Eric van Damme | |
|---|---|
 Eric van Damme (2014) | |
| Born | Eric Eleterius Coralie van Damme 27 July 1956 |
| Nationality | Dutch |
| Academic career | |
| Doctoral advisor | Jaap Wessels Reinhard Selten |
Eric Eleterius Coralie van Damme (born 27 July 1956 [1] ) is a Dutch economist and Professor of Economics at the Tilburg University, known for his contributions to game theory.
Born in Terneuzen, Van Damme received his MA in Mathematics at the Radboud University Nijmegen in 1979, where he was mentored by Stef Tijs, the godfather of game theory in the Netherlands. [2] He went on to earn his PhD in Technical Sciences in 1983 at the Eindhoven University of Technology with a thesis entitled "Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept" under supervision of Jaap Wessels and Reinhard Selten.
After graduation Van Damme started his academic career in 1983 as Assistant Professor at the Delft University of Technology, and got promoted to Associate Professor in 1984. In 1986 he moved to the University of Bonn, where he was Associate Professor in Economic Theory until 1990. In 1989 he got appointed Professor of Economics at the Tilburg University [3] Since then he has held several administrative positions at the CentER, the Center for Economic Research at the Tilburg University. In between he was Visiting Professor at European Universities in Bielefeld, Copenhagen, Stockholm, Helsinki, Vienna, Lisbon; and in the USA at the Kellogg School of Management. [1] He is also member of multiple editorial boards.
Van Damme has been elected fellow of the Econometric Society in 1993, and appointed member of the Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2004. [4] He is also a fellow of the European Economic Association. [5] In 2009 he awarded a knighthood in the Order of the Netherlands Lion.
Van Damme's research interests are in the fields of "game theory, economic theory, competition policy and regulation, experimental economics, bounded rationality and bargaining." [6]
Van Damme has authored and co-authored numerous publications specifically in the field of game theory. [7] Books, a selection:
Articles, a selection:
Reinhard Justus Reginald Selten was a German economist, who won the 1994 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences. He is also well known for his work in bounded rationality and can be considered one of the founding fathers of experimental economics.
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Equilibrium selection is a concept from game theory which seeks to address reasons for players of a game to select a certain equilibrium over another. The concept is especially relevant in evolutionary game theory, where the different methods of equilibrium selection respond to different ideas of what equilibria will be stable and persistent for one player to play even in the face of deviations of the other players. This is important because there are various equilibrium concepts, and for many particular concepts, such as the Nash equilibrium, many games have multiple equilibria.
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In economics and game theory, global games are games of incomplete information where players receive possibly-correlated signals of the underlying state of the world. Global games were originally defined by Carlsson and van Damme (1993).
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Ehud Kalai is a prominent Israeli American game theorist and mathematical economist known for his contributions to the field of game theory and its interface with economics, social choice, computer science and operations research. He was the James J. O’Connor Distinguished Professor of Decision and Game Sciences at Northwestern University, 1975–2017, and currently is a Professor Emeritus of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences.
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Ferenc Forgó (born 16 April 1942 in Pécs) is a Hungarian economist and mathematician. He is a Doctor of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and professor emeritus at the Corvinus University of Budapest. His main research interests have been mathematical programming and game theory.
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