First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan | |
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Argued March 22, 1995 Decided May 22, 1995 | |
Full case name | First Options of Chicago, Incorporated, Petitioner v. Manuel Kaplan, et us. and MK Investments, Incorporated |
Citations | 514 U.S. 938 ( more ) 115 S. Ct. 1920; 131 L. Ed. 2d 985; 1995 U.S. LEXIS 3463; 63 U.S.L.W. 4459; Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 98,728; Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 26,398; 95 Cal. Daily Op. Service 3821; 95 Daily Journal DAR 6474; 9 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 64 |
Case history | |
Prior | On writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit |
Holding | |
Judicial review of arbitrability of contract is properly permitted when parties have not clearly agreed that arbitrator will decide question | |
Court membership | |
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Case opinion | |
Majority | Breyer, joined by unanimous |
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938 (1995), was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on who decides whether a dispute is subject to arbitration, the courts or an arbitrator.
Under the 1924 U.S. Federal Arbitration Act and subsequent Supreme Court rulings, there is a strong presumption in favor of arbitration, with the courts generally deferring to the opinions of an arbitrator. [1]
This case arose out of disputes over a "workout" agreement, embodied in four documents, which governed the "working out" of debts to First Options of Chicago, Inc. incurred as a result of the October 1987 stock market crash (and later losses) by Manuel Kaplan, his wife, and his wholly owned investment company, MK Investments, Inc. (MKI). First Options is a firm that clears stock trades on the Philadelphia Stock Exchange. When First Options' demands for payment went unsatisfied, it sought arbitration by a stock exchange panel. MKI, which had signed the only workout document containing an arbitration agreement, submitted to arbitration, but the Kaplans, who had not signed that document, filed objections with the panel, denying that their disagreement with First Options was arbitrable. The arbitrators decided that they had the power to rule on the dispute's merits and ruled in First Options' favor. The District Court confirmed the award, but the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The Third Circuit said that courts should independently decide whether an arbitration panel has jurisdiction over a dispute, and that it would apply ordinary standards of review when considering the District Court's denial of the Kaplan's' motion to vacate the arbitration award.
The Court unanimously agreed with the Third Circuit that arbitrability of the Kaplan—First Options dispute was subject to independent review by the courts. On the narrow question of whether the arbitrators or the courts have the primary power to decide whether the parties agreed to arbitrate a dispute's merits, the Court held that just as the arbitrability of the merits of a dispute depends upon whether the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute, so the question "who has the primary power to decide arbitrability" turns upon whether the parties agreed to submit that question to arbitration. If so, then the court should defer to the arbitrator's arbitrability decision. If not, then the court should decide the question independently. These answers flow inexorably from the fact that arbitration is simply a matter of contract between the parties. Courts generally should apply ordinary state law principles governing contract formation in deciding whether such an agreement exists. However, courts should not assume that the parties agreed to arbitrate arbitrability unless there is "clear and unmistakable" evidence that they did so.
The Court also held that courts of appeals should apply ordinary standards when reviewing district court decisions upholding arbitration awards, i.e., accepting findings of fact that are not "clearly erroneous" but deciding questions of law de novo; they should not, in those circumstances, apply a special "abuse of discretion" standard. [2]
Arbitration, in the context of the law of the United States, is a form of alternative dispute resolution. Specifically, arbitration is an alternative to litigation through which the parties to a dispute agree to submit their respective evidence and legal arguments to a neutral third party for resolution. In practice arbitration is generally used as a substitute for litigation, particularly when the judicial process is perceived as too slow, expensive or biased. In some contexts, an arbitrator may be described as an umpire.
A forum selection clause in a contract with a conflict of laws element allows the parties to agree that any disputes relating to that contract will be resolved in a specific forum. They usually operate in conjunction with a choice of law clause which determines the proper law of the relevant contract.
The United States Arbitration Act, more commonly referred to as the Federal Arbitration Act or FAA, is an act of Congress that provides for judicial facilitation of private dispute resolution through arbitration. It applies in both state courts and federal courts, as was held in Southland Corp. v. Keating. It applies in all contracts, excluding contracts of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers involved in foreign or interstate commerce, and it is predicated on an exercise of the Commerce Clause powers granted to Congress in the U.S. Constitution.
An arbitration clause is a clause in a contract that requires the parties to resolve their disputes through an arbitration process. Although such a clause may or may not specify that arbitration occur within a specific jurisdiction, it always binds the parties to a type of resolution outside the courts, and is therefore considered a kind of forum selection clause.
Arbitration is a form of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) that resolves disputes outside the judiciary courts. The dispute will be decided by one or more persons, which renders the 'arbitration award'. An arbitration decision or award is legally binding on both sides and enforceable in the courts, unless all parties stipulate that the arbitration process and decision are non-binding.
An arbitral tribunal or arbitration tribunal, also arbitration commission, arbitration committee or arbitration council is a panel of unbiased adjudicators which is convened and sits to resolve a dispute by way of arbitration. The tribunal may consist of a sole arbitrator, or there may be two or more arbitrators, which might include a chairperson or an umpire. Members selected to serve on an arbitration panel are typically professionals with expertise in both law and in friendly dispute resolution (mediation). Some scholars have suggested that the ideal composition of an arbitration commission should include at least also one professional in the field of the disputed situation, in cases that involve questions of asset or damages valuation for instance an economist.
Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346 (2008), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held, 8–1, that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) overrules state laws declaring that certain disputes must be resolved by a state administrative agency.
Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440 (2006), is a United States Supreme Court case concerning contract law and arbitration. The case arose from a class action filed in Florida against a payday lender alleging the loan agreements the plaintiffs had signed were unenforceable because they essentially charged a higher interest rate than that permitted under Florida law.
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967), is a United States Supreme Court decision that established what has become known as the "separability principle" in contracts with arbitration clauses. Following an appellate court ruling a decade earlier, it reads the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) to require that any challenges to the enforceability of such a contract first be heard by an arbitrator, not a court, unless the claim is that the clause itself is unenforceable.
Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 (2008), was a United States Supreme Court case that held that state and federal courts cannot, on a motion to vacate or to modify an arbitration award, expand the limited scope of judicial review specified in 9 U.S.C. §§ 10 and 11, including terms that were agreed upon by the parties.
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), is a United States Supreme Court decision concerning arbitration. It was originally brought by 7-Eleven franchisees in California state courts, alleging breach of contract by the chain's then parent corporation. Southland pointed to the arbitration clauses in their franchise agreements and said it required disputes to be resolved that way; the franchisees cited state franchising law voiding any clause in an agreement that required franchisees to waive their rights under that law. A 7-2 majority held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) applied to contracts executed under state law.
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983), commonly cited as Moses Cone or Cone Hospital, is a United States Supreme Court decision concerning civil procedure, specifically the abstention doctrine, as it applies to enforcing an arbitration clause in a diversity case. By a 6–3 margin, the justices resolved a complicated construction dispute by ruling that a North Carolina hospital had to arbitrate a claim against the Alabama-based company it had hired to build a new wing, even though it meant that it could not consolidate it with ongoing litigation it had brought in state court against the contractor and architect.
Arbitration in the United States is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, which requires courts to compel parties who agree to arbitration to participate in binding arbitration, the decision from which is binding upon the parties. Since the passage of the FAA, both state and federal courts have examined arbitration clauses, as well as other statutes involving arbitration clauses, for validity and enforceability.
Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213 (1985), is a United States Supreme Court case concerning arbitration. It arose from an interlocutory appeal of a lower court's denial of brokerage firm Dean Witter Reynolds' motion to compel arbitration of the claims under state law made against it by an aggrieved former client. The Court held unanimously that the Federal Arbitration Act required that those claims be heard that way when the parties were contractually obligated to do so, even where parallel claims made under federal law would still be heard in federal court.
Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987), is a United States Supreme Court decision concerning arbitration of private securities fraud claims arising under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. By a 5–4 margin the Court held that its holding in a 1953 case, Wilko v. Swan, that the nonwaiver provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 prevented the mandatory arbitration of such claims, did not apply to claims under the 1934 Act due to differences in the corresponding language of the two statutes, reversing a decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals that had affirmed what had been considered settled law, despite the lack of a precedent. It likewise held that claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) were arbitrable, affirming an order from the district court that the Second Circuit had also upheld.
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985), is a United States Supreme Court decision concerning arbitration of antitrust claims. The Court heard the case on appeal from the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, which had ruled that the arbitration clause in a Puerto Rican car dealer's franchise agreement was broad enough to reach its antitrust claim. By a 5–3 margin it upheld the lower court, requiring that the dealer arbitrate its claim before a panel in Tokyo, as stipulated in the contract.
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), is a United States Supreme Court decision on the arbitration of securities fraud claims. It had originally been brought by an investor who claimed his broker at Hayden Stone had sold stock to him without disclosing that he and the firm were the primary sellers. By a 7–2 margin the Court held that the provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 barring any waiver of rights under that statute took precedence over the Federal Arbitration Act's (FAA) requirement that arbitration clauses in contracts be given full effect by federal courts. It reversed a decision to the contrary by a divided panel of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989), is a United States Supreme Court decision concerning the arbitration of securities fraud claims. It was originally brought by a group of Texas investors against their brokerage house. By a 5–4 margin the Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals and ruled that their claims under the Securities Act of 1933, which regulates trading in the primary market, must be arbitrated as stipulated in their customer agreements.
Disputes between consumers and businesses that are arbitrated are resolved by an independent neutral arbitrator rather than in court. Although parties can agree to arbitrate a particular dispute after it arises or may agree that the award is non-binding, most consumer arbitrations occur pursuant to a pre-dispute arbitration clause where the arbitrator's award is binding.
Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc., 586 U.S. ___ (2019), was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on January 8, 2019. The case decided the question of whether a court may disregard a valid delegation of arbitrability—a contract provision stating that an arbitrator should decide whether a dispute is subject to arbitration—when the argument in favor of arbitration is "wholly groundless." In a unanimous (9-0) opinion written by Justice Brett Kavanaugh, the court sided with petitioner Henry Schein, Inc., holding that the "wholly groundless" exception to arbitrability violates the Federal Arbitration Act, and therefore a valid delegation of arbitrability should be honored even if a court believes the argument for arbitration to be "wholly groundless." It was Justice Kavanaugh's first Supreme Court opinion.