People v. Diaz

People v. Diaz
People v. Diaz
	Supreme Court of California
Argued October 5, 2010; Decided January 3, 2011
Full case name	The People v. Gregory Diaz
Citation(s)	51 Cal. 4th 84 ; 244 P.3d 501; 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 105; 2011
Case history
Prior history	Review granted, California Court of Appeals decision unpublished
Holding
	Affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals denying motion to suppress evidence obtained without warrant from Diaz's cell phone upon lawful custodial arrest.
Court membership
Chief Justice	Joyce L. Kennard (Acting)
Associate Justices	Kathryn Werdegar, Ming Chin, Marvin R. Baxter, Carol Corrigan, Ronald M. George, Carlos R. Moreno
Case opinions
Majority	Chin, joined by Baxter, Corrigan, George
Concurrence	Kennard
Concur/dissent	Werdegar, joined by Moreno
Laws applied
	U.S. Const. Amend. IV
	Overruled by
	Riley v. California , 573 US ___ (2014)

Last updated June 13, 2021

People v. Diaz, 51 Cal. 4th 84, 244 P.3d 501, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 105 (Cal. January 3, 2011) was a Supreme Court of California case, which held that police are not required to obtain a warrant to search information contained within a cell phone in a lawful arrest.^[1] In a sting operation conducted by local police, the defendant, Gregory Diaz, was arrested for the sale of the illicit drug ecstasy and his cellphone, containing incriminating evidence, was seized and searched without a warrant. In trial court proceedings, Diaz motioned to suppress the information obtained from his cellphone, which was denied on the grounds that the search of his cellphone was incident to a lawful arrest. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the court's decision and was later upheld by the California Supreme Court.^[2] In 2014, the United States Supreme Court overruled that position in Riley v. California and held that without a warrant, police may not search the digital information on a cellphone that has been seized incident to arrest.^[3]

Background

Around 2:50 p.m. on April 25, 2007, Gregory Diaz was observed participating in an illicit ecstasy transaction with a police informant. Diaz drove to the location of sale that had been agreed upon with the police informant, and the sale took place shortly after the informant had gotten in the back seat of the car that Diaz was driving. Immediately upon the completion of the sale, Deputy Sheriff Victor Fazio, of the Ventura County Sheriff's Department, who was listening in to the transaction through a microphone hidden on the informant, pulled Diaz's car over and arrested him for conspiracy to sell drugs. Six tablets of ecstasy and a small amount of marijuana was found on Diaz's person, as well as his cellphone.^[2]

At the sheriff's station, a detective took Diaz's cell phone and handed it over to Fazio, who took it into evidence. At about 4:18 p.m., Fazio interviewed the defendant, who denied the charges against him. After the interview, at about 4:23 p.m., 90 minutes after the seizure of the cellphone, Fazio looked through Diaz's text messages and found a message that read, "6 4 80," which Fazio took to mean "6 pills of ecstasy for $80." Diaz confessed to the crime shortly after he had been shown the text message by Fazio.^[2]

Lower court decision

In trial court proceedings, Diaz filed a motion to suppress the evidence found on his cell phone, citing Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable search and seizure. The trial court denied the motion and cited the fact that "incident to the arrest, search of his person and everything that turned up is really fair game in terms of being evidence of a crime or instrumentality of a crime or whatever the theory might be."^[2] Upon denial of suppression, Diaz pleaded guilty to transportation of a controlled substance.^[2]

Decision and rationale

The California Supreme Court held that seizure of Diaz's cell phone was lawful because the seizure occurred during a search incident to arrest, an exception to the Fourth Amendment.^[4] The court reasoned that the US Supreme Court had established a precedent in several cases in which officers were allowed to seize objects under an arrestee's control and perform searches of those objects without warrant for the purpose of preserving evidence.^[2]

In doing so, the court applied the reasoning of United States v. Robinson , which held that the unwarranted search and seizure of a cigarette carton on Robinson's body was valid. The court, with Robinson in mind, contended that an arrest allows a valid search of an arrestee's person and belongings. The court then proceeded to apply United States v. Edwards to hold that the search was valid although it had occurred 90 minutes after the arrest. In Edwards, an arrestee's clothing was seized 10 hours after the arrest to preserve evidence (paint chips) that might be present on the clothes.^[2]

The Court then considered United States v. Chadwick , which held that any object associated with an arrestee may be searched incident to arrest, a precedent that supported the claim that the search of Diaz's cellphone was valid incident to his arrest. Under Chadwick, Diaz's cellphone was not only on his person but also then directly associated with him and so a delayed search of the cellphone 90 minutes after the seizure was valid.^[2]

Given the three cases, the Supreme Court concluded that the search and seizure of Diaz's cellphone was valid.^[2]

Concurrence and dissent

Kennard's concurrence

Acting Chief Justice Kennard concurred with the court's judgement, with a few exceptions. Kennard noted that in its earlier rulings surrounding the doctrine of search incident to arrest, the Supreme Court probably did not have cellphones in mind because Robinson, Edwards, and Chadwick were decided in an era before mobile communications. However, Kennard then proceeded to contend that it is not the lower court's responsibility to challenge the decisions of the Supreme Court but only to apply its precedents until the Supreme Court decides to revise them, as the Supreme Court warned in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express Inc. ^[2]

Werdegar's dissent

Justice Werdegar focused her dissent on three key arguments: the cellphone was a relatively-new piece of technology, the search of the cellphone occurred some time after it had been confiscated, and the precedents cited by the Court did not apply to the cellphone as a "container."^[2]

Werdegar argued when Robinson and Edwards were decided, the Supreme Court did not have enough information about cellphones to establish a precedent for their search. "Containers" mentioned in the cases, such as clothing or a cigarette carton, are not analogous to the cellphone, which can contain wealth of private electronic data. Werdegar was especially concerned that the size of cellphone storage could contain "thousands of images or other digital files."^[2]

Werdegar proceeded to reason that the search occurred after the cell phone had already been seized from Diaz and so it was not actually under Diaz's control, effectively negating the preservation of evidence exemption of the Fourth Amendment.^[2]

In a more philosophical argument, Werdegar contended that the privacy limitations of search and seizure upon arrest extended only to the arrestee's body, not the intangible data contained within the cellphone, which holds far more information than any container or item that could lawfully be seized. In allowing such broad seizures, Werdegar worried that the ruling would potentially give police a "carte blanche" and the legal right to search and seize any article or object belonging to an arrestee incident to arrest.^[2]

Court's response to dissent

Responding to Werdegar's contention that a cellphone is distinct from a cigarette carton or clothes on an arrestee's body, the Court cited United States v. Ross in which the Supreme Court held that no privacy existed in packages, regardless of their type, shape, or size, during the search of a car. Applied to Diaz, the Court reasoned that a cellphone was no different from any other container on Diaz's person. For the purposes of applying the past precedents of Robinson and Chadwick, the court continued, Diaz's cellphone is a container like any other.^[2]

In response to the argument that a cellphone has a much larger storage capacity than any item that Diaz could have carried on his person, the Court asserted that there was no evidence that it had a significant storage capacity. Besides, the Court reasoned, like that the size of an item should not be relevant; otherwise, it would be increasingly difficult for law enforcement to uphold the law when such distinctions in container size could be made.^[2]

Considering the dissent's contention that data on the cellphone was theoretically not on Diaz's body, the Court cited Supreme Court precedent that allowed any object found on an arrestee's body to be searched, regardless of externalities. The location of the data was irrelevant insofar as the container was associated with and under Diaz's control.^[2]

Lastly, the Court argued that despite the fact that the search occurred 90 minutes after the arrest, after the precedent in Edwards, had established the legitimacy of that particular search.^[2]

Implications

Many experts in the field argue that unlike traditional objects that can be lawfully seized, a cellphone contains far more personal data, incriminating or otherwise, and the problem with the Diaz ruling, as stated by Justice Moreno in the dissenting opinion, is that it "goes much further, apparently allowing police carte blanche, with no showing of exigency, to rummage at leisure through the wealth of personal and business information that can be carried on a mobile phone or handheld computer merely because the device was taken from an arrestee's person."^[1]^[2]

Aftermath

On February 18, 2011, shortly after the Diaz decision, California State Senator Mark Leno introduced SB 914 in the California Legislature to require a warrant to search an arrestee's cellphone. The measure passed both the California Senate and the California Assembly with a bipartisan vote of 31–4 and 28-9, respectively. The bill was vetoed by Governor Jerry Brown on October 9, 2011, which was sustained by the legislature on March 1, 2012.^[5]

In a somewhat-similar federal case, United States v. Flores-Lopez, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals on February 29, 2012, upheld the warrantless search of a cellphone upon arrest by a reasoning similar to Diaz.^[6]

Jay Leiderman, Diaz's attorney who originally filed the motion to suppress at trial, called the court decision "weak" and a "scary one" because it relies on older US Supreme Court cases that have not kept up with today's modern technology in which cellphones and smartphones can hold tens of thousands of pieces of information: "This type of thing opens up the doors for Big Brother to come flying in."^[7]

Overturned

On June 25, 2014, the US Supreme Court overturned the decision in Riley v. California .^[3] It held that without a warrant, police may not search the digital information on a cellphone that has been seized incident to arrest.

Related Research Articles

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is part of the Bill of Rights. It prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. In addition, it sets requirements for issuing warrants: warrants must be issued by a judge or magistrate, justified by probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and must particularly describe the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

In United States criminal law, probable cause is the standard by which police authorities have reason to obtain a warrant for the arrest of a suspected criminal or the issuing of a search warrant. It is also the standard by which grand juries issue criminal indictments. The principle behind the standard is to limit the power of authorities to perform random or abusive searches, and to promote lawful evidence gathering and procedural form during criminal arrest and prosecution. The standard also applies to personal or property searches.

Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), was a United States Supreme Court decision that helped to establish an implied "right to privacy" in U.S. law, in the form of mere possession of obscene materials.

In the United States, the plain view doctrine is an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement that allows an officer to seize evidence and contraband that are found in plain view during a lawful observation. The doctrine is also regularly used by TSA officers while screening persons and property at U.S. airports.

Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969), is a 1969 Supreme Court of the United States case. In Chimel, the Court held that police officers arresting a person at home could not search the entire home without a search warrant, but police may search the area within immediate reach of the person.

Suppression of evidence is a term used in the United States legal system to describe the lawful or unlawful act of preventing evidence from being shown in a trial. This could happen for several reasons. For example, if a judge believes that the evidence in question was obtained illegally, the judge can rule that it not be shown in court. It could also refer to a prosecutor improperly or intentionally hiding evidence that does not go with their case and could suggest or prove to the judge or jury that the defendant is not guilty or that (s)he is legally obligated to show the defense. In the latter case, this would be a violation of the 5th amendment to the United States Constitution. Also Rule 3.8 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct requires prosecutors to "make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense." This can result in a mistrial in the latter case and/or the dismissal of the prosecutor.

Search incident to a lawful arrest, commonly known as search incident to arrest (SITA) or the Chimel rule, is a U.S. legal principle that allows police to perform a warrantless search of an arrested person, and the area within the arrestee’s immediate control, in the interest of officer safety, the prevention of escape, and the preservation of evidence.

Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963), was a case before the United States Supreme Court, which incorporated the Fourth Amendment's protections against illegal search and seizure. The case was decided on June 10, 1963, by a vote of 5–4.

Inevitable discovery is a doctrine in United States criminal procedure that permits admission of evidence that was obtained through illegal means if it would "inevitably" have been obtained regardless of the illegality. It is one of several exceptions to the exclusionary rule, or the related fruit-of-the-poisonous tree doctrine, which prevent evidence collected in violation of a defendant's constitutional rights from being admitted in court.

In United States criminal law, the border search exception is a doctrine that allows searches and seizures at international borders and their functional equivalent without a warrant or probable cause. The doctrine is not regarded as an exception to the Fourth Amendment, but rather to its requirement for a warrant or probable cause. Balanced against the sovereign's interests at the border are the Fourth Amendment rights of entrants. Not only is the expectation of privacy less at the border than in the interior, the Fourth Amendment balance between the interests of the government and the privacy right of the individual is also struck much more favorably to the government at the border. This balance at international borders means that routine searches are "reasonable" there, and therefore do not violate the Fourth Amendment's proscription against "unreasonable searches and seizures".

New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that when a police officer has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, the officer may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automobile. Therefore, Belton extended the so-called "Chimel rule" of searches incident to a lawful arrest, established in Chimel v. California (1969), to vehicles. The Supreme Court sought to establish bright line rules to govern vehicle search incident to eliminate some confusion in the cases.

United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), was a case in which the United States Supreme Court held that "in the case of a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a reasonable search under that Amendment."

Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the warrantless seizure of evidence which is in plain view. The discovery of the evidence does not have to be inadvertent, although that is a characteristic of most legitimate plain-view seizures. The opinion clarified the plain view doctrine of the Court's Fourth Amendment analysis.

Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990), was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States handed down in 1990. In the case, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment permits a properly limited protective sweep in conjunction with an in-home arrest when the searching officer possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.

Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011), was a decision by the US Supreme Court, which held that warrantless searches conducted in police-created exigent circumstances do not violate the Fourth Amendment as long as the police did not create the exigency by violating or threatening to violate the Fourth Amendment.

Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948), was a US Supreme Court decision that ruled that warrantless searches following arrests were unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014), is a landmark United States Supreme Court case in which the Court unanimously held that the warrantless search and seizure of digital contents of a cell phone during an arrest is unconstitutional.

United States v. Quartavious Davis is a United States federal legal case that challenged the use in a criminal trial of location data obtained without a search warrant from MetroPCS, a cell phone service provider. Mobile phone tracking data had helped place the defendant in this case at the scene of several crimes, for which he was convicted. The defendant appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which found the warrantless data collection had violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, but declined to order a new trial because the evidence was collected in good faith. The Eleventh Circuit has since vacated this decision pending a rehearing by the Eleventh Circuit en banc. United States v. Davis, 573 Fed. Appx. 925. On 5 May 2015, the en banc order upheld the use of the information. On 9th Nov 2015, the Supreme Court of the United States declined to hear this case on appeal.

R v Fearon, 2014 SCC 77 is a leading section 8 Canadian constitutional law case, concerning the constitutionality of warrantless law enforcement searches of the contents of a cell phone incident to arrest.

Carpenter v. United States, No. 16-402, 585 U.S. ____ (2018), was a landmark United States Supreme Court case concerning the privacy of historical cell site location information (CSLI). The Court held, in a 5–4 decision authored by Chief Justice Roberts, that the government violates the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution by accessing historical CSLI records containing the physical locations of cellphones without a search warrant.

References

1 2 Minkevtich, Hannah (February 23, 2011). "People v. Diaz: Is Your iPhone Constitutionally Protected?". Berkeley Technology Law Journal Bolt. Retrieved 2012-03-18.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 People v. Diaz (2011) ^{[ permanent dead link ]}
1 2 Liptak, Adam (25 June 2014). "Major Ruling Shields Privacy of Cellphones". The New York Times . Retrieved 5 September 2014.
↑ U.S. Constitution: Fourth Amendment - Search and Seizure
↑ "Senate Bill SB-914 Search warrants: portable electronic devices (2011-2012)". California Leglislature. Retrieved 5 September 2014.
↑ Justia – United States v. Flores-Lopez
↑ Ventura County Star 4 January 2011; retrieved 23 January 2013