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United States v. Cortez | |
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Argued December 1, 1980 Decided January 21, 1981 | |
Full case name | United States v. Jesus E. Cortez and Pedro Hernandez-Loera |
Citations | 449 U.S. 411 ( more ) 101 S. Ct. 690; 66 L. Ed. 2d 621 |
Case history | |
Prior | United States v. Cortez, 595 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1979); cert. granted, 447 U.S. 904(1980) |
Subsequent | Convictions affirmed on remand, 653 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1979); cert. denied, 455 U.S. 923(1982); rehearing denied, 455 U.S. 1008(1982) |
Holding | |
The objective facts and circumstantial evidence justified the investigative stop of respondents' vehicle. | |
Court membership | |
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Case opinions | |
Majority | Burger, joined by Brennan, White, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, Stevens |
Concurrence | Stewart |
Concurrence | Marshall |
Laws applied | |
U.S. Const. Amend. IV |
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981), was a United States Supreme Court decision clarifying the reasonable suspicion standard for the investigative stop of a vehicle. [1]
Border Patrol officers were monitoring a remote section of the southern Arizona desert known to be a common point for illegal border crossings. The officers repeatedly found human footprints in the sand that indicated that groups of 8 to 20 persons had walked north from the Mexican border to Arizona State Route 86. This pattern of footprints appeared numerous times, always on weekend nights under clear skies. There was also a shoe print with a chevron shape that consistently reappeared, leading the officers to nickname the suspected guide "Chevron."
In late January 1977, Border Patrol officers noticed it had been two weeks since the footprints were last seen, and, moreover, it had rained on Friday and Saturday, meaning that Sunday, January 30/31 would be a likely night for "Chevron" to lead another crossing. The Border Patrol officers waited a few miles from where the footprints usually met the state highway. The officers waited from 2 am to 6 am. In this desolate area, only around 15 vehicles passed by, and only two were large enough to fit a large number of passengers. Of these vehicles, a pickup truck with a camper shell passed the officers at 4:30 am going westbound. Then, at 6:12 am, the same vehicle passed the officers again going eastbound. The officers then stopped the vehicle. They found six unauthorized immigrants in the back of the camper, and arrested Jesus Cortez, the vehicle's driver.
The Ninth Circuit ruled that the officers did not have a sufficient basis to justify the stop. [2] The Court of Appeals relied on United States v. Brignoni-Ponce , [3] ruling that the officers "did not have a valid basis for singling out the Cortez vehicle" and had violated Cortez's Fourth Amendment rights. [4]
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Ninth Circuit, ruling that the Border Patrol had reasonable suspicion to stop Cortez's vehicle. Chief Justice Burger emphasized that reasonable suspicion must be based on the "totality of the circumstances," and does not depend on "hard certainties, but ... probabilities." [5] Officers who stop a vehicle must have a "particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped," but are allowed to use their experience and training to "draw inferences and make deductions." [5]
The Court found that the officers in this case made "permissible deductions" from the known facts and had a "legitimate basis for suspicion." [6] Based on their familiarity with the area and on their two-month period of observation, the officers concluded that "Chevron" had a regular pattern of operations. Based on this pattern, it is "not surprising that when [the officers] stopped the vehicle on its return trip it contained 'Chevron' and several illegal aliens." [7] The Chief Justice praised the officers' work, writing, "We see here the kind of police work often suggested by judges and scholars as examples of appropriate and reasonable means of law enforcement." [6]
In a concurrence, Justice Stewart highlighted the facts of the case, writing, "this nocturnal round trip into desolate desert terrain" was "in any event ... puzzling," but "coming when and as it did, surely the most likely explanation for it was that Chevron was again shepherding aliens." [8]
Justice Marshall concurred without opinion.
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United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the Fourth Amendment prevented Border Patrol officers from conducting warrantless, suspicionless searches of private vehicles removed from the border or its functional equivalent.
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975), was the case in which the Supreme Court determined it was a violation of the Fourth Amendment for a roving patrol car to stop a vehicle solely on the basis of the driver appearing to be of Mexican descent. A roving patrol car must have articulable facts that allow for an officer to have a reasonable suspicion that the person is carrying illegal aliens beyond their ethnicity. The Court handed down a 9-0 decision that affirmed the Circuit Court's ruling in the case.
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), was a decision of the United States Supreme Court that allowed the United States Border Patrol to set up permanent or fixed checkpoints on public highways leading to or away from the Mexican border and that the checkpoints are not a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), was a United States Supreme Court case holding that the warrantless search of an automobile by the United States Border Patrol without a warrant or probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment. The vehicle was stopped and searched for illegal aliens twenty-five miles (40 km) from the Mexican border. The Court approached the search from four views: automobile search, administrative inspection, heavily regulated industry inspection, and border search. As to the validity of the search under the automobile exception, the Court found no justification for the search under the Carroll doctrine because there was no probable cause. As to the validity of the search under various administrative inspection doctrines, the Court found that the officers lacked an area warrant. As to the validity of the heavily regulated industry inspection, the Court found that the doctrine is not applicable to traveling on a state highway. As to the validity of a border search, the Court found that the site of the stop and the entirety of the road on which the stop occurred was too far from the border to be considered a border search.
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