Nuclear latency

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Nuclear latency or a nuclear threshold state is the condition of a country possessing the technology to quickly build nuclear weapons, without having actually yet done so. [1] Because such latent capability is not prescribed by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, this is sometimes called the "Japan Option" (as a work-around to the treaty), as Japan is considered a "paranuclear" state, being a clear case of a country with complete technical prowess to develop a nuclear weapon quickly, [2] [3] or as it is sometimes called "being one screwdriver's turn" from the bomb, as Japan is considered to have the materials, expertise and technical capacity to make a nuclear bomb at will. [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] However, nuclear latency does not presume any particular intentions on the part of a state recognized as being nuclear-latent. [10]

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Nuclear hedging

Nuclear latency can be achieved with solely peaceful intentions, but in some cases nuclear latency is achieved in order to be able to create nuclear arms in the future, which is known as "nuclear hedging". [11] While states engaging in nuclear hedging do not directly violate the NPT, they do run the risk of potentially encouraging their neighboring states, particularly those they have had conflicts with, to do the same, spawning a “virtual” arms race to ensure the potential of future nuclear capability. [11] Such a situation could rapidly escalate into an actual arms race, drastically raising tensions in the region and increasing the risk of a potential nuclear exchange. [11]

Determining peacefulness of a nuclear program

In a paper written following the establishment of the JCPOA, a Counselor of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, John Carlson, outlined several criteria for use in helping to determine whether a state's nuclear program was run solely with peaceful intentions, or if the state was engaging in nuclear hedging: [11]

  1. Production of nuclear materials significantly beyond what could feasibly be needed in order to maintain a state's current nuclear reactors. This includes both the processes of the enrichment of uranium and the reprocessing of plutonium. [11]
  2. Retaining stores of nuclear materials which can be used in weapons construction beyond the amount that could reasonably be slated for use in civilian purposes, such as research or power generation. [11]
  3. Noncompliance or lack of proper cooperation with the IAEA, or grievous disregard for reasonable safeguards. [11]
  4. Construction of facilities and infrastructure which is more reasonably oriented toward the production of nuclear weapons than for civil purposes, such as reactors that produce extremely large quantities of plutonium. [11]
  5. Production of technologies which are primarily oriented toward the creation of nuclear weapons, such as the explosive lenses required to build an implosion-type weapon. [11]
  6. Production or development of systems designed to allow for the deliverance of nuclear payloads, such as long-range ballistic missiles. [11]
  7. A supposedly civilian nuclear energy program having heavy involvement with the state's military, an indication that the state's military is likely seeking to obtain nuclear materials. [11]
  8. Making use of black market sources in order to obtain nuclear materials, technology used for reprocessing or enrichment, technology used in the production of nuclear arms or delivery systems, or the purchase of nuclear delivery systems outright. [11]
  9. The state being in a location in which it has a history of severe conflicts in its relationships with several neighboring states. [11] This gives the state a reason to desire nuclear arms as a potential deterrence of its neighboring adversaries.[ citation needed ]

Nuclear-latent powers

There are many countries capable of producing nuclear weapons, or at least enriching uranium or manufacturing plutonium. Among the most notable are Japan, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, and Australia. [12] In addition, South Africa has successfully developed its own nuclear weapons, but dismantled them in 1989. Following the collapse of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action agreement some consider Iran a nuclear threshold state. [13] Taiwan and South Korea have both been identified as "insecure" nuclear threshold states—states with the technical capability to develop nuclear weapons and the security motivations to seriously contemplate such an option—since the publishing of a Mitre Corporation report in 1977. [14] US intelligence also believes Taiwan has designed devices suitable for nuclear testing. [15]

The number of states that are technically nuclear-latent has steadily increased as nuclear energy and its requisite technologies have become more available to a variety of states. [10]

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<span class="mw-page-title-main">Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons</span> International treaty to prevent spread of nuclear weapons

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, commonly known as the Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT, is an international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. Between 1965 and 1968, the treaty was negotiated by the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament, a United Nations-sponsored organization based in Geneva, Switzerland.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Nuclear proliferation</span> Spread of nuclear weapons

Nuclear proliferation is the spread of nuclear weapons, fissionable material, and weapons-applicable nuclear technology and information to nations not recognized as "Nuclear Weapon States" by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, commonly known as the Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT. Proliferation has been opposed by many nations with and without nuclear weapons, as governments fear that more countries with nuclear weapons will increase the possibility of nuclear warfare, de-stabilize international or regional relations, or infringe upon the national sovereignty of nation states.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">North Korea and weapons of mass destruction</span>

North Korea has a military nuclear weapons program and, as of early 2020, is estimated to have an arsenal of approximately 30 to 40 nuclear weapons and sufficient production of fissile material for six to seven nuclear weapons per year. North Korea has also stockpiled a significant quantity of chemical and biological weapons. In 2003, North Korea withdrew from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Since 2006, the country has conducted six nuclear tests at increasing levels of expertise, prompting the imposition of sanctions.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Nuclear reprocessing</span> Chemical operations that separate fissile material from spent fuel to be recycled as new fuel

Nuclear reprocessing is the chemical separation of fission products and actinides from spent nuclear fuel. Originally, reprocessing was used solely to extract plutonium for producing nuclear weapons. With commercialization of nuclear power, the reprocessed plutonium was recycled back into MOX nuclear fuel for thermal reactors. The reprocessed uranium, also known as the spent fuel material, can in principle also be re-used as fuel, but that is only economical when uranium supply is low and prices are high. Nuclear reprocessing may extend beyond fuel and include the reprocessing of other nuclear reactor material, such as Zircaloy cladding.

Mixed oxide fuel, commonly referred to as MOX fuel, is nuclear fuel that contains more than one oxide of fissile material, usually consisting of plutonium blended with natural uranium, reprocessed uranium, or depleted uranium. MOX fuel is an alternative to the low-enriched uranium fuel used in the light-water reactors that predominate nuclear power generation.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">China and weapons of mass destruction</span> China and nuclear weapons

The People's Republic of China has developed and possesses weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and nuclear weapons. The first of China's nuclear weapons tests took place in 1964, and its first hydrogen bomb test occurred in 1967 at Lop Nur. Tests continued until 1996, when the country signed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), but did not ratify it. China acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1984 and ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1997.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Israel and weapons of mass destruction</span>

Israel is believed to possess weapons of mass destruction, and to be one of four nuclear-armed countries not recognized as a Nuclear Weapons State by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The US Congress Office of Technology Assessment has recorded Israel as a country generally reported as having undeclared chemical warfare capabilities, and an offensive biological warfare program. Officially, Israel neither confirms nor denies possessing nuclear weapons.

The nuclear program of Iran is an ongoing scientific, technological and industrial effort to research and produce nuclear technology in Iran. Iran has several research sites, two uranium mines, a research reactor, and uranium processing facilities that include three known uranium enrichment plants.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Taiwan and weapons of mass destruction</span>

Taiwan pursued a number of weapons of mass destruction programs from 1949 to the late 1980s. The final secret nuclear weapons program was shut down in the late 1980s under US pressure after completing all stages of weapons development besides final assembly and testing; they lacked an effective delivery mechanism and would have needed to further miniaturize any weapon before it could be effectively used in combat. Currently, there is no evidence of Taiwan possessing any chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. However, nuclear weapons from the United States were deployed to Taiwan during a period of heightened regional tensions with China beginning with the First Taiwan Strait Crisis and ending in the 1970s.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Pakistan and weapons of mass destruction</span>

Pakistan is one of nine states that possess nuclear weapons. Pakistan began developing nuclear weapons in January 1972 under Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who delegated the program to the Chairman of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) Munir Ahmad Khan with a commitment to having the device ready by the end of 1976. Since PAEC, which consisted of over twenty laboratories and projects under reactor physicist Munir Ahmad Khan, was falling behind schedule and having considerable difficulty producing fissile material, Abdul Qadeer Khan, a metallurgist working on centrifuge enrichment for Urenco, joined the program at the behest of the Bhutto administration by the end of 1974. As pointed out by Houston Wood, "The most difficult step in building a nuclear weapon is the production of fissile material"; as such, this work in producing fissile material as head of the Kahuta Project was pivotal to Pakistan developing the capability to detonate a nuclear weapon by the end of 1984.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Japanese nuclear weapons program</span>

During World War II, Japan had several programs exploring the use of nuclear fission for military technology, including nuclear reactors and nuclear weapons. Like the similar wartime programs in Nazi Germany, it was relatively small, suffered from an array of problems brought on by lack of resources and wartime disarray, and was ultimately unable to progress beyond the laboratory stage during the war.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">South Korea and weapons of mass destruction</span> South Korean nuclear experiments

South Korea has the raw materials and equipment to produce a nuclear weapon. However, it has not opted to make one. South Korea has continued on a stated policy of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons since 2004 and has adopted a policy to maintain a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula. By contrast, North Korea has and is developing additional nuclear weapons.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Iran and weapons of mass destruction</span>

Iran is not known to currently possess weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and has signed treaties repudiating the possession of WMDs including the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Iran has first-hand knowledge of WMD effects—over 100,000 Iranian troops and civilians were victims of chemical weapons during the 1980s Iran–Iraq War.

A nuclear fuel bank is reserve of low enriched uranium (LEU) for countries that need a backup source of LEU to fuel their nuclear reactors. Countries that do have enrichment technology would donate enriched fuel to a "bank", from which countries not possessing enrichment technology would obtain fuel for their power reactors.

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<span class="mw-page-title-main">Weapons-grade nuclear material</span> Nuclear material pure enough to be used for nuclear weapons

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<span class="mw-page-title-main">Romania and weapons of mass destruction</span> Usage of weapons of mass destruction in the history of Romania

Romania started pursuing nuclear technology, according to some scholars, as early as 1967. In the 1980s, during the long rule of Nicolae Ceaușescu, Romania had a secret program intended to develop nuclear weapons, violating its word on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1970. The program ended after the Romanian Revolution of 1989. Romania is considered free of weapons of mass destruction, using nuclear power only for civilian purposes.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">2010 Nuclear Security Summit</span> Nuclear Security Summit in Washington DC

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Views on the nuclear program of Iran vary greatly, as the nuclear program of Iran is a very contentious geopolitical issue. Uriel Abulof identifies five possible rationales behind Iran’s nuclear policy: (i) Economy, mainly energy needs; (ii) Identity politics, pride and prestige; (iii) Deterrence of foreign intervention; (iv) Compellence to boost regional influence; and (v) Domestic politics, mitigating, through 'nuclear diversion' the regime’s domestic crisis of legitimacy. Below are considerations of the Iranian nuclear program from various perspectives.

References

  1. ↑ Panofsky, Wolfgang K. H. (June 14, 2007). "Capability versus intent: The latent threat of nuclear proliferation". The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Archived from the original on 2013-10-10. Retrieved 2009-08-04.
  2. ↑ Cole, Juan (2009-10-07). "Does Iran really want the bomb? Perhaps what Iran wants is the ability to produce a nuclear weapon fast, rather than have a standing arsenal". Salon. Archived from the original on 2009-10-11. Retrieved 2009-10-07.
  3. ↑ "Hypothesis: Iran Seeks the 'Japan Option'". Slate. 2009-10-07. Archived from the original on 2009-10-11.
  4. ↑ Demetriou, Danielle (20 April 2009). "Japan 'should develop nuclear weapons' to counter North Korea threat". The Daily Telegraph . Archived from the original on 15 January 2020. Retrieved 29 June 2010.
  5. ↑ Sakamaki, Sachiko (28 May 2009). "North Korean Atomic Tests Lift Lid on Japan's Nuclear 'Taboo'". Bloomberg. Archived from the original on 16 September 2015. Retrieved 29 June 2010.
  6. ↑ John H. Large (May 2, 2005). "THE ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY IN THE AREA OF NORTH EAST ASIA (KOREAN PENINSULAR AND JAPAN)" (PDF). R3126-A1. Archived from the original (PDF) on 2007-07-10.
  7. ↑ "Nuclear Scholars Initiative 2010: Recap of Seminar Four". CSIS. Archived from the original on 7 August 2010. Retrieved 29 June 2010.
  8. ↑ Brumfiel, Geoff (November 2004). "Nuclear proliferation special: We have the technology". Nature. 432-437. 432 (7016): 432–7. Bibcode:2004Natur.432..432B. doi: 10.1038/432432a . PMID   15565123. S2CID   4354223.
  9. ↑ Chester Dawson (28 October 2011). "In Japan, Provocative Case for Staying Nuclear". Wall Street Journal. Archived from the original on 10 August 2020. Retrieved 13 November 2011.
  10. 1 2 Pilat, Joseph F. (October 2, 2014). "Exploring Nuclear Latency | Wilson Center". Wilson Center. Archived from the original on 2021-05-14. Retrieved 2021-05-02.
  11. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Carlson, John (November 19, 2015). ""Peaceful" Nuclear Programs and the Problem of Nuclear Latency | NTI". Nuclear Threat Initiative. Archived from the original on 2021-05-03. Retrieved 2021-05-02.
  12. ↑ "Nuclear Weapons Archive, 7.5 nuclear capable states".
  13. ↑ The Nuclear Agreement with Iran, One Year On: An Assessment and a Strategy for the Future Archived 2017-08-14 at the Wayback Machine , INSS, Amos Yadlin and Avner Golov, July 2016
  14. ↑ Report of the Nuclear Energy Policy Study Group, Nuclear Power Issues, and Choices (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1977), p. 284.
  15. ↑ "The 22 September 1979 Event" (PDF). Interagency Intelligence Memorandum. National Security Archive. December 1979. p. 5 (paragraph 4). MORI DocID: 1108245. Archived (PDF) from the original on 2014-10-24. Retrieved 2006-11-01.

Additional resources

For more on the proliferation and debates surrounding nuclear weapons and their latency, visit the Woodrow Wilson Center's Nuclear Proliferation International History Project website: http://wilsoncenter.org/program/nuclear-proliferation-international-history-project.

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