Non-combatant Casualty Value

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2009 Joint Chiefs of Staff memo CJCSI 3160-01, which described the NCV CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION CJCSI 3160-01 13 February 2009 NO-STRIKE AND THE COLLATERAL DAMAGE ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY.pdf
2009 Joint Chiefs of Staff memo CJCSI 3160-01, which described the NCV

Non-combatant casualty value (NCV), also known as the non-combatant and civilian casualty cut-off value (NCV or NCCV), is a military rule of engagement which provides an estimate of the worth placed on the lives of non-combatants, i.e. civilians or non-military individuals within a conflict zone. It has become an element of strategic planning and policy-making during a number of armed conflicts, providing a quantification of the proportionality principle as interpreted by the military command, and thus influencing decisions regarding the use of force and "acceptable" collateral damage. [1] [2] It has been described as a "central value in contemporary Western war" [3] and "perhaps our starkest rule of engagement". [4]

Contents

The value is used as a threshold for delegated authority at the operational level; the threshold can be exceeded if the military commander is able to request and achieve sign-off from higher echelons within the military or political framework.

International law's historical prohibition against intentionally targeting civilians has been said to be poorly suited to modern warfare, due to its notion of "intent". NCV calculations are possible in modern warfare due to the availability of wider information sets and advanced weaponry with more accurate targeting, reducing collateral damage. The targeting process has been systematized and proceduralized, allowing for the rationalization of the killing of noncombatants. [5]

Valuation of lives

Acceptability of NCV levels vary depending on the type of target and military objective, or for a specific area of operations, mission, or weapon system. The two most significant factors are: (1) the perceived value of the local civilians, and (2) the perceived value of the target. [6]

The value attributed to civilian lives depends on racial and geographic factors. Western forces operating in Western states, for example against a domestic terrorist attack, will use an NCV close to zero, in order to minimize casualties amongst their own citizens. Equivalent operations by Western forces in non-Western countries will use significantly higher NCVs. [6]

Lower NCVs are considered acceptable for "high-value targets", i.e. strategically important targets such as enemy command centers or weapons facilities. Higher NCVs is usually considered unacceptable for civilian infrastructure, humanitarian sites, and densely populated areas where the risk of civilian casualties is greater. [6]

Reported examples include: [6]

Criticism

NCV has faced criticism for its subjective nature, potential for manipulation, discrepancies in its application across different conflicts, and possible contravention of international humanitarian law. Critics argue that assigning a numerical value to human life undermines the inherent dignity and rights of non-combatants, reducing them to mere statistics in military calculations. Moreover, the lack of standardized methodologies for determining NCV and the influence of political considerations raise concerns about its reliability and ethical implications.

According to Mathias Delori, in military assessments of moral actions the "actual number of deaths and injuries hardly counts... the ‘way’ in which violence is perpetrated matters more than the actual level of violence... it is the very act of calculation - the very fact that calculation took place - that justifies action... [and] although all lives matter in principle, some lives count more than others in practice". [8]

See also

Bibliography

Further reading

Related Research Articles

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Gaza War fatalities estimates made by human rights NGOs and by the involved combatants:

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References

  1. ↑ Graham, Scott (2018-11-10). "The Non-combatant Casualty Cut-off Value: Assessment of a Novel Targeting Technique in Operation Inherent Resolve". International Criminal Law Review. 18 (4): 655–685. doi:10.1163/15718123-01804002. ISSN   1567-536X.
  2. ↑ Auchter, Jessica (2023). "Counting the dead: CTS and the politics of dead bodies". Contemporary Reflections on Critical Terrorism Studies. London New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group. ISBN   978-1-003-26670-9.
  3. ↑ Delori 2020, p. 317: "…a concrete and operational translation of the ‘proportionality’ principle by stating how many ‘non-combatants’ the Western military are authorized to kill - or put at risk - in order to destroy a given military target. In this regard, the so-called ‘non-combatant casualty cut-off value, or NCCV, is a central value in contemporary Western war: the ‘non-combatant casualty cut-off value’ (NCCV). A NCCV = 0 means that that the soldiers/air force pilots should put no ‘non-combatant’ at risk. A NCCV = 10 means that they are allowed to open fire if they estimate that they will not kill more than 10 civilians."
  4. ↑ McDonell 2017.
  5. ↑ Smith, Brian (2021-01-02). "Civilian Casualty Mitigation and the Rationalization of Killing". Journal of Military Ethics. 20 (1): 47–66. doi:10.1080/15027570.2021.1949783. ISSN   1502-7570.
  6. 1 2 3 4 5 6 Delori 2020 , p. 317-318: "NCCV depends, notably, on two factors. It depends, firstly, on the subjective assessment of the ‘value’ of civilians. In this respect, the most important variable is geographical or/and racial. When a ‘terrorist’ attack occurs on the territory of a Western state, the NCCV used by police and military forces is close to zero, meaning that they do not want to put at risk any French or Western civilian. When they operate in the non-Western world, however, the NCCV rises significantly. This is why Western forces use different instruments depending on whether they operate in a Western country or in other parts of the world: elite commandos on the ground in the former case, armed drones and fighter-bomber jets in the latter. Secondly, the NCCV depends on the subjective assessment of the value of the military target. During the US war in Iraq, for instance, the Rules Of Engagement allowed for an NCCV of 29 for each ‘high-value military target’. This meant, in practice, that pilots were allowed to kill up to 29 civilians in order to eliminate a high-ranking member of ‘Al Qaida’ or a senior official of Saddam Hussein’s regime. When the target is a just a rank-and-file jihadist, the NCCV falls significantly. This means, in practice, that the value of non-western human lives is a function of the target’s value. The framing of a person as a ‘high value military target’ means that more people situated nearby can be killed or, at least, put at risk."
  7. 1 2 Adams 2017 , p. footnote 13: "During the initial invasion of Iraq in 2003, the NCV was set at thirty, reflecting the lower value placed on central control of targeting decisions during the early phase of combat operations. See McNeal, supra note 6, at 751. This can be contrasted with operations in Afghanistan in 2009 where the NCV was set at one. Id. at 751–52. Up until 2008, approval for strikes required approval from the National Command Authority at Central Command Headquarters in Tampa, FL. Id. at 752. After 2009, approval was withheld at the Secretary of Defense level. Id."
  8. ↑ Delori 2020, p. 318-319: "…paradoxically, the actual number of deaths and injuries hardly counts in the assessment of what is moral and what is not. For instance, the fact that the ‘moral technologies’ used by the Western military kill way more civilians than the indiscriminate violence perpetrated by ‘terrorists’ does not lead to any ‘frame breaking’ in Goffman's sense. Two implicit schemes or ‘frames’ explain this paradoxical relation to mathematics and numbers. According to the first, the ‘way’ in which violence is perpetrated matters more than the actual level of violence. As Weizman puts it, ‘it is the very act of calculation - the very fact that calculation took place - that justifies action’. This logic is pervasive in the following excerpt of an interview with a pilot whose bomb just killed civilians. The civilians' death was not accidental. The pilot knew that his bomb would kill civilians. He decided to drop it because the number of civilians was inferior to the non-combatant cut-off value. Hence, the pilot explained: ‘I didn't try to kill civilians. I focused on military targets and tried my very best every day to minimize civilian casualties’. According to Weizman, this testimony is typical of ‘the way the economy of violence structures the humanitarian present’. The second implicit assumption is at once humanitarian and un-democratic. It posits that although all lives matter in principle, some lives count more than others in practice. A micro illustration of this rationale can be found in Delori's analysis of how French air force pilots recount their ‘air support’ missions, i.e. missions in which pilots drop bombs to save comrades-in-arms who are caught under enemy fire. These missions may involve killing more 'innocent people' than the actual number of Western combatants caught under enemy fire. However, this does not throw into question the pilots' self-representation as moral agents because the characters in their narratives, i.e. their ‘comrades in arms’ on the one hand and the ‘collateral victims, on the other, are positioned at the opposite ends of ‘economy of pity’7. They are all deemed 'human' in an abstract way but are not ‘equally human’. Whereas 'comrades in arms' must be defended at all cost, the killing of (non-Western) 'collateral victims' can be framed as a tolerable sin through which greater evil can be prevented. As Asad pointed out, this is a reminder that the frame of ‘humanitarian violence’ is like any other frame of war. It is distorted by heavy power structures: ‘The perception that human life has differential exchange value in the marketplace of death when it comes to 'civilized' and 'uncivilized' people is not only quite common in liberal democratic countries, it is necessary to a hierarchical global order’"
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