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Coalition Provisional Authority Order 1: De-Ba'athification of Iraqi Society is the first of the 100 Orders imposed by the Coalition Provisional Authority during the Iraq War. Entering into force on 16 May 2003, it describes the objectives of the de-Ba'athification policy developed by the US Office of Special Plans.
The Order is justified in the preamble lines:
Specifically, the order states that all members of the Ba'ath Party, from senior leadership to ‘Udw (Member) are "removed from their positions and banned from future employment in the public sector." The order demonstrates its broad sweep of society by stating:
The broad language of the order ensured that the broad approach favored by the Department of Defense would be the actual policy implemented under the CPA and delegated bodies. As a balance to the severity of the policy, the final clause of the Order states that the Administrator Paul Bremer can grant exceptions to the policy laid out in the Order. [1]
Entering into force on 3 June 2003, the Memorandum entitled "Implementation of De-Ba'athification Order No. 1" describes the process by which the objectives described in Order No. 1 and Order No. 5 are to be carried out. The memo envisions a two phase process by which the policy is carried out. Initially, the Multi-National Force – Iraq ("Coalition Forces"), being the most capable institution in Iraq, were charged with ferreting out Ba'athists, and convening Accreditation Review Committees in order to fully investigate and vet possible party members. The second phase was contingent on the first phase’s success. In the second phase, enough Iraqi members of government have been deemed to not be affiliated with the Ba'ath Party and the Iraqi government is competent enough, the implementation of de-Ba'athification will go from being solely a CPA and Coalition Forces duty to the duty of the Iraqi government and the Iraqi De-Ba'athification Council, established by Order No. 5.
Section two of the memo describes the process of determining if individuals have party affiliations. The memo provides for investigators to be placed within government ministries to conduct investigations into individuals using:
Once the investigator determined an individual’s affiliation and deemed them subject to Order No. 1, they were to be informed of their right to appeal. If an exception was requested, then the investigator was to determine the eligibility of the individual and prepare a case if necessary.
The overall goal of the memorandum was to provide a structure for determining Ba'ath Party membership. Additionally, Iraqis were encouraged to be part of the de-Ba'athification process, and Coalition Forces initially charged with the policy were encouraged to consult with Iraqis. If an individual received an appeals hearing, he or she could avoid the punishments under Order No. 1 by proving the following:
Such information was supposed to be considered in an individual’s appeal, but did not guarantee an exception, and the Administrator possessed the authority to overturn any ruling handed down by the Accreditation Review Committees. [2]
The Coalition Provisional Authority was a transitional government of Iraq established following the invasion of the country on 19 March 2003 by the U.S.-led Multinational Force and the fall of Ba'athist Iraq.
Lewis Paul Bremer III is an American diplomat. He led the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) following the 2003 invasion of Iraq by the United States, from May 2003 until June 2004.
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The Green Zone is the most common name for the International Zone of Baghdad. It was a 10-square-kilometer (3.9 sq mi) area in the Karkh district of central Baghdad, Iraq, that was the governmental center of the Coalition Provisional Authority during the occupation of Iraq after the American-led 2003 invasion and remains the center of the international presence in the city. Its official name beginning under the Iraqi Interim Government was the International Zone, though Green Zone remains the most commonly used term. The contrasting Red Zone refers to parts of Baghdad immediately outside the perimeter, but was also loosely applied to all unsecured areas outside the off-site military posts. Both terms originated as military designations.
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The Central Criminal Court of Iraq, or CCCI, is a criminal court of Iraq. The CCCI is based on an inquisitorial system and consists of two chambers: an investigative court and a criminal court. The court was created by the Coalition Provisional Authority in 2003 to handle cases involving serious crimes such as governmental corruption, terrorism and organized crime that were previously handled by governorate level judges in the ordinary criminal courts. Candidates for the judiciary had to be an Iraqi national of high moral character and reputation, a non-member of the Ba'ath Party, demonstrate a "high level of legal competence", and sign an oath of office.
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No End in Sight is a 2007 American documentary film about the American occupation of Iraq. The directorial debut of Academy Award-winning documentary filmmaker Charles Ferguson, it premiered on January 22, 2007, at the Sundance Film Festival and opened in its first two theaters in the United States on July 27, 2007. By December of that year, it had a theatrical gross of $1.4 million. The film was nominated for Best Documentary Feature at the 80th Academy Awards.
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The 100 Orders are "binding instructions or directives to the Iraqi people that create penal consequences or have a direct bearing on the way Iraqis are regulated, including changes to Iraqi law" created in early 2004 by Paul Bremer under the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq. The orders called for the de-Baathification of Iraq as well as extensive economic changes. Most of the economic changes are focused on transitioning the economy of Iraq from a centrally planned economy to a market economy, as outlined in the contract by BearingPoint:
De-Ba'athification refers to a policy undertaken in Iraq by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and subsequent Iraqi governments to remove the Ba'ath Party's influence in the new Iraqi political system after the U.S.-led invasion in 2003. It was considered by the CPA to be Iraq's equivalent to Germany's denazification after World War II. It was first outlined in CPA Order 1 which entered into force on 16 May 2003. The order declared that all public sector employees affiliated with the Ba'ath Party were to be removed from their positions and to be banned from any future employment in the public sector.
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The Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party – Iraq Region, officially the Iraqi Regional Branch, is an Iraqi Ba'athist political party founded in 1951 by Fuad al-Rikabi. It was the Iraqi regional branch of the original Ba'ath Party before changing its allegiance to the Iraqi-dominated Ba'ath movement following the 1966 split within the original party. The party was officially banned following the American invasion of Iraq in 2003, but despite this it still continues to function underground.
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