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Danny Escobedo (born c. 1937) was a Chicago petitioner in the Supreme Court case of Escobedo v. Illinois , which established a criminal suspect's right to remain silent and to have an attorney present during questioning. This case was an important precedent to the famous Miranda v. Arizona decision. [1]
Escobedo's brother-in-law Manuel was shot on the night of January 19, 1960, and Escobedo was arrested, without a warrant, at 2:30 a.m. the next day to be questioned. He was released at 5 p.m, that afternoon after Warren Wolfson, his lawyer, obtained a writ of habeas corpus, making no statement to the police. On January 30, Benedict DiGerlando, a man in police custody told the police that Escobedo had shot and killed Manuel. The police then arrested Escobedo, along with his sister, between 8 and 9 p.m. that day. He was then taken to the police headquarters and questioned without letting him speak to or even see his lawyer. During his questioning, Escobedo was tricked into saying he knew that DiGerlando had killed Manuel, making him an accomplice. He was then found guilty of first degree murder and was sentenced to jail for 20 years, with his "confession", which he had later recanted.
Escobedo then petitioned to the Illinois Supreme Court (where the conviction was affirmed) and then to the US Supreme Court. The US Supreme Court agreed to hear it and the case was titled Escobedo v. Illinois . The case was heard on April 29, 1964. Barry L. Kroll argued for Escobedo with Donald M. Haskell, and James R. Thompson argued for Illinois against Escobedo, with Daniel P. Ward and Elmer C. Kissane. Bernard Weisberg argued for the American Civil Liberties Union in favor of Escobedo, with Walter T. Fisher. The case was decided on June 22, 1964.
Justice Arthur Goldberg delivered the opinion of the court, which was in favor of Escobedo. The ruling reversed Escobedo's conviction and stated that "Under the circumstances of this case, where a police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect in police custody who has been refused an opportunity to consult with his counsel and who has not been warned of his constitutional right to keep silent, the accused has been denied the assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments; and no statement extracted by the police during the interrogation may be used against him at a trial."
Escobedo became a drifter after his case was resolved, moving from job to job. He was arrested in 2001, outside Mexico City, Mexico, for federal probation violations and on a warrant issued in Illinois in connection with a 1983 stabbing death. Escobedo had been listed by the US Marshals Service as one of its 15 Most Wanted Fugitives prior to this arrest.
In the United States, the Miranda warning is a type of notification customarily given by police to criminal suspects in police custody advising them of their right to silence and, in effect, protection from self-incrimination; that is, their right to refuse to answer questions or provide information to law enforcement or other officials. Named for the U.S. Supreme Court's 1966 decision Miranda v. Arizona, these rights are often referred to as Miranda rights. The purpose of such notification is to preserve the admissibility of their statements made during custodial interrogation in later criminal proceedings. The idea came from law professor Yale Kamisar, who subsequently was dubbed "the father of Miranda."
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), was a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in which the Court ruled that law enforcement in the United States must warn a person of their constitutional rights before interrogating them, or else the person's statements cannot be used as evidence at their trial. Specifically, the Court held that under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, the government cannot use a person's statements made in response to an interrogation while in police custody as evidence at the person's criminal trial unless they can show that the person was informed of the right to consult with a lawyer before and during questioning, and of the right against self-incrimination before police questioning, and that the defendant not only understood these rights but also voluntarily waived them before answering questions.
Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940), was a landmark United States Supreme Court case that dealt with the extent to which police pressure resulting in a criminal defendant's confession violates the Due Process Clause.
An arrest is the act of apprehending and taking a person into custody, usually because the person has been suspected of or observed committing a crime. After being taken into custody, the person can be questioned further and/or charged. An arrest is a procedure in a criminal justice system, sometimes it is also done after a court warrant for the arrest.
The right to silence is a legal principle which guarantees any individual the right to refuse to answer questions from law enforcement officers or court officials. It is a legal right recognized, explicitly or by convention, in many of the world's legal systems.
Ernesto Arturo Miranda was an American laborer whose criminal conviction on kidnapping, rape, and armed robbery charges based on his confession under police interrogation was set aside in the landmark U.S. Supreme Court case Miranda v. Arizona, which ruled that criminal suspects must be informed of their right against self-incrimination and their right to consult with an attorney before being questioned by police. This warning is known as a Miranda warning.
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), is a United States Supreme Court case holding that criminal suspects have a right to counsel during police interrogations under the Sixth Amendment. The case was decided a year after the court had held in Gideon v. Wainwright that indigent criminal defendants have a right to be provided counsel at trial.
In criminal law, self-incrimination is the act of making a statement that exposes oneself to an accusation of criminal liability or prosecution. Self-incrimination can occur either directly or indirectly: directly, by means of interrogation where information of a self-incriminatory nature is disclosed; or indirectly, when information of a self-incriminatory nature is disclosed voluntarily without pressure from another person.
Within the criminal justice system of Japan, there exist three basic features that characterize its operations. First, the institutions—police, government prosecutors' offices, courts, and correctional organs—maintain close and cooperative relations with each other, consulting frequently on how best to accomplish the shared goals of limiting and controlling crime. Second, citizens are encouraged to assist in maintaining public order, and they participate extensively in crime prevention campaigns, apprehension of suspects, and offender rehabilitation programs. Finally, officials who administer criminal justice are allowed considerable discretion in dealing with offenders.
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000), upheld the requirement that the Miranda warning be read to criminal suspects and struck down a federal statute that purported to overrule Miranda v. Arizona (1966).
Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941), was a case in which the United States Supreme Court upheld the criminal conviction and death sentence imposed upon a man who confessed to murder after being detained for more than 24 hours, slapped and deprived of sleep and food. The petitioner argued that the confession was coerced, and that it violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991), held that the right to counsel secured by the Sixth Amendment and the right to counsel protected by Miranda v. Arizona are separate and distinct, such that invoking one does not implicitly invoke the other.
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits the government from eliciting statements from the defendant about themselves after the point that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches.
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), was the second substantive ruling by the United States Supreme Court regarding the rights of individuals in violation of a probation or parole sentence.
Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that law enforcement officers and other public employees have the right to be free from compulsory self-incrimination. It gave birth to the Garrity warning, which is administered by investigators to suspects in internal and administrative investigations in a similar manner as the Miranda warning is administered to suspects in criminal investigations.
Fellers v. United States, 540 U.S. 519 (2004), is a United States Supreme Court case regarding the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel.
Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969), was a United States Supreme Court case that affirmed the legality of deceptive interrogation tactics by the police.
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010), is a landmark decision by the Supreme Court of the United States in which the Court considered the position of a suspect who understands their right to remain silent under Miranda v. Arizona and is aware that they have the right to remain silent, but does not explicitly invoke or waive the right.
Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990), was a decision by the United States Supreme Court that held that undercover police agents did not need to give Miranda warnings when talking to suspects in jail. Miranda warnings, named after the 1966 Supreme Court case Miranda v. Arizona, are generally required when police interrogate suspects in custody in order to protect the right not to self-incriminate and the right to counsel under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. However, the Court ruled that potential coercion must be evaluated from the suspect's point of view, and if they are unaware that they are speaking to police, they are not under the coercive pressure of a normal interrogation.
Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958), was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States that limited criminal suspects' constitutional right to counsel before trial, refusing to overturn a subsequent conviction without a showing that the refusal of counsel had a coercive or prejudicial effect. This holding was later overturned by Escobedo v. Illinois and Miranda v. Arizona.
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