 | This article has multiple issues. Please help improve it or discuss these issues on the talk page . (Learn how and when to remove these template messages)
|
For military strategy, Intent is the desired outcome of a military operation. It is a key concept in 21st century military operations and is a vital element to facilitate subordinates' initiative [1] and collaboration and cooperation [2] amongst team members in joint operations. [3]
In the reviewed open military doctrine literature intent is a critical component for command and control. The many definitions that exist of intent are mostly similar but the actual intent content differs and is unclear. Intent content can mainly be found as concept descriptions in doctrinal handbooks relating to development or impact usage of intent. [3]
The following examples represent the doctrinal intent of the United Kingdom, Sweden, Canada, United States, and NATO.
In military doctrinal handbooks the identified intent artefacts generally express the initial state and situation, the desired end state and outcome, and how to get to the desired end state. Artefacts describing the initial situation are: own and other forces, adversaries, operating environment, terrain, time, preparation for future operations. Artefacts describing the outcome are: purpose, goals, mission, effects and end state. Artefacts describing how to reach the outcome are: concept of operations, tasks to subordinate units, risk willing, how results might enable transition to future operations, objectives, transition conditions, restrictions in conducting operations, allocation of resources, and expectations of force usage.
Another way to identify intent artefacts is from how people actually communicate intent. Klein (1998, pp. 225–29) [14] present the results of information types that is identified in intent communication. The seven information types of intent are according to Klein (1998, p. 226): [14] (1) Purpose of task which describes why the task is performed, (2) objective of task, presents a picture of the desired outcome, (3) sequence of steps in the plan. Klein identifies this to be a source of problem since too detailed descriptions may limit the subordinates initiative, (4) rationale for plan includes all the information that where present when making the decision, (5) key decisions that may have to be made, i.e. if there is a choice to be made the commander can provide the intent in how he wants it to be conducted, (6) antigoals, describe unwanted outcomes, and (7) constraints and other considerations describes weather and rule of engagement etc.
The doctrinal artefacts are mapped into the structure provided by Klein and the resulting seven facets are grouped in: (a) Initial Situation describing initial situation and state and consists of Kleins rationale for the plan, (b) Outcome is describing outcomes and consists of Kleins Purpose of task, objective of task, and antigoals, and (c) Execution that is describing how to reach the outcome and consists of Kleins sequence of steps, key decisions and constraints and other considerations.
Intent is then defined to consist of the following eight facets.
Commander's intent is an intent describing military focused operations and it is a publicly stated description of the end-state as it relates to forces (entities, people) and terrain, the purpose of the operation, and key tasks to accomplish. It is developed by a small group, e.g. staff, and a commander.
Commander's intent (CSI) plays a central role in military decision making and planning. CSI acts as a basis for staffs and subordinates to develop their own plans and orders to transform thought into action, while maintaining the overall intention of their commander. The commander's intent links the mission and concept of operations. It describes the end state and key tasks that, along with the mission, are the basis for subordinates’ initiative. Commanders may also use the commander's intent to explain a broader purpose beyond that of the mission statement. The mission and the commander's intent must be understood two echelons down. (U.S Army 2003, para. 4-27) [10] Pigeau and McCann (2006) [17] state that intent is more than an aim or a purpose; they state that Intent contains the aim and purpose together with all implications. Hence, CSI is not only to describe the End-State but also a concise expression of the purpose of the operation. CSI may also include the commander's assessment of the adversary commander's intent and an assessment of where and how much risk is acceptable during the operation. This view is supported by Klein (1998, p. 225) [18] CSI originates from one commander's mind and is disseminated to the echelons below. CSI rarely gets reviewed and updated. For a short duration mission, such as a deliberate attack, the original statement may remain valid throughout planning. But for longer phases, in order to be agile the CSI might be changing in phase with the unfolding of the situation. Commanders must develop their intent within the bounds of a whole hierarchy of guiding principles that limit the types of solutions that they can entertain (Pigeau & McCann 2006). [17]
Common intent is an intent that is shared and understood by all participants, i.e. there is no discrepancy between the intent of the participating humans. Common intent is an idealized view of intent.
In today's operational environment teams need to work together towards a desired End-State. Pigeau and McCann (2000) [19] define Command and Control: “Command and Control: The establishment of common intent to achieve coordinated action”. Common intent is the combination of explicit intent and implicit intent. Pigeau and McCann (2006) [17] put forward that for a realizable Common Intent there need to be a single shared objective, together with a clear understanding in how that objective can be attained. They continue that Common Intent is an idealized concept where maximum overlap, with minimum scattering, exists between the intent of the commander and the intents of his subordinates. Knowledge known by the commander and his subordinates needs to be shared at all levels, guiding principles, reasoning ability, and to express similar levels of commitment. Intent is then not only something for a commander to disseminate but to exchange and learning the team members’ intent. Farrell and Lichacz (2004) [20] state that common intent describes a socio-psychological phenomenon that seems to be evident amongst a team that achieves a common objective. The CSI is a sort of a one person's view, but as said in the introduction “every individual have intent of her own” implies that it may not just be enough to disseminate intent amongst staff members and subordinates. A conclusion of the work of Farrell (2006) [21] is that teams with different military and civilian cultures would need that all team members establish a common understanding of the mission objectives and the Commander's intent with respect to their own competencies, authorities, and responsibilities. Pigeau and McCann (2006, pp. 85–108) [17] state that diverse team members need to have a high degree of common intent to perform effectively. In such teams the commander needs to ensure that the intent is perceived and understood by all team members (Pigeau & McCann 2000; [19] Farrell & Lichacz 2004; [20] Pigeau & McCann 2006; [17] Farrell 2006 [21] ). Alberts and Hayes (2007) [2] say that in order to allow subordinates’ initiative the operations order focuses on describing the CSI/CI so that flexibility in coordination and collaboration in the dynamic environment is entailed. There is a need for the commander to connect the subordinates’ human potential (reason, opinions, questions, seek information regarding the mission) to align and be a support to the commanders own intent (Pigeau & McCann 2006, p. 102). [17]
Command intent (CI) is a practical view of common intent, meaning that it is not plausible to expect that all individuals during a whole mission in all situations will share the same intent. CI will be developed for specific parts of missions and shared amongst the participants. To establish CI the involvement of all participants is necessary, e.g. compare with football or soccer teams where the overall intent is formalized by coaches in collaboration with the players and where each player knows what the other players’ intentions are.
Pigeau and McCann (2000) [19] states that “In reality, it is presumed true that it is impossible to have common intent”. For a specific mission bounded for a certain time an overlap of intent ought to be achievable, e.g. as illustrated by the players in a soccer team where all have individual goals with their lives and families, but on the soccer field they have the common intent to win the game. This means that during the game, and in training and exercises prior to and after the game their common intent is to perform well according to the mission declared by the coach (Farrell & Lichacz 2004; [20] Farrell 2006; [21] Gustavsson et al. 2008d). [15] A workable version of common intent is command intent that is directed for a specific situation, bounded by participating organization, space and time, i.e. for the operation at hand the intent is common but other intent and goals of the participating humans may differ. Much of the coordination can be done locally, i.e. on a lower level, without explicit orders. Brehmer (2009) [22] proposes that the higher levels of command will have the time to consider other aspects of the problems facing them. Brehmer continues that there is the loss of combat power inherent in top-down command-directed synchronization. By NATO Network Enabled Capabilities (NNEC) as presented by Alberts, Garstka & Stein (1999, pp. 87–93) [1] this is overcome by a high-speed continuum. Brehmer (2009) [22] however says that the main responsibility of the commander and his staff is to articulate intent and crafting rules of engagement. For armed forces that have mission command as their principal doctrine this is not a new concept, but Brehmer further envisions that with articulated intent larger units will be able to co-ordinate with other units and conduct the mission without any explicit directions from higher headquarters. Command Intent is then an outline of a plan, objectives to be achieved, responsibilities, linkages and schemas of manoeuvre, and constraints. Establishing command intent also involves more than one person. Traditional Commander's intent is then replaced by an intent that arises from dialogue between commanders and key staff at more than one level. Command intent is to allow self-synchronization and to provide understanding of the complex causes and effects. To enable self-synchronization the subordinates must be given the mandate to operate on their own initiatives, within the boundary of the mission. In “Rethinking Command and Control” by Curts and Cambell (2006), [23] the authors address this fine line between delegating authority and maintaining and controlling hierarchy The commander delegating authority must refrain from directing the actions of subordinates, yet must also maintain some command structure. The subordinates must have the ability to work independently or within a team to achieve the mission goals. To create this empowerment the commander's information should be shared with everyone. Autonomy is created by setting boundaries and hierarchy then can be replaced by self-directed teams. CI acts as a basis for staffs and subordinates to develop their own plans and orders that transform thought into action, while maintaining the overall intention of their commanders (Gustavsson et al. 2008d; [15] 2009 [24] ).
Explicit intent is an intent that is publicly stated and made available for the participants. Implicit intent is an intent that is not publicly stated. Implicit intent can be made explicit by the mechanism described below.
Shattuck and Woods (2000) [25] examined the role of communicating intent. In the study, company commanders received a battalion order including the battalion Commander's intent. Then changes to the situation were introduced and the actions performed by the company commanders were compared with the intent of the battalion commander. The result was that the company commanders matched their battalion commander's intent in only 34% of the cases. Pigeau and McCann (2000) [19] introduced that intent consists of an explicit part and an implicit part.
Explicit intent is the one that is publicly stated for all the headquarters (HQ) staff and subordinates to perceive, think about, and act upon. The explicit intent is either vocalized (i.e. made publicly) in doctrine, orders, statements or can be derived from questions and answers. Theoretically, each staff and subordinate member should be able to reiterate the commander's intent at any point during the process.
Implicit intent consists of all the un-vocalized expectations that the commander and all team members have. The implicit intent is developed over a longer time, prior to the mission, and develops from the style of how the commander is conducting the operations with respect to experience, risk willing, use of power and force, diplomacy, ethics, social values, moral, norms, creativity and unorthodox behaviour and the concepts, policies, laws and doctrine agreed to by military, civil, organizations, agencies, nations and coalitions. Farell and Lichacz (2004) [20] proposed that implicit intent is an internal expectation of Commander's intent. The example used by Farell & Lichacz (2004) [20] is that with an explicit intent “to capture the hill” the implicit intent might be “to capture the hill with minimal battle damage” or “to capture the hill with Air Force assets only.” The implicit expectations depend on how the members interpret Commander's intent from personal expectations based on their style and experience, (Pigeau & McCann 2000), [19] and with the staff position (e.g., planner, operator, commander, etc.), (cf. Farrell & Lichacz 2004). [20] Farell and Lichacz (2004) [20] provided a way of finding implicit intent by asking questions of the form “from perspective x, how do you interpret Commander’s intent?” Implicit intent can be made explicit by transforming the implicit into explicit statements. The commander can vocalize the Personal, Military or Cultural implicit intent. The commander can be monitored, e.g. by his subordinates, and his team members, who then draw conclusions about the commanders implicit intent. In the same way a commander can draw conclusions regarding his subordinates. Pigeau and McCann (2000) [19] presented some mechanisms of making original implicit intent made explicit. They are: (1) Externalization is when a commander or subordinate make the internal intents explicit declared; (2) Internalization is a version of tacit learning, when a commander presents the intent and the mouth is saying something and the body language signals something different, or add context and meaning that are put into the mental model and affects the implicit intent; (3) Socialization is meeting and talking and performing exercises together, teaming, i.e. is to find the implicit intent and motives etc.; and (4) Dialogue is the explicit stated, publicly vocalized available description of an individual's intent.
A military staff or general staff is a group of officers, enlisted and civilian staff who serve the commander of a division or other large military unit in their command and control role through planning, analysis, and information gathering, as well as by relaying, coordinating, and supervising the execution of their plans and orders, especially in case of multiple simultaneous and rapidly changing complex operations. They are organised into functional groups such as administration, logistics, operations, intelligence, training, etc. They provide multi-directional flow of information between a commanding officer, subordinate military units and other stakeholders. A centralised general staff results in tighter top-down control but requires larger staff at headquarters (HQ) and reduces accuracy of orientation of field operations, whereas a decentralised general staff results in enhanced situational focus, personal initiative, speed of localised action, OODA loop, and improved accuracy of orientation.
Mission-type tactics, is a form of military tactics in which the emphasis is placed on the outcome of a mission rather than the specific methods. Mission-type tactics have been a central component of the military tactics of German armed forces since the 19th century. The term Auftragstaktik was coined by the tactic's opponents, who preferred Normaltaktiker. In today's German army, the Bundeswehr, the term Auftragstaktik is considered an incorrect characterization of the concept; instead, Führen mit Auftrag is used. However, the older unofficial term is more widespread.
Principles of war are rules and guidelines that represent truths in the practice of war and military operations.
The Military Staff of the European Union (EUMS) is the directorate-general of the European Union's (EU) External Action Service (EEAS) that contributes to the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) by providing strategic advice to the High Representative (HR/VP) and commanding operations through its Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) operational headquarters. From the end of 2020 the MPCC will also be capable of running executive operations of up to 2500 troops, i.e. the size of one battle group, as well as 3 non-executive missions.
Marine Air-Ground Task Force is a term used by the United States Marine Corps to describe the principal organization for all missions across the range of military operations. MAGTFs are a balanced air-ground, combined arms task organization of Marine Corps forces under a single commander that is structured to accomplish a specific mission. The MAGTF was formalized by the publishing of Marine Corps Order 3120.3 in December 1963 "The Marine Corps in the National Defense, MCDP 1-0". It stated:
An Operation Order, often abbreviated to OPORD, is a plan format meant to assist subordinate units with the conduct of military operations. An OPORD describes the situation the unit faces, the mission of the unit, and what supporting activities the unit will conduct in order to achieve their commander's desired end state. Normally an OPORD is generated at the battalion, regimental, brigade, divisional, or corps headquarters and disseminated to its assigned or attached elements. The issuance of an OPORD triggers subordinate unit leadership to develop orders specific to the role or roles that the unit will assume within the operation. This more narrowly focused order borrows information from the original, or base, order and adds additional details that pertain more to the minutiae of the actions a unit is tasked to conduct in support of the overarching operation.
Mission command, also referred to as mission-type tactics, is a style of military command, derived from the Prussian-pioneered mission-type tactics doctrine, which combines centralized intent with decentralized execution subsidiarity and promotes freedom and speed of action, and initiative, within defined constraints. Subordinates, understanding the commander's intentions, their own missions and the context of those missions, are told what effect they are to achieve and the reason why it needs to be achieved. They then decide within their delegated freedom of action how best to achieve their missions. Orders focus on providing intent, control measures, and objectives, allowing for greater freedom of action by subordinate commanders. Mission command is closely related to civilian management concept of workplace empowerment and its use in business has been explored by writers such as Bungay (2011) and Tozer. It is advocated, but not always used, by the militaries of the United States, Canada, Netherlands, Australia and the United Kingdom. Mission command is compatible with modern military net-centric concepts, and less centralized approaches to command and control (C2) in general.
Military organization or military organisation is the structuring of the armed forces of a state so as to offer such military capability as a national defense policy may require. In some countries paramilitary forces are included in a nation's armed forces, though not considered military. Armed forces that are not a part of military or paramilitary organizations, such as insurgent forces, often mimic military organizations, or use ad hoc structures, while formal military organization tends to use hierarchical forms.
Command and control is a "set of organizational and technical attributes and processes ... [that] employs human, physical, and information resources to solve problems and accomplish missions" to achieve the goals of an organization or enterprise, according to a 2015 definition by military scientists Marius Vassiliou, David S. Alberts, and Jonathan R. Agre. The term often refers to a military system.
Effects-based operations (EBO) is a United States military concept that emerged during the Persian Gulf War for the planning and conduct of operations combining military and non-military methods to achieve a particular effect. An effects-based approach to operations was first applied in modern times in the design and execution of the Desert Storm air campaign of 1991. The principal author of the daily attack plans—then Lt Colonel, now retired Lt General David A. Deptula—used an effects-based approach in building the actual Desert Storm air campaign targeting plan. Deptula describes the background, rationale, and provides an example of how an effects-based approach to targeting was conducted in Desert Storm in the publication, "Effects-Based Operations: Change in the Nature of Warfare." The doctrine was developed with an aim of putting desired strategic effects first and then planning from the desired strategic objective back to the possible tactical level actions that could be taken to achieve the desired effect. Contrary to conventional military approaches of force-on-force application that focused on attrition and annihilation, EBO focused on desired outcomes attempting to use a minimum of force. The approach was enabled by advancements in weaponry—particularly stealth and precision weapons—in conjunction with a planning approach based on specific effects rather than absolute destruction. Deptula, speaking at the Gulf War Air Campaign Tenth Anniversary Retrospective, on 17 January 2001 on One Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC, defined the goal of EBO; "If we focus on effects, the end of strategy, rather than force-on-force the traditional means to achieve it militarily, that enables us to consider different and perhaps more effective ways to accomplish the same goal quicker than in the past, with fewer resources and most importantly with fewer casualties." Others have postulated that EBO could be interpreted as an emerging understanding that attacking a second-order target may have first order consequences for a variety of objectives, wherein the Commander's intent can be satisfied with a minimum of collateral damage or risk to his own forces.
Area of responsibility (AOR) is a pre-defined geographic region assigned to Combatant commanders of the Unified Command Plan (UCP), that are used to define an area with specific geographic boundaries where they have the authority to plan and conduct operations; for which a force, or component commander bears a certain responsibility. The term may also be used in other countries worldwide but it originated within the United States Armed Forces. This system is designed to allow a single commander to exercise command and control of all military forces in the AOR, regardless of their branch of service.
In 1961 the United States Strike Command (STRICOM) was established at MacDill Air Force Base as a unified combatant command capable of responding to global crises. The name of the command was originally derived from the acronym for Swift Tactical Reaction In Every Known Environment (STRIKE). It integrated the CONUS-based forces of the Army's Continental Army Command and the Air Force's Composite Air Strike Force (CASF) and Tactical Air Command.
Truppenführung was a German Army field manual published in 2 parts as Heeresdruckvorschrift 300: Part 1, promulgated in 1933, and Part 2 in 1934.
The Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management, or CIVCOM, is an advisory body within the European Union dealing with civilian aspects of crisis management. The activities of CIVCOM therefore forms part of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of EU, and the civilian side of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). CIVCOM is composed of representatives of the EU member states.
The reconnaissance mission within the United States Marine Corps is divided into two distinct but complementary aspects; Marine Division Recon and Force Reconnaissance.
Battle command (BC) is the discipline of visualizing, describing, directing, and leading forces in operations against a hostile, thinking, and adaptive enemy. Battle command applies leadership to translate decision into actions, by synchronizing forces and warfighting functions in time, space, and purpose, to accomplish missions. Battle command refers both to processes triggered by commanders and executed by soldiers and to the system of systems (SoS) that directly enables those processes.
Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC), is a United States Department of Defense doctrinal term. It is pronounced "Jay-Flick".
This article outlines the command and control structure of the European Union's missions, which are deployed as part of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). This structure ranges from the political strategic level to the tactical level.
Army Service Component Commands (ASCCs) are U.S. Army commands responsible for recommendations to the Joint Force Commander on the allocation and employment of U.S. Army forces within a combatant command or further assigned to subordinate unified command. In the event that a combatant commander created a subordinate unified command the Department of the Army will form a matching Army component headquarters.
The Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) is body within the European Union's (EU) External Action Service (EEAS) that is in charge of the integrated civilian-military planning within the sphere of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP).
Based on the PhD Thesis by Gustavsson Per M. (2011) "Modelling, Formalising, and Implementing Intent in Command and Control Systems", De Montfort University Leicester, UK
