Nuclear latency

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Takahama Nuclear Power Plant in Takahama, Japan, and Arak Nuclear Complex in Arak, Iran.

Nuclear latency or a nuclear threshold state is the condition of a country possessing all the technology, expertise and infrastructure needed to quickly develop nuclear weapons, without having actually yet done so. [1] Japan is considered a "paranuclear" state, with complete technical prowess to develop a nuclear weapon quickly, [2] [3] and is sometimes called being "one screwdriver's turn" from the bomb, as it is considered to have the materials and technical capacity to make a nuclear weapon at will. [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]

Contents

Alongside Japan, Iran is also considered a nuclear threshold state, [10] [11] [12] [13] and has been described being "a hop, skip, and a jump away" from developing nuclear weapons, [14] [15] [16] with its advanced nuclear program capable of producing fissile material for a bomb in a matter of days if weaponized. [17] [18] [19] Other notable nuclear threshold states are Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Brazil [20] and Australia. [21] [22]

Nuclear hedging

Nuclear latency can be achieved with solely peaceful intentions, but in some cases nuclear latency is achieved in order to be able to create nuclear arms in the future, which is known as "nuclear hedging". [23] While states engaging in nuclear hedging do not directly violate the NPT, they do run the risk of potentially encouraging their neighboring states, particularly those they have had conflicts with, to do the same, spawning a "virtual" arms race to ensure the potential of future nuclear capability. [23] Such a situation could rapidly escalate into an actual arms race, drastically raising tensions in the region and increasing the risk of a potential nuclear exchange. [23]

Determining peacefulness of a nuclear program

In a paper written following the establishment of the JCPOA, a Counselor of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, John Carlson, outlined several criteria for use in helping to determine whether a state's nuclear program was run solely with peaceful intentions, or if the state was engaging in nuclear hedging: [23]

  1. Production of nuclear materials significantly beyond what could feasibly be needed in order to maintain a state's current nuclear reactors. This includes both the processes of the enrichment of uranium and the reprocessing of plutonium. [23]
  2. Retaining stores of nuclear materials which can be used in weapons construction beyond the amount that could reasonably be slated for use in civilian purposes, such as research or power generation. [23]
  3. Noncompliance or lack of proper cooperation with the IAEA, or grievous disregard for reasonable safeguards. [23]
  4. Construction of facilities and infrastructure which is more reasonably oriented toward the production of nuclear weapons than for civil purposes, such as reactors that produce extremely large quantities of plutonium. [23]
  5. Production of technologies which are primarily oriented toward the creation of nuclear weapons, such as the explosive lenses required to build an implosion-type weapon. [23]
  6. Production or development of systems designed to allow for the deliverance of nuclear payloads, such as long-range ballistic missiles. [23]
  7. A supposedly civilian nuclear energy program having heavy involvement with the state's military, an indication that the state's military is likely seeking to obtain nuclear materials. [23]
  8. Making use of black market sources in order to obtain nuclear materials, technology used for reprocessing or enrichment, technology used in the production of nuclear arms or delivery systems, or the purchase of nuclear delivery systems outright. [23]
  9. The state being in a location in which it has a history of severe conflicts in its relationships with several neighboring states. [23] This gives the state a reason to desire nuclear arms as a potential deterrence of its neighboring adversaries.[ citation needed ]

Other nuclear-threshold states

South Africa has successfully developed its own nuclear weapons, but dismantled them in 1989. Taiwan and South Korea have both been identified as "insecure" nuclear threshold states—states with the technical capability to develop nuclear weapons. South Korea had been involved in nuclear energy technology since the end of the Korean War, and possessed an active nuclear weapons program that was terminated in the mid-1970s with its signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, while still engaging in some clandestine nuclear weapons research into the late 1980s, and the security motivations to seriously contemplate such an option—since the publishing of a Mitre Corporation report in 1977. [24] [25] [26] US intelligence also believes Taiwan has designed devices suitable for nuclear testing. [27]

The number of states that are technically nuclear-latent has steadily increased as nuclear energy and its requisite technologies have become more available, but the number of states that are actually at the threshold status are limited. [28] [29] Nuclear latency does not presume any particular intentions on the part of a state recognized as being nuclear-latent. [29]

Related Research Articles

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A nuclear weapon is an explosive device that derives its destructive force from nuclear reactions, either fission or a combination of fission and fusion reactions, producing a nuclear explosion. Both bomb types release large quantities of energy from relatively small amounts of matter.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons</span> International treaty

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, commonly known as the Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT, is an international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. Between 1965 and 1968, the treaty was negotiated by the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament, a United Nations-sponsored organization based in Geneva, Switzerland.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Nuclear proliferation</span> Spread of nuclear weapons

Nuclear proliferation is the spread of nuclear weapons, fissionable material, and weapons-applicable nuclear technology and information to nations not recognized as "Nuclear Weapon States" by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, commonly known as the Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT. Proliferation has been opposed by many nations with and without nuclear weapons, as governments fear that more countries with nuclear weapons will increase the possibility of nuclear warfare, de-stabilize international or regional relations, or infringe upon the national sovereignty of nation states.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Nuclear disarmament</span> Act of eliminating nuclear weapons

Nuclear disarmament is the act of reducing or eliminating nuclear weapons. Its end state can also be a nuclear-weapons-free world, in which nuclear weapons are completely eliminated. The term denuclearization is also used to describe the process leading to complete nuclear disarmament.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Nuclear warfare</span> Military conflict that deploys nuclear weaponry

Nuclear warfare, also known as atomic warfare, is a military conflict or prepared political strategy that deploys nuclear weaponry. Nuclear weapons are weapons of mass destruction; in contrast to conventional warfare, nuclear warfare can produce destruction in a much shorter time and can have a long-lasting radiological result. A major nuclear exchange would likely have long-term effects, primarily from the fallout released, and could also lead to secondary effects, such as "nuclear winter", nuclear famine, and societal collapse. A global thermonuclear war with Cold War-era stockpiles, or even with the current smaller stockpiles, may lead to various scenarios including the human extinction.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">North Korea and weapons of mass destruction</span>

North Korea has a military nuclear weapons program and, as of 2024, is estimated to have an arsenal of approximately 50 nuclear weapons and sufficient production of fissile material for six to seven nuclear weapons per year. North Korea has also stockpiled a significant quantity of chemical and biological weapons. In 2003, North Korea withdrew from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Since 2006, the country has conducted six nuclear tests at increasing levels of expertise, prompting the imposition of sanctions.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">China and weapons of mass destruction</span>

The People's Republic of China has developed and possesses weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and nuclear weapons. The first of China's nuclear weapons tests took place in 1964, and its first hydrogen bomb test occurred in 1966 at Lop Nur. Tests continued until 1996, when the country signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), but did not ratify it. China acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1984 and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1997.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Israel and weapons of mass destruction</span>

Israel is believed to possess weapons of mass destruction, and to be one of four nuclear-armed countries not recognized as a Nuclear Weapons State by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The US Congress Office of Technology Assessment has recorded Israel as a country generally reported as having undeclared chemical warfare capabilities, and an offensive biological warfare program. Officially, Israel neither confirms nor denies possessing nuclear weapons.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Taiwan and weapons of mass destruction</span>

Taiwan pursued a number of weapons of mass destruction programs from 1949 to the late 1980s. The final secret nuclear weapons program was shut down in the late 1980s under US pressure after completing all stages of weapons development besides final assembly and testing. Taiwan lacked an effective delivery mechanism and would have needed to further miniaturize any weapon for effective use in combat. Currently, there is no evidence of Taiwan possessing any chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. However, nuclear weapons from the United States were deployed to Taiwan during a period of heightened regional tensions with China beginning with the First Taiwan Strait Crisis and ending in the 1970s.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Pakistan and weapons of mass destruction</span>

Pakistan is one of nine states that possess nuclear weapons. Pakistan began developing nuclear weapons in January 1972 under Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who delegated the program to the Chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) Munir Ahmad Khan with a commitment to having the device ready by the end of 1976. Since PAEC, which consisted of over twenty laboratories and projects under reactor physicist Munir Ahmad Khan, was falling behind schedule and having considerable difficulty producing fissile material, Abdul Qadeer Khan, a metallurgist working on centrifuge enrichment for Urenco, joined the program at the behest of the Bhutto administration by the end of 1974. Producing fissile material was pivotal to the Kahuta Project's success and thus to Pakistan obtaining the capability to detonate a nuclear weapon by the end of 1984.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Japanese nuclear weapons program</span>

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<span class="mw-page-title-main">South Korea and weapons of mass destruction</span> South Korean nuclear experiments

South Korea has the raw materials and equipment to produce a nuclear weapon. However, it has not opted to make one. South Korea has continued on a stated policy of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons since 2004 and has adopted a policy to maintain a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. South Korea also allows the United States to maintain nuclear weapons on its territories, which the US first brought to the peninsula in January 1958. North Korea has and is developing additional nuclear weapons.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Iran and weapons of mass destruction</span>

Iran is not known to currently possess weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and has signed treaties repudiating the possession of WMD including the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Iran has first-hand knowledge of WMD effects—over 100,000 Iranian troops and civilians were victims of chemical weapons during the 1980s Iran–Iraq War.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Nuclear weapons debate</span>

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<span class="mw-page-title-main">Proliferation Security Initiative</span> Global initiative to stop trafficking of weapons of mass destruction

The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a global effort that aims to stop trafficking of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery systems, and related materials to and from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern. Launched by United States President, George W. Bush in May 2003 at a meeting in Kraków, Poland, the PSI has now grown to include the endorsement of 105 nations around the world, including Russia, Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, France, Germany, Italy, Argentina, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Singapore, New Zealand, Republic of Korea and Norway.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Nuclear weapons of the United States</span>

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<span class="mw-page-title-main">Institute for Science and International Security</span> Nonprofit non-governmental organization

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This article deals with activities of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, specifically dealing with arms control, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and weapons proliferation. It attempts to look at the process of tasking and analyzing, rather than the problem itself, other than whether the CIA's efforts match its legal mandate or assists in treaty compliance. In some cases, the details of a country's programs are introduced because they present a problem in analysis. For example, if Country X's policymakers truly believe in certain history that may not actually be factual, an analyst trying to understand Country X's policymakers needs to be able to understand their approach to an issue.

Views on the nuclear program of Iran vary greatly, as the nuclear program of Iran is a very contentious geopolitical issue. Uriel Abulof identifies five possible rationales behind Iran’s nuclear policy: (i) Economy, mainly energy needs; (ii) Identity politics, pride and prestige; (iii) Deterrence of foreign intervention; (iv) Compellence to boost regional influence; and (v) Domestic politics, mitigating, through 'nuclear diversion' the regime’s domestic crisis of legitimacy. Below are considerations of the Iranian nuclear program from various perspectives.

References

  1. ↑ Panofsky, Wolfgang K. H. (June 14, 2007). "Capability versus intent: The latent threat of nuclear proliferation". The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Archived from the original on 2013-10-10. Retrieved 2009-08-04.
  2. ↑ Cole, Juan (2009-10-07). "Does Iran really want the bomb? Perhaps what Iran wants is the ability to produce a nuclear weapon fast, rather than have a standing arsenal". Salon. Archived from the original on 2009-10-11. Retrieved 2009-10-07.
  3. ↑ "Hypothesis: Iran Seeks the 'Japan Option'". Slate. 2009-10-07. Archived from the original on 2009-10-11.
  4. ↑ Demetriou, Danielle (20 April 2009). "Japan 'should develop nuclear weapons' to counter North Korea threat". The Daily Telegraph . Archived from the original on 15 January 2020. Retrieved 29 June 2010.
  5. ↑ Sakamaki, Sachiko (28 May 2009). "North Korean Atomic Tests Lift Lid on Japan's Nuclear 'Taboo'". Bloomberg. Archived from the original on 16 September 2015. Retrieved 29 June 2010.
  6. ↑ John H. Large (May 2, 2005). "THE ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY IN THE AREA OF NORTH EAST ASIA (KOREAN PENINSULAR AND JAPAN)" (PDF). R3126-A1. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2007-07-10.
  7. ↑ "Nuclear Scholars Initiative 2010: Recap of Seminar Four". CSIS. Archived from the original on 7 August 2010. Retrieved 29 June 2010.
  8. ↑ Brumfiel, Geoff (November 2004). "Nuclear proliferation special: We have the technology". Nature. 432-437. 432 (7016): 432–7. Bibcode:2004Natur.432..432B. doi: 10.1038/432432a . PMID   15565123. S2CID   4354223.
  9. ↑ Chester Dawson (28 October 2011). "In Japan, Provocative Case for Staying Nuclear". Wall Street Journal. Archived from the original on 10 August 2020. Retrieved 13 November 2011.
  10. ↑ Azodi, Sina (2024-07-24). "Iran's Nuclear Crisis Has No Military Solution". Foreign Policy. Retrieved 2024-07-10.
  11. ↑ Sonnenfeld, Jeffrey; Boehler, Adam (2023-12-09). "Amid the Israel-Hamas War, Iran Marches Towards Nuclear Breakout". TIME. Retrieved 2024-07-10.
  12. ↑ Brewer, Eric (2024-06-25). "Iran's New Nuclear Threat". Foreign Affairs. ISSN   0015-7120 . Retrieved 2024-07-10.
  13. ↑ "The Hunt: Iran just days away from becoming a nuclear power". WTOP News. 2024-04-11. Retrieved 2024-06-04.
  14. ↑ Centre for Independent Studies (2024-05-17). Why Israel is in deep trouble: John Mearsheimer with Tom Switzer . Retrieved 2024-07-10– via YouTube.
  15. ↑ Walt, Stephen M. (2024-06-05). "The Day After Iran Gets the Bomb". Foreign Policy. Retrieved 2024-06-04.
  16. ↑ "Iran Could Make Fuel for Nuclear Bomb in Less Than 2 Weeks, Milley Says". Voice of America. 2023-03-23. Retrieved 2024-06-04.
  17. ↑ Hansler, Jennifer (2023-02-28). "Top US Defense official says Iran could produce 'one bomb's worth of fissile material' in 'about 12 days' | CNN Politics". CNN. Retrieved 2024-07-10.
  18. ↑ "Iran Could Make Fuel for Nuclear Bomb in Less Than 2 Weeks, Milley Says". Voice of America. 2023-03-23. Retrieved 2024-07-10.
  19. ↑ "Iran puts its nuclear programme beyond the reach of American bombs". The Economist. ISSN   0013-0613 . Retrieved 2024-07-10.
  20. ↑ "Almost nuclear: Introducing the Nuclear Latency dataset" (PDF). Conflit Management And Peace Science: 446. Retrieved 2024-10-18.
  21. ↑ "Nuclear Weapons Archive, 7.5 nuclear capable states".
  22. ↑ Raymond, Camille (2021-12-15). "Canada's Role in the New Nuclear Landscape". Network for Strategic Analysis (NSA). Retrieved 2024-07-10.
  23. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Carlson, John (November 19, 2015). ""Peaceful" Nuclear Programs and the Problem of Nuclear Latency | NTI". Nuclear Threat Initiative. Archived from the original on 2021-05-03. Retrieved 2021-05-02.
  24. ↑ Report of the Nuclear Energy Policy Study Group, Nuclear Power Issues, and Choices (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1977), p. 284.
  25. ↑ John H. Large (May 2, 2005). "THE ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY IN THE AREA OF NORTH EAST ASIA (KOREAN PENINSULAR AND JAPAN)" (PDF). R3126-A1. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2007-07-10.
  26. ↑ "Nuclear Weapons Archive, 7.4 States Formerly Possessing or Pursuing Nuclear Weapons".
  27. ↑ "The 22 September 1979 Event" (PDF). Interagency Intelligence Memorandum. National Security Archive. December 1979. p. 5 (paragraph 4). MORI DocID: 1108245. Archived (PDF) from the original on 2014-10-24. Retrieved 2006-11-01.
  28. ↑ "Nuclear Safeguards". www.aph.gov.au. Retrieved 2024-07-10.
  29. 1 2 Pilat, Joseph F. (October 2, 2014). "Exploring Nuclear Latency | Wilson Center". Wilson Center. Archived from the original on 2021-05-14. Retrieved 2021-05-02.

Additional resources

For more on the proliferation and debates surrounding nuclear weapons and their latency, visit the Woodrow Wilson Center's Nuclear Proliferation International History Project website: http://wilsoncenter.org/program/nuclear-proliferation-international-history-project.

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