Ontological parasite

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In ontology, a parasite is something which exists only in reference to something else. That is, it is a thing which can only exist as a feature, quality, or absence of another thing. [ citation needed ]

Contents

A common example of an ontological parasite is a hole, which is described as "always in something else and cannot exist in isolation. [1] " as well as "immaterial: every hole has a material “host” (the stuff around it, such as the edible part of a donut) and it may have a material “guest” (such as the liquid filling a cavity), but it does not itself seem to be made of matter". [2]

Examples of ontological parasites

There is some inconsistency regarding what constitutes an ontological parasite. This inconsistency concerns whether something can be said to only exist as an aspect of its host. More debated examples in the list below include color and shape:

*Some philosophers consider all properties of / relations between things (such as shape and color) as ontologically parasitic [4]

Theories

The concept of ontological parasites presents a number of philosophical theories and thought-experiments about the "existence" of the parasite itself, such as the perceptions of the absence of something (such as a hole) as itself a thing, and the categorization of parasites as having lower ontological dimension [5] than their hosts.

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References

  1. Tucholsky, K. (1931). Zur soziologischen Psychologie der Löcher. Die Weltbühne. p. 389.
  2. Casati, Roberto; Varzi, Achille (1996-12-05). "Holes". Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.{{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  3. Varzi, Achille (2015), "Boundary", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2015 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, retrieved 2020-09-26
  4. MacBride, Fraser (2020), "Relations", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2020 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, retrieved 2020-09-26
  5. Varzi, Achille (2015), "Boundary", in Zalta, Edward N. (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2015 ed.), Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, retrieved 2020-09-26