Barbara Koremenos

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Barbara Koremenos is an American Professor of Political Science at the University of Michigan. She is known for her research in the field of international relations, in particular on international organizations and international agreements. [1] [2] [3] [4] Her work on the application of rational choice institutionalism to the design of international organizations is among the most assigned work in international relations graduate training in United States universities. [5]

She has a PhD in Political Science from the University of Chicago. [1]

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References

  1. 1 2 "Barbara Koremenos | U-M LSA Political Science". lsa.umich.edu. Retrieved 2021-01-03.
  2. Westerwinter, Oliver (2017-12-01). "Barbara Koremenos. 2016. The continent of international law. Explaining agreement design. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press)". The Review of International Organizations. 12 (4): 647–651. doi:10.1007/s11558-017-9274-3. ISSN   1559-744X. S2CID   157895115.
  3. Copelovitch, Mark S.; Putnam, Tonya L. (2014). "Design in Context: Existing International Agreements and New Cooperation". International Organization. 68 (2): 471–493. doi:10.1017/S0020818313000441. ISSN   0020-8183. S2CID   55443909.
  4. Sandholtz, Wayne (2017). "International Norm Change". Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. doi:10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.588. ISBN   9780190228637.
  5. Colgan, Jeff D. (2016-09-01). "Where Is International Relations Going? Evidence from Graduate Training". International Studies Quarterly. 60 (3): 486–498. doi:10.1093/isq/sqv017. ISSN   0020-8833.