Approval ballot

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An approval ballot, [1] also called an unordered ballot, [2] is a ballot in which a voter may vote for any number of candidates simultaneously, rather than for just one candidate. Candidates that are selected in a voter's ballot are said to be approved by the voter; the other candidates are said to be disapproved or rejected. Approval ballots do not let the voters specify a preference-order among the candidates they approve; hence the name unordered. This is in contrast to ranked ballots, which are ordered. There are several electoral systems that use approval balloting; they differ in the way in which the election outcome is determined:

Contents

Approval ballots let the voters express dichotomous preferences.

Description

On an approval ballot, the voter can select any number of candidates. Approval ballot.svg
On an approval ballot, the voter can select any number of candidates.

Approval voting ballots show a list of the candidates running for that seat for each office being contested. Next to each name is a checkbox (or another similar way to mark "Yes" or "No" for that candidate).

Each candidate may be treated as a separate question: "Do you approve of this person for the job?" Approval voting lets each voter indicate support for one, some, or all candidates.

Each ballot separates candidates into two groups: those supported and those that are not. Each candidate approved is considered preferred to any candidate not approved, while the voter's preferences among approved candidates is unspecified, and likewise, the voter's preferences among unapproved candidates is also unspecified.

Ballot types

Approval ballots can be of at least four semi-distinct forms. The simplest form is a blank ballot on which voters hand-write the names of the candidates they support. A more structured ballot lists all candidates, and voters mark each candidate they support. A more explicit structured ballot can list the candidates and provide two choices by each. (Candidate list ballots can include spaces for write-in candidates as well.)

Approvalballotname.png Approvalballotword.png Approvalballotmark.png Approvalballotchoice.png

All four ballots are theoretically equivalent. The more structured ballots may aid voters in offering clear votes so they explicitly know all their choices. The Yes/No format can help to detect an "undervote" when a candidate is left unmarked and allow the voter a second chance to confirm the ballot markings are correct. The "single bubble" format is incapable of producing invalid ballots (which might otherwise be rejected in counting).

Unless the second or fourth format is used, fraudulently adding votes to an approval voting ballot does not invalidate the ballot (that is, it does not make it appear inconsistent). Thus, approval voting raises the importance of ensuring that the "chain of custody" of ballots is secure.

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Proportional approval voting (PAV) is a proportional electoral system for selecting committees. It is an extension of the D'Hondt method of apportionment that additionally allows for personal votes. The voters vote via approval ballots where each voter marks those candidates that the voter finds acceptable.

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In the fields of mechanism design and social choice theory, Gibbard's theorem is a result proven by philosopher Allan Gibbard in 1973. It states that for any deterministic process of collective decision, at least one of the following three properties must hold:

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  3. The process is open to strategic voting: once an agent has identified their preferences, it is possible that they have no action at their disposal that best defends these preferences irrespective of the other agents' actions.

Combined approval voting (CAV) is an electoral system where each voter may express approval, disapproval, or indifference toward each candidate. The winner is the most-approved candidate.

STAR voting Single-winner electoral system

STAR voting is an electoral system for single-seat elections. Variations also exist for multi-winner and proportional representation elections. The name stands for "Score then Automatic Runoff", referring to the fact that this system is a combination of score voting, to pick two finalists with the highest total scores, followed by a "virtual runoff" in which the finalist who is preferred on more ballots wins. It is a type of cardinal voting electoral system.

Multiwinner approval voting, also called approval-based committee voting, is a multi-winner electoral system that uses approval ballots. Each voter may select ("approve") any number of candidates, and multiple candidates are elected. The number of elected candidates is usually fixed in advance. For example, it can be the number of seats in a country's parliament, or the required number of members in a committee.

Phragmén's voting rules are multiwinner voting methods that guarantee proportional representation. They were published by Lars Edvard Phragmén in French and Swedish between 1893 and 1899, and translated to English by Svante Janson in 2016. There are two kinds of Phragmén rules: rules using approval ballots, and rules using ranked ballots.

References

  1. Duddy, Conal (2014-07-01). "Electing a representative committee by approval ballot: An impossibility result". Economics Letters. 124 (1): 14–16. doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2014.04.009. ISSN   0165-1765.
  2. Janson, Svante (2018-10-12). "Phragmen's and Thiele's election methods". arXiv: 1611.08826 [math.HO].