Presumption of regularity

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The presumption of regularity [1] is a presumption that forms part of the law of evidence of England and Wales. It also plays a role in some other countries.

Contents

It is expressed by the maxim of law [2] omnia praesumuntur rite et solemniter esse acta donec probetur in contrarium, [3] (lit. 'Everything is presumed right and solemn about this act until proven to the contrary'); which may be shortened to omnia praesumuntur rite et solemniter esse acta [4] (lit. 'everything is presumed right and solemn about this act') or omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta (lit. 'Everything is presumed right about this act'). [5]

Official actions

Where it has been proved that an "official act" has been done, it will be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that the said act "complied with any necessary formalities" and that the person who did it was "duly appointed". [6] [7]

This is a presumption of law. [8]

The following cases are relevant to this presumption:

Business transactions

Where it has been proved that "necessary business transactions" have been carried out, it will be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that the said transactions were carried out in the order (if any) that they are required to be carried out. [9] See Eaglehill Ltd v J Needham (Builders) Ltd [1973] AC 992, HL.

Mechanical contraptions

Where it has been proved that a "mechanical device" is normally in "good working order", it will be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that it was in good working order on any relevant occasion. [10] See Tingle Jacobs & Co v Kennedy [1964] 1 WLR 638, CA

In the United States

In the United States, the presumption of regularity is a principle of deference that narrows judicial scrutiny over executive decisions. It applies to "a subset of factual disputes about administrative motivations and internal processes". [11]

References

  1. ↑ For this name, see Cooper, Simon & Murphy, Peter & Beaumont, John. Cases & Materials on Evidence. Fourth Edition. Oxford University Press. 1994. p. 86
  2. ↑ Archbold Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice, 1999, para 10-5 at p. 1130
  3. ↑ For this version, see Archbold Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice, 1999, para 10-5 at p. 1130
  4. ↑ For this version, see Simon Cooper, Peter Murphy, & John Beaumont, Cases & Materials on Evidence, 4th edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), 86.
  5. ↑ For this version, see Archbold Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice, 1999, para 10-5 at p. 1130
  6. ↑ Cooper, Simon & Murphy, Peter & Beaumont, John. Cases & Materials on Evidence. Fourth Edition. Oxford University Press. 1994. p. 86
  7. ↑ Archbold Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice, 1999, para 10-5 at p. 1130
  8. ↑ Archbold Criminal Pleading, Evidence and Practice, 1999, p. 1130, see heading "B" to paras. 10-4 and 10-5
  9. ↑ Cooper, Simon & Murphy, Peter & Beaumont, John. Cases & Materials on Evidence. Fourth Edition. Oxford University Press. 1994. pp. 86 and 91
  10. ↑ Cooper, Simon & Murphy, Peter & Beaumont, John. Cases & Materials on Evidence. Fourth Edition. Oxford University Press. 1994. pp. 86 and 90
  11. ↑ Harvard Law Review, The presumption of regularity in judicial review of the executive branch , Volume 131, Issue 8, June 2018, accessed 2025-07-28
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