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In game theory, the Nash equilibrium, named after the mathematician John Nash, is the most common way to define the solution of a non-cooperative game involving two or more players. In a Nash equilibrium, each player is assumed to know the equilibrium strategies of the other players, and no one has anything to gain by changing only one's own strategy. The principle of Nash equilibrium dates back to the time of Cournot, who in 1838 applied it to competing firms choosing outputs.
In mathematics, Sperner's lemma is a combinatorial result on colorings of triangulations, analogous to the Brouwer fixed point theorem, which is equivalent to it. It states that every Sperner coloring of a triangulation of an -dimensional simplex contains a cell whose vertices all have different colors.
In graph theory, a vertex cover of a graph is a set of vertices that includes at least one endpoint of every edge of the graph.
In game theory, folk theorems are a class of theorems describing an abundance of Nash equilibrium payoff profiles in repeated games. The original Folk Theorem concerned the payoffs of all the Nash equilibria of an infinitely repeated game. This result was called the Folk Theorem because it was widely known among game theorists in the 1950s, even though no one had published it. Friedman's (1971) Theorem concerns the payoffs of certain subgame-perfect Nash equilibria (SPE) of an infinitely repeated game, and so strengthens the original Folk Theorem by using a stronger equilibrium concept: subgame-perfect Nash equilibria rather than Nash equilibria.
In game theory, a correlated equilibrium is a solution concept that is more general than the well known Nash equilibrium. It was first discussed by mathematician Robert Aumann in 1974. The idea is that each player chooses their action according to their private observation of the value of the same public signal. A strategy assigns an action to every possible observation a player can make. If no player would want to deviate from their strategy, the distribution from which the signals are drawn is called a correlated equilibrium.
In computational complexity, problems that are in the complexity class NP but are neither in the class P nor NP-complete are called NP-intermediate, and the class of such problems is called NPI. Ladner's theorem, shown in 1975 by Richard E. Ladner, is a result asserting that, if P ≠ NP, then NPI is not empty; that is, NP contains problems that are neither in P nor NP-complete. Since it is also true that if NPI problems exist, then P ≠ NP, it follows that P = NP if and only if NPI is empty.
In computational complexity theory, Polynomial Local Search (PLS) is a complexity class that models the difficulty of finding a locally optimal solution to an optimization problem. The main characteristics of problems that lie in PLS are that the cost of a solution can be calculated in polynomial time and the neighborhood of a solution can be searched in polynomial time. Therefore it is possible to verify whether or not a solution is a local optimum in polynomial time. Furthermore, depending on the problem and the algorithm that is used for solving the problem, it might be faster to find a local optimum instead of a global optimum.
In computer science, PPAD is a complexity class introduced by Christos Papadimitriou in 1994. PPAD is a subclass of TFNP based on functions that can be shown to be total by a parity argument. The class attracted significant attention in the field of algorithmic game theory because it contains the problem of computing a Nash equilibrium: this problem was shown to be complete for PPAD by Daskalakis, Goldberg and Papadimitriou with at least 3 players and later extended by Chen and Deng to 2 players.
In graph theory, a branch of mathematics, the handshaking lemma is the statement that, in every finite undirected graph, the number of vertices that touch an odd number of edges is even. In more colloquial terms, in a party of people some of whom shake hands, the number of people who shake an odd number of other people's hands is even. The handshaking lemma is a consequence of the degree sum formula, also sometimes called the handshaking lemma, according to which the sum of the degrees equals twice the number of edges in the graph. Both results were proven by Leonhard Euler (1736) in his famous paper on the Seven Bridges of Königsberg that began the study of graph theory.
In game theory, an epsilon-equilibrium, or near-Nash equilibrium, is a strategy profile that approximately satisfies the condition of Nash equilibrium. In a Nash equilibrium, no player has an incentive to change his behavior. In an approximate Nash equilibrium, this requirement is weakened to allow the possibility that a player may have a small incentive to do something different. This may still be considered an adequate solution concept, assuming for example status quo bias. This solution concept may be preferred to Nash equilibrium due to being easier to compute, or alternatively due to the possibility that in games of more than 2 players, the probabilities involved in an exact Nash equilibrium need not be rational numbers.
Algorithmic game theory (AGT) is an area in the intersection of game theory and computer science, with the objective of understanding and design of algorithms in strategic environments.
Constantinos Daskalakis is a Greek theoretical computer scientist. He is a professor at MIT's Electrical Engineering and Computer Science department and a member of the MIT Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Laboratory. He was awarded the Rolf Nevanlinna Prize and the Grace Murray Hopper Award in 2018.
In algorithmic game theory, a succinct game or a succinctly representable game is a game which may be represented in a size much smaller than its normal form representation. Without placing constraints on player utilities, describing a game of players, each facing strategies, requires listing utility values. Even trivial algorithms are capable of finding a Nash equilibrium in a time polynomial in the length of such a large input. A succinct game is of polynomial type if in a game represented by a string of length n the number of players, as well as the number of strategies of each player, is bounded by a polynomial in n.
In theoretical computer science, the term isolation lemma refers to randomized algorithms that reduce the number of solutions to a problem to one, should a solution exist. This is achieved by constructing random constraints such that, with non-negligible probability, exactly one solution satisfies these additional constraints if the solution space is not empty. Isolation lemmas have important applications in computer science, such as the Valiant–Vazirani theorem and Toda's theorem in computational complexity theory.
The Lemke–Howson algorithm is an algorithm that computes a Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game, named after its inventors, Carlton E. Lemke and J. T. Howson. It is said to be "the best known among the combinatorial algorithms for finding a Nash equilibrium", although more recently the Porter-Nudelman-Shoham algorithm has outperformed on a number of benchmarks.
In the mathematical discipline of graph theory, a rainbow matching in an edge-colored graph is a matching in which all the edges have distinct colors.
Fisher market is an economic model attributed to Irving Fisher. It has the following ingredients:
Guoqiang Tian is a Chinese-American economist. He is the Alfred F. Chalk Professor of Economics at Texas A&M University. He is Honorary Dean of Institute for Advanced Research at Shanghai University of Finance and Economics.
In graph theory, a matching in a hypergraph is a set of hyperedges, in which every two hyperedges are disjoint. It is an extension of the notion of matching in a graph.
In graph theory, a vertex cover in a hypergraph is a set of vertices, such that every hyperedge of the hypergraph contains at least one vertex of that set. It is an extension of the notion of vertex cover in a graph.
References
- Papadimitriou, Christos (1994). "On the Complexity of the Parity Argument and Other Inefficient Proofs of Existence". Journal of Computer and System Sciences. 48 (3): 498–532. doi: 10.1016/S0022-0000(05)80063-7 . Paper available online at Papadimitriou's Homepage.
- C. Daskalakis, P. W. Goldberg and C.H. Papadimitriou (2009). "The Complexity of Computing a Nash Equilibrium". SIAM Journal on Computing . 39 (3): 195–259. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.68.6111 . doi:10.1137/070699652.
- Xi Chen and Xiaotie Deng (2006). "Settling the complexity of two-player Nash equilibrium". In Proc. 47th FOCS. pp. 261–272.