Dynes v. Hoover

Dynes v. Hoover
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided February 1, 1858
Full case name	Dynes v. Hoover
Citations	61 U.S. 65 ( more )
Holding
Congress's power to establish military tribunals under Article I is completely separate from its power to create Article III courts.
Court membership
Chief Justice Roger B. Taney Associate Justices John McLean  · James M. Wayne John Catron  · Peter V. Daniel Samuel Nelson  · Robert C. Grier John A. Campbell  · Nathan Clifford
Case opinion
Majority	Wayne, joined by unanimous

Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How. )65(1858), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the court held that Congress's power to establish military tribunals under Article I is completely separate from its power to create Article III courts. ^{[1] [2] [3]} As a result, a judgment of a military tribunal cannot be collaterally attacked with an appeal to Article III courts, and the scope of a defendant's rights is determined entirely by statutory interpretation or the customs of the military. ^[4]

Background

Dynes was a seaman in the Navy, who was tried by a court martial upon a charge of desertion. He was found not guilty of deserting but guilty of attempting to desert, and sentenced him to discharged from the service and to be confined for six months in the penitentiary of the Washington, D.C. at hard labor, without pay. Dynes's conviction and sentence was approved by Secretary of the Navy James C. Dobbin, on September 26, 1854. Dynes was then brought from New York to Washington aboard the USS Engineer, and President Franklin Pierce ordered him to be incarcerated. ^[1]

Dynes challenged his conviction on some grounds, including that the court martial had no jurisdiction over him and that the President did not have the authority to make such an order. ^[1]

Opinion of the court

The Supreme Court issued an opinion on February 1, 1858. ^[5]

Later developments

The significance of this case expanded greatly after it was cited in William Winthrop's scholarly work arguing that the system of court martial was an "instrumentality" for the Executive branch to use to enforce discipline in the military. Thus, for Winthrop, it was acceptable under the Constitution for the executive branch to be in the business of trying, convicting, and even executing people of its own volition. Near these statements, Winthrop cited Dynes correctly for the proposition that courts martial are Article I tribunals. However, judges who read Winthrop began to summarily cite Dynes incorrectly as authority for Winthrop's larger point, and the executive instrumentality interpretation became the "traditional view." The wisdom of this policy has been questioned since. ^{[6] [7]}

References

1. Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. 65 (1858).
2. May, Christopher N.; Ides, Allan (2012). Constitutional Law: National Power and Federalism (6th ed.). p. 89.
3. John F. Munger, Procedural Due Process in the Civilian and Military Justice Systems, 14 ARIZ. L. REV. 344 (1972).
4. Scott W. Stucky, Appellate Review of Courts-Martial in the United States, 69 CATH. U. L. REV. 797 (Fall 2020).
5. "Dates of Supreme Court decisions and arguments United States reports volumes 2 – 107 (1791 – 1882)" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on June 10, 2010.
6. Richard L. Tedrow, Get Rid of this Fallacy, 32 JUDGE ADVOC. J. 48 (1962).
7. Joshua E. Kastenberg, Reassessing the Ahistorical Judicial Use of William Winthrop and Frederick Bernays Wiener, Journal of National Security Law & Policy (2021). Available at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/law_facultyscholarship/904.

External links

• Text of Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. 65(1858) is available from: Justia

This article incorporates written opinion of a United States federal court. As a work of the U.S. federal government, the text is in the public domain .