Implied license

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An implied license is an unwritten license which permits a party (the licensee) to do something that would normally require the express permission of another party (the licensor). Implied licenses may arise by operation of law from actions by the licensor which lead the licensee to believe that it has the necessary permission.

Contents

Implied licenses often arise where the licensee has purchased a physical embodiment of some intellectual property belonging to the licensor, or has paid for its creation, but has not obtained permission to use the intellectual property.

Examples

Types

In the United States, implied licenses are usually considered to be of two kinds: either they reflect the intention of the parties, which is inferred from a fact-specific inquiry into the surrounding circumstances, or else they are constructive agreements, in which case the intention of the parties is likely to be immaterial. In reality, there is a continuum between these kinds of implied license and it may be difficult to determine whether the license or contract in question is one which the law implies, irrespective of any protests by the unwilling licensor, or instead one inferred from the whole pattern of factual circumstances including the evidence of intent.[ citation needed ]

In England, there is more of a tendency to regard all implied licenses as matters of fact and intent, while what would be a license implied by law in the US is treated under some other branch of substantive law such as the doctrine of non-derogation from grants. [10]

In both countries, the exhaustion doctrine has the effect of creating an implied license to use a product sold under the "authority" of the patentee. It is controversial whether and to what extent contractual expedients can successfully limit the scope of such implied licenses.

Express license

The opposite of an implied license is an express license, which, for some forms of intellectual property, must be in writing. Oral exclusive licenses were permitted, however, under US copyright law before 1978. [11] Oral nonexclusive copyright licenses remain valid under US law. [12] Patent licenses may be oral. [13] Licenses under the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act must be in writing. [14]

Related Research Articles

A royalty payment is a payment made by one party to another that owns a particular asset, for the right to ongoing use of that asset. Royalties are typically agreed upon as a percentage of gross or net revenues derived from the use of an asset or a fixed price per unit sold of an item of such, but there are also other modes and metrics of compensation. A royalty interest is the right to collect a stream of future royalty payments.

Software copyright is the application of copyright in law to machine-readable software. While many of the legal principles and policy debates concerning software copyright have close parallels in other domains of copyright law, there are a number of distinctive issues that arise with software. This article primarily focuses on topics particular to software.

Copyright misuse is an equitable defence to copyright infringement in the United States based upon the doctrine of unclean hands. The misuse doctrine provides that the copyright holder engaged in abusive or improper conduct in exploiting or enforcing the copyright will be precluded from enforcing his rights against the infringer. Copyright misuse is often comparable to and draws from the older and more established doctrine of patent misuse, which bars a patentee from obtaining relief for infringement when he extends his patent rights beyond the limited monopoly conferred by the law.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Patent infringement</span> Breach of the rights conferred by a patent

Patent infringement is an unauthorized act of - for example - making, using, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes a patented product. Where the subject-matter of the patent is a process, infringement involves the act of using, offering for sale, selling or importing for these purposes at least the product obtained by the patented process. In other words, patent infringement is the commission of a prohibited act with respect to a patented invention without permission from the patent holder. Permission may typically be granted in the form of a license. The definition of patent infringement may vary by jurisdiction.

In United States patent law, patent misuse is a patent holder's use of a patent to restrain trade beyond enforcing the exclusive rights that a lawfully obtained patent provides. If a court finds that a patent holder committed patent misuse, the court may rule that the patent holder has lost the right to enforce the patent. Patent misuse that restrains economic competition substantially can also violate United States antitrust law.

The doctrine of assignor estoppel is a doctrine of United States patent law barring a patent's seller (assignor) from attacking the patent's validity in subsequent patent infringement litigation. The doctrine is based on the doctrine of legal estoppel, which prohibits a grantor from challenging the validity of his/her/its grant.

A compulsory license provides that the owner of a patent or copyright licenses the use of their rights against payment either set by law or determined through some form of adjudication or arbitration. In essence, under a compulsory license, an individual or company seeking to use another's intellectual property can do so without seeking the rights holder's consent, and pays the rights holder a set fee for the license. This is an exception to the general rule under intellectual property laws that the intellectual property owner enjoys exclusive rights that it may license—or decline to license—to others.

The exhaustion doctrine, also referred to as the first sale doctrine, is a U.S. common law patent doctrine that limits the extent to which patent holders can control an individual article of a patented product after a so-called authorized sale. Under the doctrine, once an authorized sale of a patented article occurs, the patent holder's exclusive rights to control the use and sale of that article are said to be "exhausted," and the purchaser is free to use or resell that article without further restraint from patent law. However, under the repair and reconstruction doctrine, the patent owner retains the right to exclude purchasers of the articles from making the patented invention anew, unless it is specifically authorized by the patentee to do so.

<i>Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc.</i>

Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, is a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, in which the court appeared to overrule or drastically limit many years of U.S. Supreme Court precedent affirming the patent exhaustion doctrine, for example in Bauer & Cie. v. O'Donnell.

Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008), is a case decided by the United States Supreme Court in which the Court reaffirmed the validity of the patent exhaustion doctrine. The decision made uncertain the continuing precedential value of a line of decisions in the Federal Circuit that had sought to limit Supreme Court exhaustion doctrine decisions to their facts and to require a so-called "rule of reason" analysis of all post-sale restrictions other than tie-ins and price fixes. In the course of restating the patent exhaustion doctrine, the Court held that it is triggered by, among other things, an authorized sale of a component when the only reasonable and intended use of the component is to engage the patent and the component substantially embodies the patented invention by embodying its essential features. The Court also overturned, in passing, that the exhaustion doctrine was limited to product claims and did not apply to method claims.

The doctrine of non-derogation from grants is a principle of the law of England and Wales. As the House of Lords explained in British Leyland Motor Corp. v. Armstrong Patents Co., it states that a seller of realty or goods is not permitted to take any action that will lessen the value to the buyer of the thing sold.

United States v. General Electric Co., 272 U.S. 476 (1926), is a decision of the United States Supreme Court holding that a patentee who has granted a single license to a competitor to manufacture the patented product may lawfully fix the price at which the licensee may sell the product.

A post-sale restraint, also termed a post-sale restriction, as those terms are used in United States patent law and antitrust law, is a limitation that operates after a sale of goods to a purchaser has occurred and purports to restrain, restrict, or limit the scope of the buyer's freedom to utilize, resell, or otherwise dispose of or take action regarding the sold goods. Such restraints have also been termed "equitable servitudes on chattels".

<i>Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc.</i> United States district court case

Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc. was a case in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington regarding the applicability of the first-sale doctrine to software sold under the terms of so-called "shrinkwrap licensing." The court held that when the transfer of software to the purchaser materially resembled a sale it was, in fact, a "sale with restrictions on use" giving rise to a right to resell the copy under the first-sale doctrine. As such, Autodesk could not pursue an action for copyright infringement against Vernor, who sought to resell used versions of its software on eBay. The decision was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which issued a decision on September 10, 2010, reversing the first-sale doctrine ruling and remanding for further proceedings on the misuse of copyright claim. The Ninth Circuit's decision asserted that its ruling was compelled by Ninth Circuit precedent, but observed that the policy considerations involved in the case might affect motion pictures and libraries as well as sales of used software.

<i>Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc.</i>

Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, 320 F.3d 1317, was a U.S. Court of Appeals Federal Circuit case involving Harold L. Bowers and Baystate Technologies over patent infringement, copyright infringement, and breach of contract. In the case, the court found that Baystate had breached their contract by reverse engineering Bower's program, something expressly prohibited by a shrink wrap license that Baystate entered into upon purchasing a copy of Bower's software. This case is notable for establishing that license agreements can preempt fair use rights as well as expand the rights of copyright holders beyond those codified in US federal law.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Trademark infringement</span> Violation of trademark rights

Trademark infringement is a violation of the exclusive rights attached to a trademark without the authorization of the trademark owner or any licensees. Infringement may occur when one party, the "infringer", uses a trademark which is identical or confusingly similar to a trademark owned by another party, especially in relation to products or services which are identical or similar to the products or services which the registration covers. An owner of a trademark may commence civil legal proceedings against a party which infringes its registered trademark. In the United States, the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984 criminalized the intentional trade in counterfeit goods and services.

Princo Corp. v. ITC, 616 F.3d 1318 was a 2010 decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, that sought to narrow the defense of patent misuse to claims for patent infringement. Princo held that a party asserting the defense of patent misuse, absent a case of so-called per se misuse, must prove both "leveraging" of the patent being enforced against it and a substantial anticompetitive effect outside the legitimate scope of that patent right. In so ruling, the court emphasized that the misuse alleged must involve the patent in suit, not another patent.

<i>Button-Fastener case</i>

The Button-Fastener Case, Heaton-Peninsular Button-Fastener Co. v. Eureka Specialty Co., also known as the Peninsular Button-Fastener Case, was for a time a highly influential decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Many courts of appeals, and the United States Supreme Court in the A.B. Dick case adopted its "inherency doctrine"—"the argument that, since the patentee may withhold his patent altogether from public use, he must logically and necessarily be permitted to impose any conditions which he chooses upon any use which he may allow of it." In 1917, however, the Supreme Court expressly overruled the Button-Fastener Case and the A.B. Dick case, in the Motion Picture Patents case.

Impression Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc., 581 U.S. ___ (2017), is a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States on the exhaustion doctrine in patent law in which the Court held that after the sale of a patented item, the patent holder cannot sue for patent infringement relating to further use of that item, even when in violation of a contract with a customer or imported from outside the United States. The case concerned a patent infringement lawsuit brought by Lexmark against Impression Products, Inc., which bought used ink cartridges, refilled them, replaced a microchip on the cartridge to circumvent a digital rights management scheme, and then resold them. Lexmark argued that as they own several patents related to the ink cartridges, Impression Products was violating their patent rights. The U.S. Supreme Court, reversing a 2016 decision of the Federal Circuit, held that the exhaustion doctrine prevented Lexmark's patent infringement lawsuit, although Lexmark could enforce restrictions on use or resale of its contracts with direct purchasers under regular contract law. Besides printer and ink manufacturers, the decision of the case could affect the markets of high tech consumer goods and prescription drugs.

<i>National Lockwasher Co. v. George K. Garrett Co.</i>

National Lockwasher Co. v. George K. Garrett Co., 137 F.2d 255, is one of the earliest or the earliest federal court decision to hold that it is patent misuse for a patentee to require licensees not to use a competitive technology. Such provisions are known as "tie-outs."

References

  1. "An incident to the purchase of any article, whether patented or unpatented, is the right to use and sell it...." United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 249 (1942); see also Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 484 (1964) ("[I]t is fundamental that sale of a patented article by the patentee or under his authority carries with it an 'implied license to use.'") (quoting Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 453, 456 (1873)).
  2. United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178 (1933); Lariscey v. United States, 949 F.2d 1137 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
  3. Section 101, Copyright Act of 1976 (USC 17 §101)
  4. Asset Marketing Systems, Inc. v. Gagnon, 542 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2008)
  5. Barry, William Frederick (1928). "Harold Drabble, Limited, and Another v. Hycolite Manufacturing Company and Others". Times Law Reports. Vol. 44. pp. 264–267.
  6. Karapapa, Stavroula (2020). Defences to Copyright Infringement. Oxford University Press. p. 145. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198795636.003.0005. ISBN   9780198795636.
  7. Blair v Osborn and Tomkins [1971] 2 WLR 503
  8. David Bainbridge, Intellectual Property, 1999 (4th ed.), pp.84-85
  9. Pessach, Guy; Shur-Ofry, Michal (April 28, 2019). "Copyright and the Holocaust". Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities. 30 (2): 42. ISSN   1041-6374 . Retrieved July 4, 2020.
  10. An illustrative case is British Leyland Motor Corp. v. Armstrong Patents Co., [1986] A.C. 577, [1986] All E.R. 850 (H.L.). The opinion by Lord Templeman in that case pointed out that an implied license might be negatived by express language, under principles of freedom of contract, but that was not so when non-derogation instead is involved: “The right cannot be withheld by the manufacturer of the car by contract with the first purchaser and cannot be withheld from any subsequent owner.” That is, the nature of property makes the right inherent and not a matter of freedom of contract. It is thus seen that the effect is comparable to the US license that is implied by operation of law.
  11. See Davis v. Blige, 505 F.3d 90, 108 (2d Cir. 2007).
  12. See Vincent v. City Colleges of Chicago, 485 F.3d 919, 922 (7th Cir. 2007); Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1538 n.12 (11th Cir. 1996).
  13. Waymark Corp. v. Porta Systems Corp., 334 F.3d 1358, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Enzo APA & Son v. Geapag A.G., 134 F.3d 1090, 1093 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
  14. Section 903(b) of the Act, 17 U.S.C. § 903(b), provides: "The owner of the exclusive rights in a mask work may transfer all of those rights, or license all or less than all of those rights, by any written instrument signed by such owner or a duly authorized agent of the owner."

Further reading