Complicity in genocide

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Complicity in genocide is illegal under international law both for individuals, as part of international criminal law, and state parties to the Genocide Convention. The latter was first held in the Bosnian genocide case (2007) in which the International Court of Justice held Serbia responsible for failure to prevent the Bosnian genocide. [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]

Contents

Responsibility to Protect

This section is an excerpt from Responsibility to protect.[ edit ]

The responsibility to protect (R2P or RtoP) is a global political commitment which was endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly at the 2005 World Summit in order to address its four key concerns to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. [9] [10] The doctrine is regarded as a unanimous and well-established international norm over the past two decades. [11]

The principle of the responsibility to protect is based upon the underlying premise that sovereignty entails a responsibility to protect all populations from mass atrocity crimes and human rights violations. [12] [13] [14] The principle is based on a respect for the norms and principles of international law, especially the underlying principles of law relating to sovereignty, peace and security, human rights, and armed conflict. [15] [16] The R2P has three pillars:

  1. Pillar I: The protection responsibilities of the state – "Each individual state has the responsibility to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity"
  2. Pillar II: International assistance and capacity-building – States pledge to assist each other in their protection responsibilities
  3. Pillar III: Timely and decisive collective response – If any state is "manifestly failing" in its protection responsibilities, then states should take collective action to protect the population. [17] [18]

While there is agreement among states about the responsibility to protect, there is persistent contestation about the applicability of the third pillar in practice. [17] The responsibility to protect provides a framework for employing measures that already exist (i.e., mediation, early warning mechanisms, economic sanctions, and chapter VII powers) to prevent atrocity crimes and to protect civilians from their occurrence. The authority to employ the use of force under the framework of the responsibility to protect rests solely with United Nations Security Council and is considered a measure of last resort. [19]

The responsibility to protect has been the subject of considerable debate, particularly regarding the implementation of the principle by various actors in the context of country-specific situations, such as Libya, Syria, Sudan, Kenya, Ukraine, Venezuela, and Palestine, for example. [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26]

See also

References

  1. ↑ Jørgensen, Nina HB (2011). "Complicity in Genocide and the Duality of Responsibility". In Swart, Bert; Zahar, Alexander; Sluiter, Göran (eds.). The Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Oxford University Press. ISBN   978-0-19-957341-7.
  2. ↑ van der Wilt, Harmen G. (2006). "Genocide, Complicity in Genocide and International v. Domestic Jurisdiction". Journal of International Criminal Justice. 4 (2): 239–257. doi:10.1093/jicj/mql014.
  3. ↑ Greenfield, Daniel (2008). "The Crime of Complicity in Genocide: How the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia Got It Wrong, and Why It Matters". Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology. 98 (3): 921.
  4. ↑ van Sliedregt, Elies (2009). "Complicity to Commit Genocide". In Gaeta, Paola (ed.). The UN Genocide Convention: A Commentary. Oxford University Press. ISBN   978-0-19-957021-8.
  5. ↑ Dawson, Grant; Boynton, Rachel (2008). "Reconciling Complicity in Genocide and Aiding and Abetting Genocide in the Jurisprudence of the United Nations Ad Hoc Tribunals". Harvard Human Rights Journal. 21: 241.
  6. ↑ Eboe-Osuji, C. (2005). "'Complicity in Genocide' versus 'Aiding and Abetting Genocide': Construing the Difference in the ICTR and ICTY Statutes". Journal of International Criminal Justice. 3 (1): 56–81. doi:10.1093/jicj/3.1.56.
  7. ↑ Boas, Gideon; Bischoff, James L.; Reid, Natalie L.; Taylor, B. Don (2008). "Complicity and aiding and abetting". International Criminal Law Practitioner Library: International Criminal Procedure. Cambridge University Press. ISBN   978-0-521-11630-5.
  8. ↑ May, Larry (2010). "Complicity and the Rwandan Genocide". Res Publica. 16 (2): 135–152. doi:10.1007/s11158-010-9112-4. ISSN   1572-8692. S2CID   144322521.
  9. ↑ "Responsibility to Protect – Office of The Special Adviser on The Prevention of Genocide". www.un.org. Archived from the original on 8 February 2017. Retrieved 2016-03-21.
  10. ↑ "About the Responsibility to Protect". www.globalr2p.org. Archived from the original on 2016-03-25. Retrieved 2016-03-21.
  11. ↑ "What is R2P?". Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect. Retrieved 2021-09-01.
  12. ↑ "Mission Statement". United Nations: Office of the special adviser on the prevention of genocide. Retrieved 2012-01-07.
  13. ↑ "Sovereignty as Responsibility". The Brookings Institution. 10 May 2012. Retrieved 2016-03-21.
  14. ↑ "The Responsibility to Protect: Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty" (PDF). ICISS. December 2001. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2016-07-06. Retrieved 2016-03-21.
  15. ↑ http://otago.ourarchive.ac.nz/handle/10523/2279. (Judson 2012).
  16. ↑ Hehir, Aidan (2011), "Chapter 7, The responsibility to protect and international law", in Cunliffe, Philip (ed.), Critical Perspectives on the Responsibility to Protect: Interrogating Theory, Practice, New York, NY: Taylor and Francis e-Library, pp. 84–100, ISBN   978-0-203-83429-9
  17. 1 2 Welsh, Jennifer M (2019). "Norm Robustness and the Responsibility to Protect". Journal of Global Security Studies. 4 (1): 53–72. doi: 10.1093/jogss/ogy045 . hdl: 1814/61795 . ISSN   2057-3170.
  18. ↑ "United Nations Official Document". www.un.org. Retrieved 2016-03-21.
  19. ↑ "Paragraphs 138–139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document" (PDF). GCR2P. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2016-07-06. Retrieved 2016-03-21.
  20. ↑ "Libya and the Responsibility to Protect". Council on Foreign Relations. Archived from the original on 2011-04-14. Retrieved 2016-03-21.
  21. ↑ "R2P down but not out after Libya and Syria". openDemocracy. Retrieved 2016-03-21.
  22. ↑ "Debating the Responsibility to Protect in Libya, Syria". ICRtoP Blog. 6 April 2012. Archived from the original on 2018-09-06. Retrieved 2016-03-21.
  23. ↑ Tutu, Desmond (2008-11-09). "Taking the responsibility to protect". The New York Times. ISSN   0362-4331 . Retrieved 2016-03-21.
  24. ↑ "The 'Responsibility to Protect' at 10". E-International Relations. 29 March 2015. Retrieved 2016-03-21.
  25. ↑ Brockmeier, Sarah; Stuenkel, Oliver; Tourinho, Marcos (2016-01-02). "The Impact of the Libya Intervention Debates on Norms of Protection". Global Society. 30 (1): 113–133. doi: 10.1080/13600826.2015.1094029 . ISSN   1360-0826.
  26. ↑ Rendon; et al. (17 November 2020). "What Does the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Mean for Venezuela?". Center for Strategic and International Studies. Retrieved 18 September 2024.


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