 | This article needs additional citations for verification .(July 2017) |
Voluntary Offer Safeguards with Nonproliferation Treaty Nuclear-Weapon States CSA in force CSA signed |
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards are a system of inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials as part of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) , supervised by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Safeguards activities are undertaken and by the Department of Safeguards, a separate department within the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Department is headed by Deputy Director General and Head of the Department of Safeguards Massimo Aparo. The mission statement of the Department of Safeguards is: "The primary role of the {Safeguard} Department is to administer and implement IAEA safeguards. It also contributes to nuclear arms control and disarmament, by responding to requests for verification and technical assistance associated with related agreements and arrangements." [2] The Department is organized into operations divisions, which include the inspectors that conduct safeguards inspections in the IAEA's member states to confirm that they are living up to their NPT commitments, and support divisions, that provide the tools and services for the safeguards inspectors to complete their mission. Safeguards inspections compare a state's nuclear program, as declared to the IAEA, to observed nuclear activities in the country. The Divisions of Operations [2] are organized as follows:
• Operations A: conducting safeguards inspections in East Asia and Australasia
• Operations B: conducting safeguards inspections in the Middle East (Southwest Asia), South Asia, Africa and the Americas; this geographic region also includes non-EU European states
• Operations C: conducting safeguards inspection in the European Union states, Russia and Central Asia
• Operations for verification in Iran (as stated in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, known commonly as the Iranian Nuclear Deal)
The history of the IAEA safeguards begins at the foreground of the nuclear regime to which debate over the disposal of leftover fissile material was the primary concern. Dwight Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace speech in 1953 was the first step towards establishing regulation of nuclear activity to ensure only peaceful purposes were driving scientific development. It proposed that states with leftover fissile material contribute to an international fuel bank. The IAEA was proposed in 1954 with the mission to control the distribution and disposal of used nuclear material. [3] Negotiations of safeguards were controversial due to the idea that they would inhibit the promotion of nuclear energy. [4] However, safeguards help solidify the line between using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and creating weapons-grade material that could serve militant purposes. Though safeguards are only one part of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, they underpin inspection and verification, and provide assurance that proliferation is not occurring in states declared to be nuclear weaponized, as well as non-nuclear weapons states. [5]
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Safeguards are a system of inspection and verification of the peaceful uses of nuclear materials as part of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), supervised by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Information Circular 66 (INFCIRC 66) is an agreement between the IAEA and member states that provides for the conduct of limited safeguards within the member state. The member states identifies facilities that are made available for inspection. [6]
The Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) opened for signature in 1968 and entered into force in 1970. The NPT defines nuclear weapons states as the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the People's Republic of China, the Russian Federation, and France. The treaty requires signatories to become members of the IAEA. Nuclear weapons states are responsible for working toward disarmament and non-nuclear weapons states must submit to IAEA safeguards. The treaty requires that non-nuclear weapons states conclude comprehensive safeguards agreements under INFCIRC 153. The NPT is the centerpiece of global efforts to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. [5]
Safeguards inspectors are first appointed by the IAEA's Director General, then approved by the Board of Governors, designated by the State, and granted privileges and immunities by the member states in which they designated to perform inspections. Inspectors are responsible for conducting in-field verification activities at nuclear facilities or locations outside facilities. The general objective of an inspection is to verify that the nuclear material declared and safeguarded at the facility is used only for peaceful nuclear activities and that it is accounted for. Verification activities are performed in different types of inspector access: design information verification (DIV), ad hoc inspections, routine inspections, and complementary access (CA) .
Safeguards are implemented on an annual cycle and include four fundamental processes: [7]
The IAEA prepares a Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) for each country and draws safeguards conclusions based on the information collected during inspections and through remote monitoring and information collection. Safeguards conclusions provide the international community assurance that States are complying with their agreements by following the safeguards obligations. In some cases, the conclusion is that safeguards were not conclusive. Safeguards conclusions are documented in the annual Safeguards Implementation Report which is presented to the Board of Governors at its June meeting.
The IAEA offers several useful services to member states including aide for officiating required documentation and assistance with safeguards measures. [8]
| Year | Month | Event |
|---|---|---|
| 1946 | Acheson-Lilienthal Report and Baruch Plan propose safeguards as part of international control of atomic energy | |
| 1953 | December | Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace Speech [9] |
| 1954 | IAEA Proposed | |
| 1955-56 | Negotiation of IAEA Statute | |
| 1957 | IAEA Statute enters into force, establishes IAEA to promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy The first IAEA General Conference in Vienna [9] | |
| 1958 | Petition by Linus Pauling to UN that urged for International Agreement to cease nuclear bomb testing Rome Treaty of EURATOM | |
| 1961 | September | US and Soviet Union sign Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiation, or McCloy-Zorin Accords |
| 1961 | December | United Nations General Assembly adopts McCloy-Zorin Accords |
| 1961 | The first IAEA Seibersdorf Laboratories open [9] INFCIRC/26 establishes first IAEA safeguards system | |
| 1965 | INFCIRC/66 establishes revised IAEA safeguards system | |
| 1967 | Treaty of Tlatelolco establishes nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean INFCIRC/66/Rev.1 | |
| 1968 | The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is signed in Washington, Moscow, and London INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 | |
| 1970 | March | NPT enters into force [9] |
| 1971 | Comprehensive Safeguards (INFCIRC/153) are established [9] | |
| 1975 | Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) established | |
| 1980 | Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials is signed in New York | |
| 1981 | US ratifies Additional Protocol I to Treaty of Tlateloclo which submitted US territories in Latin America to nuclear-weapons-free-zones | |
| 1986 | Treaty of Rarotonga establishes nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Pacific | |
| 1990 | South Africa begins deconstruction of 6 nuclear weapons | |
| 1991 | Iraq Action Team is created to implement nuclear inspections within the country [9] Iraq found in non-compliance with IAEA safeguards agreement | |
| 1992 | North Korea concludes IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement, six years after acceding to the NPT. Inconsistencies with declared materials in North Korea initiated the IAEA to act and demand verification at facilities, but North Korea denied access. | |
| 1993 | North Korea announces withdrawal from the NPT but "suspends" withdrawal notification one day before it would have become effective The IAEA reports DPRK non-compliance with its safeguards agreements and verification of nuclear material being used for only peaceful purposes cannot be confirmed [9] | |
| 1994 | The DPRK withdraws its IAEA membership | |
| 1997 | INFCIRC/540 (Model Additional Protocol) adopted [9] Treaty of Bangkok establishes nuclear-weapon-free zone in Southeast Asia | |
| 2005 | IAEA Board of Governors finds Iran in non-compliance with its safeguards agreement for undeclared nuclear fuel cycle activities | |
| 2009 | Treaty of Pelindaba establishes nuclear-weapon-free zone in Africa Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone enters into force | |
| 2011 | IAEA Board of Governors finds Syria in non-compliance with its safeguards agreement for construction of an undeclared plutonium production reactor | |
| 2015 | Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) was signed by the US, Russian Federation, China, the UK, France and Germany with the Islamic Republic of Iran to provide assurances that Iran's nuclear program remained solely peaceful. [9] | |
| 2021 | Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons enters into force |
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is an intergovernmental organization that seeks to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to inhibit its use for any military purpose, including nuclear weapons. It was established in 1957 as an autonomous organization within the United Nations system; though governed by its own founding treaty, the organization reports to both the General Assembly and the Security Council of the United Nations, and is headquartered at the UN Office at Vienna, Austria.
The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, commonly known as the Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT, is an international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. Between 1965 and 1968, the treaty was negotiated by the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament, a United Nations-sponsored organization based in Geneva, Switzerland.
Nuclear proliferation is the spread of nuclear weapons, fissionable material, and weapons-applicable nuclear technology and information to nations not recognized as "Nuclear Weapon States" by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, commonly known as the Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT. Proliferation has been opposed by many nations with and without nuclear weapons, as governments fear that more countries with nuclear weapons will increase the possibility of nuclear warfare, de-stabilize international or regional relations, or infringe upon the national sovereignty of nation states.
The Zangger Committee, also known as the Nuclear Exporters Committee, sprang from Article III.2 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) which entered into force on March 5, 1970. Under the terms of Article III.2 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards must be applied to nuclear exports.
The Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (북미제네바기본합의서) was signed on 21 October 1994, between North Korea (DPRK) and the United States. The objective of the agreement was the freezing and replacement of North Korea's indigenous nuclear power plant program with more nuclear proliferation resistant light water reactor power plants, and the step-by-step normalization of relations between the U.S. and the DPRK. Implementation of the agreement was troubled from the start, but its key elements were being implemented until it effectively broke down in 2003.
Iran has several research sites, two uranium mines, a research reactor, and uranium processing facilities that include three known uranium enrichment plants.
In the 1970s and 1980s, during the military regime, Brazil had a secret program intended to develop nuclear weapons. The program was dismantled in 1990, five years after the military regime ended. Brazil is considered to possess no weapons of mass destruction but does have some of the key technologies needed to produce nuclear weapons.
Iran is not known to currently possess weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and has signed treaties repudiating the possession of WMDs including the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Iran has first-hand knowledge of WMD effects—over 100,000 Iranian troops and civilians were victims of chemical weapons during the 1980s Iran–Iraq War.
A nuclear fuel bank is reserve of low enriched uranium (LEU) for countries that need a backup source of LEU to fuel their nuclear reactors. Countries that do have enrichment technology would donate enriched fuel to a "bank", from which countries not possessing enrichment technology would obtain fuel for their power reactors.
United Nations Security Council resolution 825, adopted on 11 May 1993, called upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to reconsider its decision to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and allow weapons inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) into the country, after it had previously refused entry.
The 123 Agreement signed between the United States of America and the Republic of India is known as the U.S.–India Civil Nuclear Agreement or Indo-US nuclear deal. The framework for this agreement was a July 18, 2005, joint statement by then Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and then U.S. President George W. Bush, under which India agreed to separate its civil and military nuclear facilities and to place all its civil nuclear facilities under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and, in exchange, the United States agreed to work toward full civil nuclear cooperation with India. This U.S.-India deal took more than three years to come to fruition as it had to go through several complex stages, including amendment of U.S. domestic law, especially the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, a civil-military nuclear Separation Plan in India, an India-IAEA safeguards (inspections) agreement and the grant of an exemption for India by the Nuclear Suppliers Group, an export-control cartel that had been formed mainly in response to India's first nuclear test in 1974. In its final shape, the deal places under permanent safeguards those nuclear facilities that India has identified as "civil" and permits broad civil nuclear cooperation, while excluding the transfer of "sensitive" equipment and technologies, including civil enrichment and reprocessing items even under IAEA safeguards. On August 18, 2008, the IAEA Board of Governors approved, and on February 2, 2009, India signed an India-specific safeguards agreement with the IAEA. After India brought this agreement into force, inspections began in a phased manner on the 35 civilian nuclear installations India has identified in its Separation Plan. The deal is seen as a watershed in U.S.-India relations and introduces a new aspect to international nonproliferation efforts. On August 1, 2008, the IAEA approved the safeguards agreement with India, after which the United States approached the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to grant a waiver to India to commence civilian nuclear trade. The 48-nation NSG granted the waiver to India on September 6, 2008, allowing it to access civilian nuclear technology and fuel from other countries. The implementation of this waiver made India the only known country with nuclear weapons which is not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) but is still allowed to carry out nuclear commerce with the rest of the world.
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1696, adopted on July 31, 2006, after expressing concern at the intentions of the nuclear programme of Iran, the Council demanded that Iran halt its uranium enrichment programme.
This is the timeline of the nuclear program of Iran.
President Adly Mansour announced on 7 November 2013 that Egypt was restarting its nuclear power program in El Dabaa; a deal was reached with the residents in which it was agreed that a residential area will also be built. The Egyptian minister of electricity, Ahmed Emam, has called the project "necessary" because of a small amount of renewable energy sources and not enough fuel.
The 13 steps are identified in a paragraph of the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, providing a set of 'practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons'. Article VI is the part of the Treaty that provides for disarmament, including nuclear disarmament.
Iran convened a conference titled "International Disarmament and Non-proliferation: World Security without Weapons of Mass Destruction" on 17 and 18 April 2010 in Tehran. The theme of the conference was Nuclear Energy for All, Nuclear Weapons for No One.
The 2010 Review Conference for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was held at United Nations Headquarters in New York City from 3 to 28 May 2010. The President of the Review Conference is Ambassador Libran N. Cabactulan of the Philippines. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon used the opening of the conference to note that "sixty five years later, the world still lives under the nuclear shadow".
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, 22 U.S.C. § 3201, is a United States federal law declaring that nuclear explosive devices pose a perilous threat to the security interests of the United States. The law restricts U.S. export of civil nuclear programs to other states.
Material unaccounted for (MUF), in the context of nuclear material, refers to any discrepancy between a nuclear-weapons state's physical inventory of nuclear material, and the book inventory. The difference can be either a positive discrepancy or a negative discrepancy. Nuclear accounting discrepancies are commonplace and inevitable due to the problem of accurately measuring nuclear materials. This problem of inaccurate measurement provides a potential loophole for diversion of nuclear materials for weapons production. In a large plant, even a tiny percentage of the annual through-put of nuclear material will suffice to build one or more nuclear weapons.
 | This article related to international law is a stub. You can help Wikipedia by expanding it. |
 | This article related to nuclear weaponry is a stub. You can help Wikipedia by expanding it. |