Blantyre mining disaster

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12 inch". [14] In addition, the Blantyre explosion was before Trimdon Grange (1882) and the Bedford Colliery Disaster of 1886 and so the shielding of gauzes from direct currents of air had not yet been introduced. [15] Notwithstanding Moore's claims for the Scottish safety lamp, the report's conclusions call for the banning of naked lights and the introduction of locked Davy lamps which "are better than the present safety lamps". [1]

The report also roundly criticises poor discipline (including shots being fired by unauthorised workers), poor ventilation around old or incomplete stoops and the whole method of ventilating one pit from another. The report does not come to a firm conclusion about how the explosion started. [1]

Aftermath

It is reported that, six months after the accident, Dixon's raised summonses against 34 widows whose husbands had been killed and who had not left the tied cottages which they and their husbands had rented from the mining company. They were evicted two weeks later, on 28 May 1878. [7] [16]

Further incidents

1878 lift crash

On 5 March 1878 at No. 3 Pit, six men were killed when the cage they were in was drawn up past the top of the pit and 32 feet (9.8 m) into the pithead wheels. The cage was wrecked and overturned, throwing six men to the bottom of the 900 ft (270 m) shaft. A seventh man (James Gerrity) managed to hold on until he was assisted down and, apart from being shaken, was unhurt. [8]

At the time of the accident, Mr J T Robson (Assistant Government Inspector for the district) and Mr Robert Robson (his assistant) were in the colliery office with Mr Watson, the manager. Robert Robson descended number 2 pit and went to the bottom of the number 3 shaft to supervise the recovery of the bodies from a flooded sump. Meanwhile, several men descended number 3 pit in a "kettle" to examine the shaft for damage. The shaft itself being undamaged, the bodies were recovered that way. [8]

The engine keeper, Arthur Cleland, stated that "something had gone wrong" with the indicator to the colliery engineer, James Patterson, was in the vicinity at the time of the accident. Patterson examined the indicator which showed the cage's position and found it registered 40 fathoms (240 ft; 73 m) from the pit head, about a quarter of the shaft's total depth. Cleland was advised to stay but left shortly afterwards. After going home to clean up and change Cleland was observed heading across the fields towards Glasgow but was overtaken by a policeman and arrested. After helping down Gerrity, Patterson had returned to the engine house and seen that the indicator now showed 7 fathoms (42 ft; 13 m) although the cage had not moved in the meantime. [8]

Cleland was charged with culpable homicide and tried at the High Court in Glasgow on 24 April. At the trial Patterson said that when he touched the indicator it was "very loose. He had never noticed it so loose before". Two engineers called for the defence at the trial also criticised the method of attaching the indicator as "not proper" and "not ... to be the best mode known to engineers". Michael Flanagan, a furnaceman at the pithead, reported that Cleland said "the indicator was wrong" and Flanagan observed that the indicator was further down than it should have been. The manager, Watson, admitted under cross-examination that it was the duty of the oversman to examine the indicator but he did not do so. Most witnesses also gave Cleland a good character reference. After a short retirement, the jury returned a verdict of not proven. [8]

1879 explosion

The 1879 disaster occurred in the ell coal, the shallowest of the three seams. The coal was worked from number 1 pit which was the downcast. There was a "blind pit" down to the main coal, which was no longer being worked, and a communication mine down to the splint coal at the foot of pit number 3. Air came down number 1 pit and the current was split to ventilate the north and south workings respectively. The south current passed along the south level for 770 yards (700 m) to the southern extremity. It passed through the longwall workings there and returned via the older stoop and room workings before joining the north current return and passing up the upcast, number 5 pit. The inspectors report concluded "1 That the arrangements for the ventillation of this pit were sufficient, and that the quantity of air sent in was ample under ordinary conditions". [2]

Although the owners banned the men from opening lamps or from taking smoking materials below ground, several prosecutions had occurred for breaches of the rules. The last such was the day before the explosion when a miner was fined £2 (equivalent to £257in 2023 [f] ) for opening his lamp. [2]

The explosion was first noticed on the surface as a "sharp retort" at 21:00 on Wednesday 2 July 1879. Once John White, the oversman, had been summoned an attempt was made to lower the cage, but it stuck. White then descended number 3 pit and found that the men there were unaware of the explosion. He, a group of men, and shortly afterwards Mr Watson (the manager) proceeded up the communication mine into number 1 pit's workings. Parties descended the blind pit into the main coal and other parties searched the north workings and both reported all was well. Exploration of the south workings was stopped by falls and afterdamp. Various attempts were made to recover the bodies during the Thursday, but it was 04:00 on Friday before the whole workings could be reached and recovery completed. [2]

Not all the safety lamps were found; however, one was found that was unlocked. Smoking materials including matches were found in the clothes of the deceased, one man was found with a half full pipe in his hand. Several men had unofficial (and therefore illegal) lamp-keys on them. In the immediate vicinity of the seat of the explosion little burning was seen, the supposition was that a firedamp explosion had raised dust in the passageways and the coal dust had exploded. The official investigation tentatively suggested that shot firing had displaced the gas towards the area where men were smoking and that a naked flame there triggered off the explosion. [2]

Legacy

Memorial

A memorial window at St Joseph's, Blantyre St Joseph Blantyre 1.jpg
A memorial window at St Joseph's, Blantyre

The mine owner erected a 5.5-metre-tall granite monument to mark the two explosion disasters. An engraved dedication reads: "William Dixon Ltd—in memory of 240 of their workmen who were killed by explosions in Blantyre Colliery on 22 October 1877 and 2 July 1879 and many of whom are buried here". [17] There is also a memorial to the Catholic miners killed in the disaster of October 1877 which is located in Dalbeath Cemetery, London Road, Glasgow. In addition a memorial commemorating the centenary is located at Blantyre Cross, Blantyre. [18] An incomplete list of the deaths is given in Veverka 2015.

Music

Irish folk artist Christy Moore recorded a song called "Blantyre Explosion". It appears on his 1985 album Ordinary Man . It had previously been recorded by Ewan MacColl and Dick Gaughan. The exact origin of the song is unknown, but it is thought to have been collected by A. L. Lloyd from an unnamed local singer. The text first appears in LLoyd's 1951 book "coaldust ballads". [19]

See also

Notes

  1. 5 or more killed, the definition used by the Durham Mining Museum.
  2. Ventillation of mines was not done by using piped air, instead one or more pits were downcast where air was drawn down into the mine and one or more upcast where air was expelled. Men and materials commonly travelled in downcast pits as the air in upcast pits was hot and foul.
  3. Firemen: miners who in earlier times looked for firedamp and set fire to it in a controlled manner. By 1877 their duties only extended to testing for firedamp.
  4. Miners have traditionally referred to various gases as damps. The most common damps are: firedamp – mainly methane, blackdamp or chokedamp – nitrogen and carbon dioxide with no oxygen, whitedamp carbon monoxide rich air from the incomplete combustion of coal or firedamp, stinkdamp hydrogen sulphide and other damps and afterdamp – the gas formed by an explosion. Afterdamp is particularly feared, it contains varying proportions of blackdamp and whitedamp and is therefore suffocating, toxic, or explosive, or any combination of these.
  5. A brattice is a partition (usually of timber, but in an emergency possibly of cloth) which seals off air flow
  6. UK Retail Price Index inflation figures are based on data from Clark, Gregory (2017). "The Annual RPI and Average Earnings for Britain, 1209 to Present (New Series)". MeasuringWorth . Retrieved 7 May 2024.

References

  1. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 Moore, Wales & Willis 1877.
  2. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Alexander & Moore 1879.
  3. Anderson 2014.
  4. South Lanarkshire Council.
  5. Hutton, Guthrie (2022). The Scottish Coal Industry. Catrine: Stenlake Publishing Ltd. p. 30. ISBN   978-1-84033-928-4.
  6. Blantyre 1877.
  7. 1 2 3 Anon.
  8. 1 2 3 4 5 Blantyre 1878.
  9. Blantyre Parish 2014, Accidents pages: to 1880, 1881 to 1914 and post 1914.
  10. Jones 1880, plan facing page 229.
  11. The Scotsman 2006.
  12. Jones 1880, p. 230.
  13. Jones 1880.
  14. Lupton 1893, section: Davy Lamps.
  15. Lupton 1893, section: Shielded Lamps.
  16. Sim 2017.
  17. Wright 1885.
  18. Sim 2015.
  19. Raven 1978, p. 94.

Bibliography

55°47′05″N04°06′23″W / 55.78472°N 4.10639°W / 55.78472; -4.10639

Blantyre mining disaster
1877 disaster
Date22 October 1877 (1877-10-22)
Time09:30
LocationBlantyre, Scotland
TypeCoal mine disaster
CauseFiredamp explosion caused by either a naked flame or a modified Davy lamp
Deaths207
InquiriesReport by the Inspectors of Mines to both houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty [1]
OS grid reference NS 68269 56240