The no-impeachment rule is a part of U.S. evidence law that generally prohibits jurors from testifying about their deliberations in an attempt to discredit a verdict. [1] Arising in British common law, the rule has come to be implemented in Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 606(b) and in each state. [2] [3]
The no-impeachment rule was inaugurated in a 1785 case in which a party sought to challenge a verdict by producing affidavits from jurors who said that they had based their decision on a coin toss. [4] Lord Mansfield rejected these affidavits, thereby initiating a broad common law prohibition against juror testimony about their deliberations. [2]
Courts in the United States imported this prohibition in two varieties. [2] One approach barred jurors from sharing details about what was said in deliberations. [2] This method was codified in FRE 606(b), and it came to be known as the “federal approach.” [2] By contrast, the “Iowa rule” allowed jurors to testify about the deliberations themselves, so long as they never disclosed their own perspective during the deliberations. [2] [5] The “federal approach” is the predominant version of the rule, with 42 jurisdictions in the United States following it. [2]
Specifically, FRE 606(b)(1) stipulates that "[d]uring an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify about any statement made or incident that occurred during the jury deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror’s or another juror’s vote; or any juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict or indictment." [6] In practice, this rule restricts the kind of evidence that defendants can provide in a motion for a new trial and in a hearing for that motion. [1]
In Tanner v. United States , the Supreme Court offered several rationales for the no-impeachment rule. [7] The rule allows jurors to deliberate candidly, while protecting them from dissatisfied parties. [7] It also protects the jury's verdict from perpetual reexamination, which may threaten the public's confidence in juries and the clarity that comes with a verdict. [7]
FRE 606(b)(2) lists specific exceptions to the no-impeachment rule, noting that jurors “may testify about whether: (A) extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury’s attention; (B) an outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any juror; or (C) a mistake was made in entering the verdict on the verdict form.” [6] Under these exceptions, a juror can give post-verdict testimony about issues like a juror's independent legal research, [8] a bailiff's comments to the jury, [9] or an incorrect damages award listed on a verdict form. [10]
The Supreme Court has heard three cases that concern whether the Constitution requires particular exceptions to the no-impeachment rule. [3] [2] In Tanner, the Court held that a jury's use of drugs and alcohol did not constitute an “outside influence” that fit the FRE 606(b)(2) exception, and that the rule barred jurors from impeaching their verdict based on this conduct. [7] The Court reasoned that there were other safeguards in place to protect a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury: prospective jurors are evaluated in voir dire, seated jurors can be monitored by those in court, and non-jurors can testify about a juror's inappropriate behavior even after a verdict has been reached. [7]
In Warger v. Shauers , the Court similarly held that the Sixth Amendment did not require an exception to the no-impeachment rule when a juror had been untruthful in her voir dire responses. [11] It referenced the same safeguards that Tanner had spotlighted, while noting that “[t]here may be cases of juror bias so extreme that, almost by definition, the jury trial right has been abridged.” [11]
In Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado , the Court held that the Sixth Amendment mandated an exception to the no-impeachment rule when the juror's testimony regards racial animus in jury deliberations. [2] To meet this exception, a defendant must show “that one or more jurors made statements exhibiting overt racial bias,” and “that racial animus was a significant motivating factor in the juror’s vote to convict.” [2]
Jury instructions, also known as charges or directions, are a set of legal guidelines given by a judge to a jury in a court of law. They are an important procedural step in a trial by jury, and as such are a cornerstone of criminal process in many common law countries.
A jury trial, or trial by jury, is a legal proceeding in which a jury makes a decision or findings of fact. It is distinguished from a bench trial in which a judge or panel of judges makes all decisions.
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution sets forth rights related to criminal prosecutions. It was ratified in 1791 as part of the United States Bill of Rights. The Supreme Court has applied all but one of this amendment's protections to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
A jury is a sworn body of people (jurors) convened to hear evidence and render an impartial verdict officially submitted to them by a court, or to set a penalty or judgment.
Hearsay is testimony from a witness under oath who is reciting an out-of-court statement that is being offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
A hung jury, also called a deadlocked jury, is a judicial jury that cannot agree upon a verdict after extended deliberation and is unable to reach the required unanimity or supermajority. Hung juries usually result in the case being tried again.
First adopted in 1975, the Federal Rules of Evidence codify the evidence law that applies in United States federal courts. In addition, many states in the United States have either adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence, with or without local variations, or have revised their own evidence rules or codes to at least partially follow the federal rules.
In the law of evidence in the United States, public policy doctrines for the exclusion of relevant evidence encompass several types of evidence that would be relevant to prove facts at issue in a legal proceeding, but which are nonetheless excluded because of public policy concerns. There are five major areas of exclusion that arise out of the Federal Rules of Evidence ("FRE"): subsequent remedial measures, ownership of liability insurance, offers to plead guilty to a crime, offers to settle a claim, and offers to pay medical expenses. Many states have modified versions of the FRE under their own state evidence codes which widen or narrow the public policy exclusions in state courts.
Witness impeachment, in the law of evidence of the United States, is the process of calling into question the credibility of an individual testifying in a trial. The Federal Rules of Evidence contain the rules governing impeachment in US federal courts.
In law, a trial is a coming together of parties to a dispute, to present information in a tribunal, a formal setting with the authority to adjudicate claims or disputes. One form of tribunal is a court. The tribunal, which may occur before a judge, jury, or other designated trier of fact, aims to achieve a resolution to their dispute.
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right…to be confronted with the witnesses against him." The right only applies to criminal prosecutions, not civil cases or other proceedings. Generally, the right is to have a face-to-face confrontation with witnesses who are offering testimonial evidence against the accused in the form of cross-examination during a trial. The Fourteenth Amendment makes the right to confrontation applicable to the states and not just the federal government.
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United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, was a case in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that a juror could not be removed from a jury on the ground that the juror was acting in purposeful disregard of the court's instructions on the law, when the record evidence raises a possibility that the juror was simply unpersuaded by the Government's case against the defendants. The case had important implications for secrecy of the jury deliberation process outweighs the ability to dismiss a juror for nullification.
United States v. Morlang, 531 F.2d 183, was a case decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit that held that calling a witness knowing that unfavorable testimony will be given is improper when it allows the proponent to bring in substantive evidence under the guise of witness impeachment.
Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150 (1995), was a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States that held that under Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 801(d)(1)(B), a prior consistent statement is not hearsay only if the statement was made before the motive to fabricate arose.
Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107 (1987), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that juror testimony could not be used to impeach a jury verdict even when the jury had been consuming copious amounts of alcohol, marijuana, and cocaine during the course of the trial.
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60 (1942), was a landmark decision of the US Supreme Court on two issues of constitutional criminal procedure. Glasser was the first Supreme Court decision to hold that the Assistance of Counsel Clause of the Sixth Amendment required the reversal of a criminal defendant's conviction if his lawyer's representation of him was limited by a conflict of interest.
Warger v. Shauers, 574 U.S. 40 (2014), was a unanimous decision by the United States Supreme Court, ruling that jurors may not testify about what occurred during jury deliberations, even to expose dishonesty during jury selection or voir dire. The Court delivered its ruling on December 9, 2014.
Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 580 U.S. ___ (2017), was a United States Supreme Court decision holding that the Sixth Amendment requires a racial bias exception to the no-impeachment rule. According to two jurors, a third juror made a number of biased statements about the defendant's Mexican ethnicity, stating, "I think he did it because he’s Mexican and Mexican men take whatever they want." In a 5–3 vote, the Court held that, notwithstanding a state evidentiary rule, the trial court must be permitted to consider the two jurors' testimony.
Julius Darius Jones is an American prisoner and former death row inmate from Oklahoma who was convicted of the July 1999 murder of Paul Howell. His case has received international attention due to claims of innocence and controversy surrounding his trial and conviction. Jones was convicted of the crime on the basis of what the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals later characterized as an "overwhelming" body of evidence consisting of "a co-defendant who directly implicated Jones, eyewitness identification, incriminating statements made by Jones after the crime, flight from police, damning physical evidence hidden in Jones's parents' home, and an interlocking web of other physical and testimonial evidence consistent with the State's theory."