Edgeworth price cycle

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An Edgeworth price cycle is cyclical pattern in prices characterized by an initial jump, which is then followed by a slower decline back towards the initial level. The term was introduced by Maskin and Tirole (1988) [1] in a theoretical setting featuring two firms bidding sequentially and where the winner captures the full market.

Contents

Phases of a price cycle

A price cycle has the following phases:

Discussion

It can be debated whether Edgeworth Cycles should be thought of as tacit collusion because it is a Markov Perfect equilibrium, but Maskin and Tirole write: "Thus our model can be viewed as a theory of tacit collusion." (p. 592). [1]

Edgeworth cycles have been reported in gasoline markets in many countries. [2] Because the cycles tend to occur frequently, weekly average prices found in government reports will generally mask the cycling. Wang (2012) [3] emphasizes the role of price commitment in facilitating price cycles: without price commitment, the dynamic game becomes one of simultaneous move and here, the cycles are no longer a Markov Perfect equilibrium but rely on, e.g., supergame arguments.

Edgeworth cycles are distinguished from both sticky pricing and cost-based pricing. Sticky prices are typically found in markets with less aggressive price competition, so there are fewer or no cycles. Purely cost-based pricing occurs when retailers mark up from wholesale costs, so costs follow wholesale variations closely.

Alternative models of price cycles

There is a separate literature, which has explored conditions under which price cycles like the ones observed gasoline markets and found that consumer search models can rationalize cycling under various conditions. [4] [5] [6] Here, the intuition is that there is a small subset of consumers that are not informed about prices and therefore will buy from a firm regardless of the price charged. Once prices get low enough, a firm may find it optimal to charge a high price and exploit this small loyal segment rather than trying to win the whole market.

See also

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Collusion is a secret cooperation or deceitful agreement in order to deceive others, although not necessarily illegal, as a conspiracy. A secret agreement between two or more parties to limit open competition by deceiving, misleading, or defrauding others of their legal rights, or to obtain an objective forbidden by law typically by defrauding or gaining an unfair market advantage is an example of collusion. It is an agreement among firms or individuals to divide a market, set prices, limit production or limit opportunities. It can involve "unions, wage fixing, kickbacks, or misrepresenting the independence of the relationship between the colluding parties". In legal terms, all acts effected by collusion are considered void.

Price point

Price points are prices at which demand for a given product is supposed to stay relatively high.

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David Knudsen Levine is department of Economics and Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Study Joint Chair at the European University Institute; he is John H. Biggs Distinguished Professor of Economics Emeritus at Washington University in St. Louis. His research includes the study of intellectual property and endogenous growth in dynamic general equilibrium models, the endogenous formation of preferences, social norms and institutions, learning in games, and game theory applications to experimental economics.

Tacit collusion occurs where firms undergo actions that are likely to minimize a response from another firm, e.g. avoiding the opportunity to price cut an opposition. Put another way, two firms agree to play a certain strategy without explicitly saying so. Oligopolists usually try not to engage in price cutting, excessive advertising or other forms of competition. Thus, there may be unwritten rules of collusive behavior such as price leadership. A price leader will then emerge and it sets the general industry price, with other firms following suit. For example, see the case of British Salt Limited and New Cheshire Salt Works Limited.

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In microeconomics, the Bertrand–Edgeworth model of price-setting oligopoly looks at what happens when there is a homogeneous product where there is a limit to the output of firms which they are willing and able to sell at a particular price. This differs from the Bertrand competition model where it is assumed that firms are willing and able to meet all demand. The limit to output can be considered as a physical capacity constraint which is the same at all prices, or to vary with price under other assumptions.

References

  1. 1 2 Maskin, Eric; Tirole, Jean (1988). "A Theory of Dynamic Oligopoly, II: Price Competition, Kinked Demand Curves, and Edgeworth Cycles". Econometrica. 56 (3): 571–599. doi:10.2307/1911701. JSTOR   1911701.
  2. "Edgeworth price cycles : The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics". www.dictionaryofeconomics.com. Retrieved 2018-01-02.
  3. Wang, Zhongmin (2009-12-01). "(Mixed) Strategy in Oligopoly Pricing: Evidence from Gasoline Price Cycles Before and Under a Timing Regulation". Journal of Political Economy. 117 (6): 987–1030. CiteSeerX   10.1.1.320.9839 . doi:10.1086/649801. ISSN   0022-3808.
  4. Fershtman, Chaim; Fishman, Arthur (1992). "Price Cycles and Booms: Dynamic Search Equilibrium". The American Economic Review. 82 (5): 1221–1233. JSTOR   2117475.
  5. Tappata, Mariano (2009-12-01). "Rockets and feathers: Understanding asymmetric pricing". The RAND Journal of Economics. 40 (4): 673–687. doi:10.1111/j.1756-2171.2009.00084.x. ISSN   1756-2171.
  6. Lewis, Matthew S. (2011-06-01). "Asymmetric Price Adjustment and Consumer Search: An Examination of the Retail Gasoline Market". Journal of Economics & Management Strategy. 20 (2): 409–449. CiteSeerX   10.1.1.199.1790 . doi:10.1111/j.1530-9134.2011.00293.x. ISSN   1530-9134.