Hovav Shacham | |
---|---|
Alma mater | Stanford University (PhD) |
Scientific career | |
Fields | Computer Security |
Institutions | University of Texas at Austin |
Thesis | New Paradigms in Signature Schemes (2005) |
Doctoral advisor | Dan Boneh |
Hovav Shacham is a professor in computer security at the University of Texas at Austin. He has made many advances to both cryptography and computer security.
Shacham his PhD from Stanford University under the supervision of Dan Boneh, where he wrote his dissertation on "New Paradigms in Signature Schemes". He currently has over 50 publications in the area of computer security and cryptography. In 2007 he participated in the California's 2007 "Top-to-Bottom" voting systems review. [1] He was the program chair of IEEE S&P 2019 and 2020, one of the leading computer security conferences. [2]
Shacham's research covers the areas of cryptography and security.
In cryptography, Shacham developed a scheme to digital signature scheme based on the Weil pairing with Dan Boneh and Ben Lynn. [3] The scheme was important because of the size of the signature: half of that of typical other signatures. For this reason this method, or those based on it, are now one of the leading signature schemes.
In security, Shacham is best known for developing Return Oriented Programming (ROP), a method to exploit a memory corruption vulnerability. In his 2007 ACM CCS paper, he showed that it was possible to perform Turing complete computation by re-using existing executable code in a program without needing to inject new code. ROP attacks are now the most common type of memory corruption exploit. Most operating systems now implement defenses to help prevent this attack, [4] and some microprocessors such as modern Intel CPUs include new hardware instructions that prevent this attack. [5]
Shacham performed a high-profile audit of the security systems in modern software-controlled cars in a paper published at IEEE S&P 2010, which in 2020 was recognized by IEEE with the test of time award. In this work, Shacham showed that many cars had little to no security and it was possible to "disable the brakes, selectively brake individual wheels on demand, or stop the engine". [6]
Shacham also researched the security of Backscatter X-ray full body scanners as used in many airports. [7] He found that it was possible to infect these scanners with malware, and that it was possible to hide weapons through the scanners. [8]
Shacham received the ACM CCS 2017 and 2019 test of time award, [9] and the IEEE S&P 2020 Test-of-Time Award. [10]
Ralph C. Merkle is an American computer scientist and mathematician. He is one of the inventors of public-key cryptography, the inventor of cryptographic hashing, and more recently a researcher and speaker on cryonics.
Ronald Linn Rivest is a cryptographer and computer scientist whose work has spanned the fields of algorithms and combinatorics, cryptography, machine learning, and election integrity. He is an Institute Professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), and a member of MIT's Department of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science and its Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory.
David Lee Chaum is an American computer scientist, cryptographer, and inventor. He is known as a pioneer in cryptography and privacy-preserving technologies, and widely recognized as the inventor of digital cash. His 1982 dissertation "Computer Systems Established, Maintained, and Trusted by Mutually Suspicious Groups" is the first known proposal for a blockchain protocol. Complete with the code to implement the protocol, Chaum's dissertation proposed all but one element of the blockchain later detailed in the Bitcoin whitepaper. He has been referred to as "the father of online anonymity", and "the godfather of cryptocurrency".
Bailey Whitfield 'Whit' Diffie ForMemRS is an American cryptographer and mathematician and one of the pioneers of public-key cryptography along with Martin Hellman and Ralph Merkle. Diffie and Hellman's 1976 paper New Directions in Cryptography introduced a radically new method of distributing cryptographic keys, that helped solve key distribution—a fundamental problem in cryptography. Their technique became known as Diffie–Hellman key exchange. The article stimulated the almost immediate public development of a new class of encryption algorithms, the asymmetric key algorithms.
The computational Diffie–Hellman (CDH) assumption is a computational hardness assumption about the Diffie–Hellman problem. The CDH assumption involves the problem of computing the discrete logarithm in cyclic groups. The CDH problem illustrates the attack of an eavesdropper in the Diffie–Hellman key exchange protocol to obtain the exchanged secret key.
The external Diffie–Hellman (XDH) assumption is a computational hardness assumption used in elliptic curve cryptography. The XDH assumption holds if there exist certain subgroups of elliptic curves which have useful properties for cryptography. Specifically, XDH implies the existence of two distinct groups with the following properties:
Solvency, in finance or business, is the degree to which the current assets of an individual or entity exceed the current liabilities of that individual or entity. Solvency can also be described as the ability of a corporation to meet its long-term fixed expenses and to accomplish long-term expansion and growth. This is best measured using the net liquid balance (NLB) formula. In this formula, solvency is calculated by adding cash and cash equivalents to short-term investments, then subtracting notes payable. There exist cryptographic schemes for both proofs of liabilities and assets, especially in the blockchain space.
A group signature scheme is a method for allowing a member of a group to anonymously sign a message on behalf of the group. The concept was first introduced by David Chaum and Eugene van Heyst in 1991. For example, a group signature scheme could be used by an employee of a large company where it is sufficient for a verifier to know a message was signed by an employee, but not which particular employee signed it. Another application is for keycard access to restricted areas where it is inappropriate to track individual employee's movements, but necessary to secure areas to only employees in the group.
Dan Boneh is an Israeli–American professor in applied cryptography and computer security at Stanford University.
Pairing-based cryptography is the use of a pairing between elements of two cryptographic groups to a third group with a mapping to construct or analyze cryptographic systems.
The Decision Linear (DLIN) assumption is a computational hardness assumption used in elliptic curve cryptography. In particular, the DLIN assumption is useful in settings where the decisional Diffie–Hellman assumption does not hold. The Decision Linear assumption was introduced by Boneh, Boyen, and Shacham.
A BLS digital signature, also known as Boneh–Lynn–Shacham (BLS), is a cryptographic signature scheme which allows a user to verify that a signer is authentic.
Return-oriented programming (ROP) is a computer security exploit technique that allows an attacker to execute code in the presence of security defenses such as executable space protection and code signing.
Identity-based cryptography is a type of public-key cryptography in which a publicly known string representing an individual or organization is used as a public key. The public string could include an email address, domain name, or a physical IP address.
Elie Bursztein, is a French computer scientist and software engineer. He is Google and DeepMind AI cybersecurity technical and research lead.
Mordechai M. "Moti" Yung is a cryptographer and computer scientist known for his work on cryptovirology and kleptography.
Matthew Keith "Matt" Franklin is an American cryptographer, and a professor of computer science at the University of California, Davis.
Jonathan Katz is a professor in the Department of Computer Science at the University of Maryland who conducts research on cryptography and cybersecurity. In 2019–2020 he was a faculty member in the Volgenau School of Engineering at George Mason University, where he held the title of Eminent Scholar in Cybersecurity. In 2013–2019 he was director of the Maryland Cybersecurity Center at the University of Maryland.
Amit Sahai is an Indian-American computer scientist. He is a professor of computer science at UCLA and the director of the Center for Encrypted Functionalities.
Hertzbleed is a hardware security attack which describes exploiting dynamic frequency scaling to reveal secret data. The attack is a kind of timing attack, bearing similarity to previous power analysis vulnerabilities. Hertzbleed is more dangerous than power analysis, as it can be exploited by a remote attacker. Disclosure of cryptographic keys is the main concern regarding the exploit but other uses of the attack have been demonstrated since its initial discovery.