Judicial deference

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Judicial deference is the condition of a court yielding or submitting its judgment to that of another legitimate party, such as the executive branch in the case of national defense. It is most commonly found in countries, such as the United Kingdom, which lack an entrenched constitution, as the essential purpose of such documents is to limit the power of the legislature.

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United Kingdom

In Regina v. Director of Public Prosecutions Ex Parte Kebeline and Others [1999], Lord Hope explained that courts should "defer, on democratic grounds, to the considered opinion of the elected body as to where the balance is to be struck between the rights of the individual and the needs of society". Nevertheless, the doctrine has been criticised for representing a way in which the courts should act obediently to the British Parliament to uphold the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.

However, any suggestions that the House of Lords was being unduly servile to Parliament were overturned by A v Home Secretary [2005]. In the case, detainees imprisoned without charge under section 23 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, on the grounds that they posed a threat to national security, appealed successfully against their detention. The court held that the powers of detention without charge had discriminatory impact (Articles 5 and 14 of the Human Rights Act 1998).

United States

There are some examples of judicial deference in the United States, despite its entrenched constitution. For example, in immigration law, the judiciary has historically sought to allow the explicit constitutional authority of the US Congress. An example is US Supreme Court decision Fiallo v. Bell (1977).

The same restraint is requested in foreign affairs as not-judicable matters, [1] to safeguard the executive branch.

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<span class="mw-page-title-main">Political question</span> Legal doctrine of political matters justiciability

In United States constitutional law, the political questiondoctrine holds that a constitutional dispute that requires knowledge of a non-legal character or the use of techniques not suitable for a court or explicitly assigned by the Constitution to the U.S. Congress, or the President of the United States, lies within the political, rather than the legal, realm to solve, and judges customarily refuse to address such matters. The idea of a political question is closely linked to the concept of justiciability, as it comes down to a question of whether or not the court system is an appropriate forum in which to hear the case. This is because the court system only has the authority to hear and decide a legal question, not a political one. Legal questions are deemed to be justiciable, while political questions are nonjusticiable. One scholar explained:

The political question doctrine holds that some questions, in their nature, are fundamentally political, and not legal, and if a question is fundamentally political ... then the court will refuse to hear that case. It will claim that it doesn't have jurisdiction. And it will leave that question to some other aspect of the political process to settle out.

Judicial independence is the concept that the judiciary should be independent from the other branches of government. That is, courts should not be subject to improper influence from the other branches of government or from private or partisan interests. Judicial independence is important for the idea of separation of powers.

In many Commonwealth jurisdictions, the phrase "peace, order, and good government" (POGG) is an expression used in law to express the legitimate objects of legislative powers conferred by statute. The phrase appears in many Imperial Acts of Parliament and Letters Patent, most notably the constitutions of Barbados, Canada, Australia and formerly New Zealand and South Africa.

<i>A v Secretary of State for the Home Department</i> UK human rights case

A and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department[2004] UKHL 56 is a UK human rights case heard before the House of Lords. It held that the indefinite detention of foreign prisoners in Belmarsh without trial under section 23 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 was incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights.

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), was a landmark decision of the United States Supreme Court that set forth the legal test used when U.S. federal courts must defer to a government agency's interpretation of a law or statute. The decision articulated a doctrine known as "Chevron deference". Chevron deference consisted of a two-part test that was deferential to government agencies: first, whether Congress has spoken directly to the precise issue at question, and second, "whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute".

The protection of basic human rights is enshrined in Constitution of Malaysia. These include liberty of the person and prohibition of slavery and forced labour. At the national level, legislative measures that exist to prevent human rights violations and abuses can be found in acts and laws on issues that either have a human rights component or relate to certain groups of society whose rights may be at risk of being violated. Human rights groups are generally critical of the Malaysian government and the Royal Malaysia Police. Preventive detention laws such as the Internal Security Act and the Emergency Ordinance 1969 allow for detention without trial or charge and as such are a source of concern for human rights organizations like Suara Rakyat Malaysia.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990</span> New Zealand statute

The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 is a statute of the Parliament of New Zealand part of New Zealand's uncodified constitution that sets out the rights and fundamental freedoms of anyone subject to New Zealand law as a bill of rights, and imposes a legal requirement on the attorney-general to provide a report to parliament whenever a bill is inconsistent with the Bill of Rights.

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<span class="mw-page-title-main">Internal Security Act (Singapore)</span> Statute of the Parliament of Singapore

The Internal Security Act 1960 (ISA) of Singapore is a statute that grants the executive power to enforce preventive detention, prevent subversion, suppress organized violence against persons and property, and do other things incidental to the internal security of Singapore. The present Act was originally enacted by the Parliament of Malaysia as the Internal Security Act 1960, and extended to Singapore on 16 September 1963 when Singapore was a state of the Federation of Malaysia.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Law of Bangladesh</span>

Bangladesh is a common law country having its legal system developed by the British rulers during their colonial rule over British India. The land now comprises Bangladesh was known as Bengal during the British and Mughal regime while by some other names earlier. Though there were religious and political equipments and institutions from almost prehistoric era, Mughals first tried to recognise and establish them through state mechanisms. The Charter of 1726, granted by King George I, authorised the East India Company to establish Mayor's Courts in Madras, Bombay and Calcutta and is recognised as the first codified law for the British India. As a part of the then British India, it was the first codified law for the then Bengal too. Since independence in 1971, statutory law enacted by the Parliament of Bangladesh has been the primary form of legislation. Judge-made law continues to be significant in areas such as constitutional law. Unlike in other common law countries, the Supreme Court of Bangladesh has the power to not only interpret laws made by the parliament, but to also declare them null and void and to enforce fundamental rights of the citizens. The Bangladesh Code includes a compilation of all laws since 1836. The vast majority of Bangladeshi laws are in English. But most laws adopted after 1987 are in Bengali. Family law is intertwined with religious law. Bangladesh has significant international law obligations.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">United Kingdom administrative law</span>

United Kingdom administrative law is part of UK constitutional law that is designed through judicial review to hold executive power and public bodies accountable under the law. A person can apply to the High Court to challenge a public body's decision if they have a "sufficient interest", within three months of the grounds of the cause of action becoming known. By contrast, claims against public bodies in tort or contract are usually limited by the Limitation Act 1980 to a period of 6 years.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Judicial review</span> Ability of courts to review actions by executive and legislatures

Judicial review is a process under which a government's executive, legislative, or administrative actions are subject to review by the judiciary. In a judicial review, a court may invalidate laws, acts, or governmental actions that are incompatible with a higher authority. For example, an executive decision may be invalidated for being unlawful, or a statute may be invalidated for violating the terms of a constitution. Judicial review is one of the checks and balances in the separation of powers—the power of the judiciary to supervise the legislative and executive branches when the latter exceed their authority. The doctrine varies between jurisdictions, so the procedure and scope of judicial review may differ between and within countries.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Constitution of the United Kingdom</span> Uncodified constitution of the UK

The constitution of the United Kingdom comprises the written and unwritten arrangements that establish the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as a political body. Unlike in most countries, no official attempt has been made to codify such arrangements into a single document, thus it is known as an uncodified constitution. This enables the constitution to be easily changed as no provisions are formally entrenched.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Article 9 of the Constitution of Singapore</span> Guarantee of the right to life, and the right to personal liberty

Article 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore, specifically Article 9(1), guarantees the right to life and the right to personal liberty. The Court of Appeal has called the right to life the most basic of human rights, but has yet to fully define the term in the Constitution. Contrary to the broad position taken in jurisdictions such as Malaysia and the United States, the High Court of Singapore has said that personal liberty only refers to freedom from unlawful incarceration or detention.

<i>Chng Suan Tze v Minister for Home Affairs</i> 1988 Singapore Court of Appeal judgement

Chng Suan Tze v. Minister for Home Affairs is a seminal case in administrative law decided by the Court of Appeal of Singapore in 1988. The Court decided the appeal in the appellants' favour on a technical ground, but considered obiter dicta the reviewability of government power in preventive detention cases under the Internal Security Act ("ISA"). The case approved the application by the court of an objective test in the review of government discretion under the ISA, stating that all power has legal limits and the rule of law demands that the courts should be able to examine the exercise of discretionary power. This was a landmark shift from the position in the 1971 High Court decision Lee Mau Seng v. Minister of Home Affairs, which had been an authority for the application of a subjective test until it was overruled by Chng Suan Tze.

<i>Teo Soh Lung v Minister for Home Affairs</i>

Teo Soh Lung v Minister for Home Affairs is the name of two cases of the Singapore courts, a High Court decision delivered in 1989 and the 1990 judgment in the appeal from that decision to the Court of Appeal. The cases were concerned with the constitutionality of amendments made to the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore and the Internal Security Act ("ISA") in 1989. The latter statute authorizes detention without trial on security grounds. These amendments had the effect of changing the law on judicial review of executive discretion under the ISA by re-establishing the subjective test enunciated in the 1971 High Court decision Lee Mau Seng v Minister for Home Affairs which had been overruled in 1988 by Chng Suan Tze v Minister for Home Affairs, and limiting the right of judicial review to ensuring compliance with procedures specified in the ISA. In other words, the amendments were intended to render the exercise of power by the President and the Minister for Home Affairs under the ISA to detain persons without trial not justiciable by the courts. Both the High Court and Court of Appeal found that these amendments were constitutional because Parliament had done nothing more than enact the rule of law relating to the law applicable to judicial review. Thus, the amendments validly operated to deprive the applicant Teo Soh Lung of the ability to apply to the courts for judicial review.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Judicial independence in Singapore</span> Judicial independence in the nation

Judicial independence is protected by Singapore's Constitution, statutes such as the State Courts Act and Supreme Court of Judicature Act, and the common law. Independence of the judiciary is the principle that the judiciary should be separated from legislative and executive power, and shielded from inappropriate pressure from these branches of government, and from private or partisan interests. It is crucial as it serves as a foundation for the rule of law and democracy.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Rule of law doctrine in Singapore</span> Law doctrine in Singapore

In Singapore, the rule of law doctrine has been the topic of considerable disagreement and debate, largely through differing conceptions of the doctrine. These conceptions can generally be divided into two categories developed by legal academics, the "thin", or formal, conception and the "thick", or substantive, conception of the rule of law. The thin conception, often associated with the legal scholars Albert Venn Dicey and Joseph Raz, advocates the view that the rule of law is fulfilled by adhering to formal procedures and requirements, such as the stipulations that all laws be prospective, clear, stable, constitutionally enacted, and that the parties to legal disputes are treated equally and without bias on the part of judges. While people subscribing to the thin conception do not dismiss the importance of the content of the law, they take the view that this is a matter of substantive justice and should not be regarded as part of the concept of the rule of law. On the other hand, the thick conception of the rule of law entails the notion that in addition to the requirements of the thin rule, it is necessary for the law to conform to certain substantive standards of justice and human rights.

The rule of law is one of the longest established common law fundamental principles of the governance of the United Kingdom, dating to Magna Carta of 1215, particularly jurisprudence following its late 13th century re-drafting. At a minimum, it subjects an otherwise absolute monarch (executive) and all free people within its jurisdictions, primarily those of England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, to legal doctrines known as the general principles of law. It has evolved to work only alongside equal application of the law to all free people 'equality before the law' and within the framework of the constitutional monarchy supports the legal doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. Exactly what it entails beyond this and the way that different aspects of the rule of law principle are applied, depends on the specific situation and era.

References

  1. Kirk A. Randazzo, Defenders of Liberty or Champions of Security? Federal Courts, the Hierarchy of Justice, and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1438430477, 9781438430478, SUNY Press 2010.

See also