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Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), was a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, unanimously ruling that anti-indecency provisions of the 1996 Communications Decency Act violated the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of speech. This was the first major Supreme Court ruling on the regulation of materials distributed via the Internet.
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Prior restraint is censorship imposed, usually by a government or institution, on expression, that prohibits particular instances of expression. It is in contrast to censorship that establishes general subject matter restrictions and reviews a particular instance of expression only after the expression has taken place.
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), was a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States that helped to establish an implied "right to privacy" in U.S. law in the form of mere possession of obscene materials.
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Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964), is an in rem United States Supreme Court decision on First Amendment questions relating to the forfeiture of obscene material. By a 7–2 margin, the Court held that a seizure of the books was unconstitutional, since no hearing had been held on whether the books were obscene, and it reversed a Kansas Supreme Court decision that upheld the seizure.
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Film censorship in the United States was a frequent feature of the industry almost from the beginning of the U.S. motion picture industry until the end of strong self-regulation in 1966. Court rulings in the 1950s and 1960s severely constrained government censorship, though statewide regulation lasted until at least the 1980s.
United States obscenity law deals with the regulation or suppression of what is considered obscenity and therefore not protected speech or expression under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. In the United States, discussion of obscenity typically relates to defining what pornography is obscene. Issues of obscenity arise at federal and state levels. State laws operate only within the jurisdiction of each state, and state laws on obscenity differ. Federal statutes ban obscenity and child pornography produced with real children. Federal law also bans broadcasting of "indecent" material during specified hours.
Times Film Corporation v. City of Chicago, or Times v. City of Chicago is the name of two cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1957 and 1961. Both involved the issue of limits on freedom of expression in connection with motion pictures. In both cases the court affirmed the right of local governments to engage in some form of censorship.
Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957), was a Supreme Court case that addressed issues of obscenity, free speech, and due process. The case stemmed from the confiscation and destruction of books from a New York City bookstore. The court's determination was that:
A state injunction against distribution of material designated as "obscene" does not violate freedom of speech and press protected by the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that the actions of the Rhode Island Commission to Encourage Morality in Youth, which involved pressuring distributors to stop selling certain publications, violated the First Amendment by creating an unconstitutional system of informal censorship. The Court ruled that the commission's practice of issuing notices and lists of objectionable publications to book distributors, and requesting their cooperation in preventing the sale of such publications, was unconstitutional. Justice William J. Brennan Jr. delivered the majority opinion, emphasizing that government entities cannot use indirect methods to suppress constitutionally protected speech and that states must create procedural safeguards to protect non-obscene materials from being censored subjectively. Justice John Marshall Harlan II dissented, arguing that the majorities decision failed to justify ruling against the commission's actions which he viewed only as an attempt to deal with a societal problem rather than a suppression of free speech.
References
- 1 2 3 4 5 6 Holmby Productions, Inc. et al v. Vaughn et al, 177Kan.728 (1955).
- ↑ Holmby Productions, Inc. v. Vaughn, 350 U.S. 870
- ↑ "Censorship of Film, "Lady Chatterley's Lover," Struck Down". The Catholic Lawyer . 6 (1): 71. Winter 1960.
- ↑ Recognized as unconstitutional by the Court of Appals of Maryland in United Artists v. Bd. of Censors, 124 A. 2d 292, 210 Md. 586 O1956), and by the Pennsyulvania Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Blumenstein, 396 Pa. 417 (1959).