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| Pemberton v. Tallahassee Memorial Regional Center | |
|---|---|
| Court | United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida |
| Full case name | Pemberton v. Tallahassee Memorial Regional Center, Inc. |
| Decided | October 13, 1999 |
| Docket nos. | 4:98-cv-00161 |
| Citation | 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247 |
| Court membership | |
| Judge sitting | Robert Lewis Hinkle |
Pemberton v. Tallahassee Memorial Regional Center, 66 F. Supp. 2d 1247 (N.D. Fla. 1999), is a case in the United States regarding reproductive rights. In particular, the case explored the limits of a woman's right to choose her medical treatment in light of fetal rights at the end of pregnancy.
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Pemberton had a previous c-section with a vertical incision, and with her second child attempted to have a VBAC (vaginal birth after c-section). However, since she could not find any doctor willing to assist her in this endeavor, she labored at home, with a midwife. [1]
When a doctor she had approached about a related issue at the Tallahassee Memorial Regional Center found out, he and the hospital sued to force her to get a c-section. The court held that the rights of the fetus at or near birth outweighed the rights of Pemberton to determine her own medical care. [2] [3] She was physically forced to go to the hospital, where a c-section was performed. [1]
Her suit against the hospital was dismissed. [1] The court held that a cesarean section at the end of a full-term pregnancy was here deemed to be medically necessary by doctors to avoid a substantial risk that the fetus would die during delivery due to uterine rupture. The risk of uterine rupture was estimated at 4–6% according to the hospital's doctors and 2% according to Pemberton's doctors. Furthermore, the court held that a state's interest in preserving the life of an unborn child outweighed the mother's constitutional interest of bodily integrity. [4] The court held that Roe v. Wade was not applicable, because bearing an unwanted child is a greater intrusion on the mother's constitutional interests than undergoing a cesarean section to deliver a child that the mother affirmatively desires to deliver. The court further distinguished In re A.C. by stating that it left open the possibility that a non-consenting patient's interest would yield to a more compelling countervailing interest in an "extremely rare and truly exceptional case." The court then held this case to be such. [1] [5]