Breard v. City of Alexandria

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Breard v. City of Alexandria
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Argued March 7–8, 1951
Decided June 4, 1951
Full case nameJack H. Breard v. City of Alexandria, LA
Citations341 U.S. 622 ( more )
71 S. Ct. 920; 95 L. Ed. 2d 1233
Court membership
Chief Justice
Fred M. Vinson
Associate Justices
Hugo Black  · Stanley F. Reed
Felix Frankfurter  · William O. Douglas
Robert H. Jackson  · Harold H. Burton
Tom C. Clark  · Sherman Minton
Case opinions
MajorityReed, joined by Frankfurter, Jackson, Burton, Clark, Minton
DissentVinson, joined by Douglas
DissentBlack, joined by Douglas
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amend. I

Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951), was a United States Supreme Court case, which held that door-to-door solicitation could be restricted without violating the Due Process Clause, the First Amendment or the Commerce Clause.

Contents

Background

Jack H. Breard was a regional representative for Keystone Readers Services, Inc. Breard was arrested for going door-to-door in the City of Alexandria, Louisiana soliciting magazine subscriptions. Breard was arrested for violating an ordinance that required him to get permission from the owners of the residences where he was soliciting.

Opinion of the Court

The case went all the way to the Supreme Court, which ruled the Breard's First Amendment Rights were not violated and that door-to-door solicitation could be restricted without unduly interfering with interstate commerce, and without violating Due Process. [1]

Justice Reed's majority opinion said that the state police power to regulate soliciting does not unreasonably burden or conflict with the due process freedom to engage in legitimate business: "The problem is legislative where there are reasonable bases for legislative action".

In a dissenting opinion, Justice Black held that the decision went against recent doctrine. Vinson and Douglas wrote another dissenting opinion, calling the ordinance "flat prohibition" and arguing that it discriminated against interstate commerce because it made an exception for local farm products. [2]

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References

  1. Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
  2. "Review of Recent Supreme Court Decisions". American Bar Association Journal . 37: 920. 1951.