Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. | |
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Argued December 3, 1985 Decided June 25, 1986 | |
Full case name | Jack Anderson, et al. v. Liberty Lobby, Incorporated, et al. |
Citations | 477 U.S. 242 ( more ) 106 S. Ct. 2505; 91 L. Ed. 2d 202; 1986 U.S. LEXIS 115; 54 U.S.L.W. 4755; 4 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (Callaghan) 1041; 12 Media L. Rep. 2297 |
Holding | |
Summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is "genuine," that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. | |
Court membership | |
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Case opinions | |
Majority | White, joined by Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, Stevens, O'Connor |
Dissent | Brennan |
Dissent | Rehnquist, joined by Burger |
Laws applied | |
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure |
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986), is a United States Supreme Court case articulating the standard for a trial court to grant summary judgment. Summary judgment will lie when, taking all factual inferences in the non-movant's favor, there exists no genuine issue as to a material fact and the movant deserves judgment as a matter of law. Because courts almost always cite Liberty Lobby in their opinions for the standard regarding motions for summary judgment, Liberty Lobby is the most cited Supreme Court case. [1]
The Investigator, an investigative news magazine, published three articles about the Liberty Lobby, calling the organization and its founder Willis Carto antisemitic, racist and Fascist. Liberty Lobby and Carto sued Investigator Publishing and its publisher, journalist Jack Anderson for libel. The defendants moved for summary judgment under the standard set by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan , which requires a plaintiff to prove with clear and convincing evidence that a defamatory statement was made with actual malice. The District Court ruled that The Investigator had duly researched its statements and granted the motion. Summary judgment was reversed on appeal with respect to some of the alleged defamatory statements, with the Court of Appeals stating that evidence need not be clear and convincing for the purpose of summary judgment.
A majority of the Supreme Court held that when a "clear and convincing" standard applies, it applies as well to summary judgment. It vacated the Court of Appeals' ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. Justices Rehnquist, Burger and (separately) Brennan dissented on the grounds that the Court's reasoning was too abstract to provide the necessary guidance to lower courts.
In a legal dispute, one party has the burden of proof to show that they are correct, while the other party had no such burden and is presumed to be correct. The burden of proof requires a party to produce evidence to establish the truth of facts needed to satisfy all the required legal elements of the dispute.
In law, a summary judgment is a judgment entered by a court for one party and against another party summarily, i.e., without a full trial. Summary judgments may be issued on the merits of an entire case, or on discrete issues in that case. The formulation of the summary judgment standard is stated in somewhat different ways by courts in different jurisdictions. In the United States, the presiding judge generally must find there is "no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." In England and Wales, the court rules for a party without a full trial when "the claim, defence or issue has no real prospect of success and there is no other compelling reason why the case or issue should be disposed of at a trial."
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