

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References

  1. 1 2 Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979).