| Keeble v Hickeringill | |
|---|---|
 | |
| Court | Queen's Bench |
| Decided | 1707 |
| Citation(s) | (1707) 11 East 574; 103 ER 1127 |
| Case history | |
| Prior action(s) | Plaintiff won £20 at trial |
| Court membership | |
| Judge(s) sitting | Holt, C.J. |
Keeble v Hickeringill (1707) 103 ER 1127 is a famous English property law and tort law case about rights to wild animals. [1]
Samuel Keeble (the plaintiff) owned property called Minott's Meadow, which contained a pond outfitted with nets and channels in a manner used to catch large numbers of commercially viable ducks. This type of pond served as a sort of "duck trap" and was known as a decoy. Tame ducks were used to lure their wild counterparts into the decoy.
On three occasions, defendant Edmund Hickeringill, while on his own land, discharged firearms toward Keeble's pond in order to scare away the ducks. [2]
Chief Justice Holt sustained the action of trespass on the case, because every person has the right to put his property to use for his own pleasure and profit. If Hickeringill had built a decoy on his own land near Keeble's meadow to draw away ducks (which, in fact, he had done previous to the construction of Keeble's own decoy and may have lent some cause as to Hickeringill's harassing actions), no action could be taken, because Hickeringill would have just as much right to set up a decoy on his own property as Keeble does on his. But, Hickeringill actively disturbed the ducks on Keeble's land, thereby causing damages in that,
he that hinders another in his trade or livelihood is liable.
Furthermore, Keeble had gone through the expense of setting up the decoy and nets, and to allow Hickeringill to disturb the profitable use of the land was bad for commerce. When a person hinders another's use of his own property for profit, it is actionable, even if there is no physical trespassing. Thus, Justice Holt concluded that
in short, that which is the true reason for this action is not brought to recover damage for the loss of the fowl, but for the disturbance.
On appeal, made by Hickeringill the verdict was re-affirmed without any change. Keeble won a verdict of £20. [3]
In the later House of Lords case of Allen v Flood, the Lords held that Keeble v Hickeringill was just a nuisance case, and not an economic torts case. [4]
Trespass is an area of tort law broadly divided into three groups: trespass to the person, trespass to chattels, and trespass to land.
Trespass to chattels is a tort whereby the infringing party has intentionally interfered with another person's lawful possession of a chattel. The interference can be any physical contact with the chattel in a quantifiable way, or any dispossession of the chattel. As opposed to the greater wrong of conversion, trespass to chattels is argued to be actionable per se.
Nuisance is a common law tort. It means something which causes offence, annoyance, trouble or injury. A nuisance can be either public or private. A public nuisance was defined by English scholar Sir James Fitzjames Stephen as,
"an act not warranted by law, or an omission to discharge a legal duty, which act or omission obstructs or causes inconvenience or damage to the public in the exercise of rights common to all Her Majesty's subjects".
Edmund Hickeringill (1631–1708) was an English churchman, soldier and author. He was separately convicted of forgery, slander and trespass.
English tort law concerns the compensation for harm to people's rights to health and safety, a clean environment, property, their economic interests, or their reputations. A "tort" is a wrong in civil, rather than criminal law, that usually requires a payment of money to make up for damage that is caused. Alongside contracts and unjust enrichment, tort law is usually seen as forming one of the three main pillars of the law of obligations.
Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330 is a leading decision by the House of Lords which established a new area of English tort law. It established the rule that one's non-natural use of their land, which leads to another's land being damaged as a result of dangerous things emanating from the land, is strictly liable.
Trespass to land is a common law tort or crime that is committed when an individual or the object of an individual intentionally enters the land of another without a lawful excuse. Trespass to land is actionable per se. Thus, the party whose land is entered upon may sue even if no actual harm is done. In some jurisdictions, this rule may also apply to entry upon public land having restricted access. A court may order payment of damages or an injunction to remedy the tort.
Tortious interference, also known as intentional interference with contractual relations, in the common law of torts, occurs when one person intentionally damages someone else's contractual or business relationships with a third party, causing economic harm. As an example, someone could use blackmail to induce a contractor into breaking a contract; they could threaten a supplier to prevent them from supplying goods or services to another party; or they could obstruct someone's ability to honor a contract with a client by deliberately refusing to deliver necessary goods.
The Case of the Thorns (1466) YB 6 Ed 4, 7a pl 18 is an important historical court case from the King's Bench in common law torts. The English case, which occurred in the 15th century, is the earliest record of a common law court basing its decision on the now fundamental principle of torts: That if an individual suffers (civil) damages at the hand of another, that individual has a right to be compensated.
The writs of trespass and trespass on the case are the two catchall torts from English common law, the former involving trespass against the person, the latter involving trespass against anything else which may be actionable. The writ is also known in modern times as action on the case and can be sought for any action that may be considered as a tort but is yet to be an established category.
In tort common law, the defense of necessity gives the state or an individual a privilege to take or use the property of another. A defendant typically invokes the defense of necessity only against the intentional torts of trespass to chattels, trespass to land, or conversion. The Latin phrase from common law is necessitas inducit privilegium quod jura privata. A court will grant this privilege to a trespasser when the risk of harm to an individual or society is apparently and reasonably greater than the harm to the property. Unlike the privilege of self-defense, those who are harmed by individuals invoking the necessity privilege are usually free from any wrongdoing. Generally, an individual invoking this privilege is obligated to pay any actual damages caused in the use of the property but not punitive or nominal damages.
Allen v Flood [1898] AC 1 is a leading case in English tort law and UK labour law on intentionally inflicted economic loss.
The following outline is provided as an overview of and introduction to tort law in common law jurisdictions:
The Occupiers' Liability Act 1984 is an Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom that covers occupiers' liability for trespassers. In British Railways Board v Herrington 1972 AC 877, the House of Lords had decided that occupiers owed a duty to trespassers, but the exact application of the decision was unclear. The matter was then referred to the Law Commission for a report, and as a result the Occupiers' Liability Bill was introduced to Parliament by Lord Hailsham on 23 June 1983. The Act was given the Royal Assent on 13 March 1984 as the Occupiers' Liability Act 1984 and came into force on 13 May.
Ashby v White (1703) 92 ER 126, is a foundational case in UK constitutional law and English tort law. It concerns the right to vote and misfeasance of a public officer. Lord Holt laid down the important principle that where there is injury in the absence of financial loss (injuria sine damno) the law makes the presumption of damage and that it is sufficient to demonstrate that a right has been infringed.
Conversion is an intentional tort consisting of "taking with the intent of exercising over the chattel an ownership inconsistent with the real owner's right of possession". In England & Wales, it is a tort of strict liability. Its equivalents in criminal law include larceny or theft and criminal conversion. In those jurisdictions that recognise it, criminal conversion is a lesser crime than theft/larceny.
Dougherty v. Stepp, 18 N.C. 371 is a decision of the North Carolina Supreme Court authored by Chief Justice Thomas Ruffin. For at least a century, this case has been used in first-year Torts classes in American law schools to teach students about the tort of trespass upon real property.
Trespass in English law is an area of tort law broadly divided into three groups: trespass to the person, trespass to goods, and trespass to land.
Tort law in India is primarily governed by judicial precedent as in other common law jurisdictions, supplemented by statutes governing damages, civil procedure, and codifying common law torts. As in other common law jurisdictions, a tort is breach of a non-contractual duty which has caused damage to the plaintiff giving rise to a civil cause of action and for which remedy is available. If a remedy does not exist, a tort has not been committed since the rationale of tort law is to provide a remedy to the person who has been wronged.
Cattle trespass was an ancient common law tort whereby the keeper of livestock was held strictly liable for any damage caused by the straying livestock. Under English law the tort was abolished by section 1(1)(c) of the Animals Act 1971, but the tort continues to subsist in other common law jurisdictions, either in its original form as a common law tort, or as modified by statute.
