Last diminisher

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The last diminisher procedure is a procedure for fair cake-cutting. It involves a certain heterogenous and divisible resource, such as a birthday cake, and n partners with different preferences over different parts of the cake. It allows the n people to achieve a proportional division, i.e., divide the cake among them such that each person receives a piece with a value of at least 1/n of the total value according to his own subjective valuation. For example, if Alice values the entire cake as $100 and there are 5 partners then Alice can receive a piece that she values as at least $20, regardless of what the other partners think or do.

Contents

History

During World War II, the Polish-Jewish mathematician Hugo Steinhaus, who was hiding from the Nazis, occupied himself with the question of how to divide resources fairly. Inspired by the divide and choose procedure for dividing a cake between two brothers, he asked his students, Stefan Banach and Bronisław Knaster, to find a procedure that can work for any number of people, and published their solution. [1]

This publication has initiated a new research topic which is now studied by many researchers in different disciplines; see fair division.

Description

This is the description of the division protocol in the words of the author:

"The partners being ranged A, B, C,.. N, A cuts from the cake an arbitrary part. B has now the right, but is not obliged, to diminish the slice cut off. Whatever he does, C has the right (without obligation) to diminish still the already diminished (or not diminished) slice, and so on up to N. The rule obliges the "last diminisher" to take as his part the slice he was the last to touch. This partner being thus disposed of, the remaining n−1 persons start the same game with the remainder of the cake. After the number of participants has been reduced to two, they apply the classical rule for halving the remainder."

Each partner has a method that guarantees that he receives a slice with a value of at least 1/n. The method is: always cut the current slice such that the remainder has a value of 1/n for you. There are two options: either you receive the slice that you have cut, or another person receives a smaller slice, whose value for you is less than 1/n. In the latter case, there are n−1 partners remaining and the value of the remaining cake is more than (n−1)/n. Hence by induction it is possible to prove that the received value is at least 1/n.

Degenerate case of a common preference function

The algorithm simplifies in the degenerate case that all partners have the same preference function because the partner that optimally first cuts a slice will also be its last diminisher. Equivalently,[ citation needed ] each partner 1, 2, ..., n−1 in turn cuts a slice from the remaining cake. Then in reverse order, each partner n, n−1, ..., 1 in turn selects a slice that has not yet been claimed. The first partner who cut a slice other than of value 1/n would be envious of another partner who ended up with more than they did.

Analysis

The last-diminisher protocol is discrete and can be played in turns. In the worst case, n × (n−1) / 2 = O(n2) actions are needed: one action per player per turn.

However, most of these O(n2) actions are not actual cuts, i.e. Alice can mark her desired slice on a paper and have the other players diminish them on the same paper etc.; only the "last diminisher" has to actually cut the cake. So, only n−1 cuts are needed.

The procedure is very liberal regarding the cuts. the cuts made by the partners can have any shape; they can even be disconnected. On the other hand, it is possible to restrict the cuts in order to guarantee that the pieces have a nice shape. In particular:

Continuous version

A continuous-time version of this protocol can be executed using the Dubins-Spanier Moving-knife procedure. [2] It was the first example of a continuous procedure in fair division. The knife is passed over the cake from the left end to the right. Any player may say stop when they think of the cake is to the left of the knife, the cake is cut and the player who spoke gets that piece. Repeat with the remaining cake and players, the last player gets the remainder of the cake. Similar to the last diminisher procedure, it can be used to cut the cake into contiguous parts for each player.

Approximate-envy-free version

When there are 3 or more partners, the division obtained by the last-diminisher protocol is not always envy-free. For example, suppose the first partner Alice receives a piece (which she values as 1/3 of the total). Then, the other two partners Bob and Charlie divide the remainder in such a way that is fair in their opinion, but in Alice's opinion Bob's share is worth 2/3 while Charlie's share is worth 0. Then Alice envies Bob.

A simple solution [3] is to allow re-entrance. I.e, a partner that won a piece by being the last diminisher, does not have to leave the game, but may rather stay and participate in further steps. If he wins again, he must release his current piece and it is returned to the cake. In order to make sure that the protocol terminates, we select a certain constant and add a rule that allows each partner to re-enter at most times.

In the reentrant version, each partner has a method that guarantees that he receives a slice with a value of at least the largest value minus . The method is: always cut the current slice such that the remainder has a value of plus your current value. This guarantees that your value grows by each time you win, and if you don't win - the value of the winner is at most more than your own value. Thus, the level of envy is at most (an additive constant).

The run-time is at most , since there are at most steps and at each step we query each of the partners.

A disadvantage of the approximate-envy-free variant is that the pieces are not necessarily connected, since pieces are constantly returned to the cake and re-divided. See envy-free cake-cutting#Connected pieces for other solutions to this problem.

Improvements

The last diminisher procedure has been improved later in many ways. For details, see proportional division.

Related Research Articles

Fair division is the problem in game theory of dividing a set of resources among several people who have an entitlement to them so that each person receives their due share. That problem arises in various real-world settings such as division of inheritance, partnership dissolutions, divorce settlements, electronic frequency allocation, airport traffic management, and exploitation of Earth observation satellites. It is an active research area in mathematics, economics, dispute resolution, etc. The central tenet of fair division is that such a division should be performed by the players themselves, maybe using a mediator but certainly not an arbiter as only the players really know how they value the goods.

An envy-free cake-cutting is a kind of fair cake-cutting. It is a division of a heterogeneous resource ("cake") that satisfies the envy-free criterion, namely, that every partner feels that their allocated share is at least as good as any other share, according to their own subjective valuation.

Divide and choose is a procedure for fair division of a continuous resource, such as a cake, between two parties. It involves a heterogeneous good or resource and two partners who have different preferences over parts of the cake. The protocol proceeds as follows: one person cuts the cake into two pieces; the other person selects one of the pieces; the cutter receives the remaining piece.

The Austin moving-knife procedures are procedures for equitable division of a cake. They allocate each of n partners, a piece of the cake which this partner values as exactly of the cake. This is in contrast to proportional division procedures, which give each partner at least of the cake, but may give more to some of the partners.

Chore division is a fair division problem in which the divided resource is undesirable, so that each participant wants to get as little as possible. It is the mirror-image of the fair cake-cutting problem, in which the divided resource is desirable so that each participant wants to get as much as possible. Both problems have heterogeneous resources, meaning that the resources are nonuniform. In cake division, cakes can have edge, corner, and middle pieces along with different amounts of frosting. Whereas in chore division, there are different chore types and different amounts of time needed to finish each chore. Similarly, both problems assume that the resources are divisible. Chores can be infinitely divisible, because the finite set of chores can be partitioned by chore or by time. For example, a load of laundry could be partitioned by the number of articles of clothing and/or by the amount of time spent loading the machine. The problems differ, however, in the desirability of the resources. The chore division problem was introduced by Martin Gardner in 1978.

Exact division, also called consensus division, is a partition of a continuous resource ("cake") into some k pieces, such that each of n people with different tastes agree on the value of each of the pieces. For example, consider a cake which is half chocolate and half vanilla. Alice values only the chocolate and George values only the vanilla. The cake is divided into three pieces: one piece contains 20% of the chocolate and 20% of the vanilla, the second contains 50% of the chocolate and 50% of the vanilla, and the third contains the rest of the cake. This is an exact division (with k=3 and n=2), as both Alice and George value the three pieces as 20%, 50% and 30% respectively. Several common variants and special cases are known by different terms:

The Selfridge–Conway procedure is a discrete procedure that produces an envy-free cake-cutting for three partners. It is named after John Selfridge and John Horton Conway. Selfridge discovered it in 1960, and told it to Richard Guy, who told many people, but Selfridge did not publish it. John Conway later discovered it independently, and also never published it. This procedure was the first envy-free discrete procedure devised for three partners, and it paved the way for more advanced procedures for n partners.

The Brams–Taylor procedure (BTP) is a procedure for envy-free cake-cutting. It explicated the first finite procedure to produce an envy-free division of a cake among any positive integer number of players.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Fair cake-cutting</span> Fair division problem

Fair cake-cutting is a kind of fair division problem. The problem involves a heterogeneous resource, such as a cake with different toppings, that is assumed to be divisible – it is possible to cut arbitrarily small pieces of it without destroying their value. The resource has to be divided among several partners who have different preferences over different parts of the cake, i.e., some people prefer the chocolate toppings, some prefer the cherries, some just want as large a piece as possible. The division should be unanimously fair - each person should receive a piece that he or she believes to be a fair share.

The Simmons–Su protocols are several protocols for envy-free division. They are based on Sperner's lemma. The merits of these protocols is that they put few restrictions on the preferences of the partners, and ask the partners only simple queries such as "which piece do you prefer?".

The Robertson–Webb protocol is a protocol for envy-free cake-cutting which is also near-exact. It has the following properties:

The fair pie-cutting problem is a variation of the fair cake-cutting problem, in which the resource to be divided is circular.

Equitable (EQ) cake-cutting is a kind of a fair cake-cutting problem, in which the fairness criterion is equitability. It is a cake-allocation in which the subjective value of all partners is the same, i.e., each partner is equally happy with his/her share. Mathematically, that means that for all partners i and j:

A proportional cake-cutting is a kind of fair cake-cutting. It is a division of a heterogeneous resource ("cake") that satisfies the proportionality criterion, namely, that every partner feels that his allocated share is worth at least 1/n of the total.

Weller's theorem is a theorem in economics. It says that a heterogeneous resource ("cake") can be divided among n partners with different valuations in a way that is both Pareto-efficient (PE) and envy-free (EF). Thus, it is possible to divide a cake fairly without compromising on economic efficiency.

Utilitarian cake-cutting is a rule for dividing a heterogeneous resource, such as a cake or a land-estate, among several partners with different cardinal utility functions, such that the sum of the utilities of the partners is as large as possible. It is a special case of the utilitarian social choice rule. Utilitarian cake-cutting is often not "fair"; hence, utilitarianism is often in conflict with fair cake-cutting.

In the fair cake-cutting problem, the partners often have different entitlements. For example, the resource may belong to two shareholders such that Alice holds 8/13 and George holds 5/13. This leads to the criterion of weighted proportionality (WPR): there are several weights that sum up to 1, and every partner should receive at least a fraction of the resource by their own valuation.

The Robertson–Webb rotating-knife procedure is a procedure for envy-free cake-cutting of a two-dimensional cake among three partners. It makes only two cuts, so each partner receives a single connected piece.

Truthful cake-cutting is the study of algorithms for fair cake-cutting that are also truthful mechanisms, i.e., they incentivize the participants to reveal their true valuations to the various parts of the cake.

In computer science, the Robertson–Webb (RW) query model is a model of computation used by algorithms for the problem of fair cake-cutting. In this problem, there is a resource called a "cake", and several agents with different value measures on the cake. The goal is to divide the cake among the agents such that each agent will consider his/her piece as "fair" by his/her personal value measure. Since the agents' valuations can be very complex, they cannot - in general - be given as inputs to a fair division algorithm. The RW model specifies two kinds of queries that a fair division algorithm may ask the agents: Eval and Cut. Informally, an Eval query asks an agent to specify his/her value to a given piece of the cake, and a Cut query asks an agent to specify a piece of cake with a given value.

References

  1. Steinhaus, Hugo (1948). "The problem of fair division". Econometrica. 16 (1): 101–4. JSTOR   1914289.
  2. Dubins, Lester Eli; Spanier, Edwin Henry (1961). "How to Cut a Cake Fairly". The American Mathematical Monthly. 68 (1): 1–17. doi:10.2307/2311357. JSTOR   2311357.
  3. Brams, Steven J.; Taylor, Alan D. (1996). Fair division: from cake-cutting to dispute resolution. Cambridge University Press. pp. 130–131. ISBN   0-521-55644-9.