Public interest theory

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The public interest theory of regulation claims that government regulation acts to protect and benefit the public. [1]

Contents

The public interest is "the welfare or well-being of the general public" and society. [2] Regulation in this context means the employment of legal instruments (laws and rules) for the implementation of policy objectives.

Public interest theory competes for acceptance with public choice and regulatory capture in explaining regulation and its effects on public welfare.

Markets and regulation

In modern economies, resource are allocated mainly by markets. Ideally under certain market theories, this allocation is meant to be optimal, but the conditions necessary to achieve that optimum are frequently not present. In that case resource allocation is suboptimal, creating the possibility that some intervention could improve things. One such intervention is government regulation. [3] Others include taxes/subsidies and improvements to education/infrastructure.

Public interest theory claims that government regulation can improve markets, compensating for imperfect competition, unbalanced market operation, missing markets and undesirable market outcomes. Regulation can facilitate, maintain, or imitate markets. [3]

Public interest theory is a part of welfare economics. It emphasizes that regulation should maximize social welfare and that regulation should follow a cost/benefit analysis to determine whether the increased social welfare outweighs the regulatory cost.

The following costs can be distinguished:[ citation needed ]

History

Public interest theory developed from classical conceptions of representative democracy and the role of government. [4] It presumes confidence in the civil service. According to Max Weber civil servants are to carry out their particular role or task within a strictly ordered and specialized hierarchy.[ citation needed ] The combination of merit and tenure with unambiguous norms of impartiality support rational decision making. Individual decisions must either be subsumed under norms or balance means and ends.[ citation needed ]

In this conception, regulatory administration neither adds to nor subtracts from the policy adopted by lawmakers. The public interest may be served, but it must be served exactly as prescribed by lawmakers. Bureaucracy must not usurp the public interest, nor does it protect against its usurpation by particular interests seeing regulation as a vehicle for their own concerns. [5] It states that regulation pursues some conception of the general good

While there is no pointed origin or categorical articulation of public interest theory, its notions can be traced back to Pigou; [6] related to his analysis of externalities and welfare economics. This theory was prevalent, especially during the New Deal era.

Starting in the 1960s, economists of the Chicago school began critiquing the assumption of benevolent regulators, proposing counter theories, like public choice theory, which asserts that instead of pursuing the public interest, regulators act to protect their own positions. The theory of regulatory capture asserts that regulated entities influence regulators to benefit themselves, particularly at the expense of less sophisticated competitors, who are less able to influence the regulators.

Regulation, according to public interest theory, is assumed to benefit society as a whole rather than particular vested interests. [7] The regulators are considered to represent society's interest rather than the private interests of regulators or particular regulated entities. [8]

Example

One application of public Interest theory can be seen in an investigation in Sweden and the energy market:

We test the public interest and regulatory capture hypotheses, in the context of the Swedish electricity market, by studying the factors influencing the Swedish Energy Agency's decision to replace decision-makers it employs to hear customer complaints against utilities.
We test if the regulator's decision to retain, or replace, the decision-maker, following a sequence of decisions, can be explained by whether the customer or utility is being favored by the civil servant. Based on whether the regulator replaces the decision maker that it has the power to appoint, we draw inferences about what theory can best explain the behavior of the regulator. The regulator can choose to favor the customer. To do so would be consistent with the fact that the primary objective of the electricity market reform in 1996 was to put the onus on the Swedish Energy Agency to provide stronger consumer protection against market abuse by the electricity utilities. On the other hand, the regulator might be captured because the utilities have more financial and legal resources and they have a well-established lobby organization which the customers do not have. It is not clear, therefore, whether customers or utilities have benefited most during the post-reform regulation. [9]

Criticism

The most critiqued aspects of public interest theory are its ambiguity, and its inability to recognize/address imperfections in the regulatory regime. Further, it provides no framework for assessing when and if the public interest has been served.

Another issue is whether the integrity of the regulatory function is maintainable over time. When a regulatory regime is established, typically during a period of regulatory reform, the regulatory body is subject to close scrutiny from the government and the public. With the passage of time, attention turns to other issues. Without this scrutiny the body becomes more susceptible to regulatory capture and or the contradictions exposed by public choice theory. [9]

Related Research Articles

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Natural monopoly</span> Concept in economics

A natural monopoly is a monopoly in an industry in which high infrastructural costs and other barriers to entry relative to the size of the market give the largest supplier in an industry, often the first supplier in a market, an overwhelming advantage over potential competitors. Specifically, an industry is a natural monopoly if the total cost of one firm, producing the total output, is lower than the total cost of two or more firms producing the entire production. In that case, it is very probable that a company (monopoly) or minimal number of companies (oligopoly) will form, providing all or most relevant products and/or services. This frequently occurs in industries where capital costs predominate, creating large economies of scale about the size of the market; examples include public utilities such as water services, electricity, telecommunications, mail, etc. Natural monopolies were recognized as potential sources of market failure as early as the 19th century; John Stuart Mill advocated government regulation to make them serve the public good.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Environmental economics</span> Sub-field of economics

Environmental economics is a sub-field of economics concerned with environmental issues. It has become a widely studied subject due to growing environmental concerns in the twenty-first century. Environmental economics "undertakes theoretical or empirical studies of the economic effects of national or local environmental policies around the world. ... Particular issues include the costs and benefits of alternative environmental policies to deal with air pollution, water quality, toxic substances, solid waste, and global warming."

Public choice, or public choice theory, is "the use of economic tools to deal with traditional problems of political science". Its content includes the study of political behavior. In political science, it is the subset of positive political theory that studies self-interested agents and their interactions, which can be represented in a number of ways – using standard constrained utility maximization, game theory, or decision theory. It is the origin and intellectual foundation of contemporary work in political economy.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Externality</span> In economics, an imposed cost or benefit

In economics, an externality or external cost is an indirect cost or benefit to an uninvolved third party that arises as an effect of another party's activity. Externalities can be considered as unpriced goods involved in either consumer or producer market transactions. Air pollution from motor vehicles is one example. The cost of air pollution to society is not paid by either the producers or users of motorized transport to the rest of society. Water pollution from mills and factories is another example. All consumers are made worse off by pollution but are not compensated by the market for this damage. A positive externality is when an individual's consumption in a market increases the well-being of others, but the individual does not charge the third party for the benefit. The third party is essentially getting a free product. An example of this might be the apartment above a bakery receiving the benefit of enjoyment from smelling fresh pastries every morning. The people who live in the apartment do not compensate the bakery for this benefit.

Regulation is the management of complex systems according to a set of rules and trends. In systems theory, these types of rules exist in various fields of biology and society, but the term has slightly different meanings according to context. For example:

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Public utility</span> Company running public service infrastructure

A public utility company is an organization that maintains the infrastructure for a public service. Public utilities are subject to forms of public control and regulation ranging from local community-based groups to statewide government monopolies.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Arthur Cecil Pigou</span> English economist (1877–1959)

Arthur Cecil Pigou was an English economist. As a teacher and builder of the School of Economics at the University of Cambridge, he trained and influenced many Cambridge economists who went on to take chairs of economics around the world. His work covered various fields of economics, particularly welfare economics, but also included Business cycle theory, unemployment, public finance, index numbers, and measurement of national output. His reputation was affected adversely by influential economic writers who used his work as the basis on which to define their own opposing views. He reluctantly served on several public committees, including the Cunliffe Committee and the 1919 Royal Commission on Income tax.

A Pigouvian tax is a tax on any market activity that generates negative externalities. The tax is normally set by the government to correct an undesirable or inefficient market outcome and does so by being set equal to the external marginal cost of the negative externalities. In the presence of negative externalities, social cost includes private cost and external cost caused by negative externalities. This means the social cost of a market activity is not covered by the private cost of the activity. In such a case, the market outcome is not efficient and may lead to over-consumption of the product. Often-cited examples of negative externalities are environmental pollution and increased public healthcare costs associated with tobacco and sugary drink consumption.

Cost–benefit analysis (CBA), sometimes also called benefit–cost analysis, is a systematic approach to estimating the strengths and weaknesses of alternatives. It is used to determine options which provide the best approach to achieving benefits while preserving savings in, for example, transactions, activities, and functional business requirements. A CBA may be used to compare completed or potential courses of action, and to estimate or evaluate the value against the cost of a decision, project, or policy. It is commonly used to evaluate business or policy decisions, commercial transactions, and project investments. For example, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission must conduct cost-benefit analyses before instituting regulations or deregulations.

Welfare economics is a field of economics that applies microeconomic techniques to evaluate the overall well-being (welfare) of a society. This evaluation is typically done at the economy-wide level, and attempts to assess the distribution of resources and opportunities among members of society.

Government failure, in the context of public economics, is an economic inefficiency caused by a government intervention, if the inefficiency would not exist in a true free market. The costs of the government intervention are greater than the benefits provided. It can be viewed in contrast to a market failure, which is an economic inefficiency that results from the free market itself, and can potentially be corrected through government regulation. However, Government failure often arises from an attempt to solve market failure. The idea of government failure is associated with the policy argument that, even if particular markets may not meet the standard conditions of perfect competition required to ensure social optimality, government intervention may make matters worse rather than better.

Regulatory economics is the application of law by government or regulatory agencies for various economics-related purposes, including remedying market failure, protecting the environment and economic management.

In politics, regulatory capture is a form of corruption of authority that occurs when a political entity, policymaker, or regulator is co-opted to serve the commercial, ideological, or political interests of a minor constituency, such as a particular geographic area, industry, profession, or ideological group.

A regulatory agency or independent agency is a government authority that is responsible for exercising autonomous dominion over some area of human activity in a licensing and regulating capacity.

Rate-of-return regulation is a system for setting the prices charged by government-regulated monopolies, such as public utilities. Its main premise is that monopolies must charge the same price that would ideally prevail in a perfectly competitive market, equal to the efficient costs of production, plus a market-determined rate of return on capital.

Public economics(or economics of the public sector) is the study of government policy through the lens of economic efficiency and equity. Public economics builds on the theory of welfare economics and is ultimately used as a tool to improve social welfare. Welfare can be defined in terms of well-being, prosperity, and overall state of being.

In public utility regulation, decoupling refers to the disassociation of a utility's profits from its sales of the energy commodity. Instead, a rate of return is aligned with meeting revenue targets, and rates are adjusted up or down to meet the target at the end of the adjustment period. This makes the utility indifferent to selling less product and improves the ability of energy efficiency and distributed generation to operate within the utility environment.

Utility ratemaking is the formal regulatory process in the United States by which public utilities set the prices they will charge consumers. Ratemaking, typically carried out through "rate cases" before a public utilities commission, serves as one of the primary instruments of government regulation of public utilities.

Performance-based regulation (PBR) is an approach to utility regulation designed to strengthen utility performance incentives. Thus defined, the term PBR is synonymous with incentive regulation. The two most common forms of PBR are award-penalty mechanisms (“APMs”) and multiyear rate plans (“MRPs”). Both involve mathematical formulas that can lower regulatory cost at the same time that they encourage better performance. This constitutes a remarkable potential advance in the “technology” of regulation. Economic theorists whose work has supported the development of PBR include Nobel prize-winning economist Jean Tirole.

This glossary of economics is a list of definitions of terms and concepts used in economics, its sub-disciplines, and related fields.

References

  1. Hantke-Domas, Michael (March 2003). "The Public Interest Theory of Regulation: Non-Existence or Misinterpretation?". European Journal of Law and Economics. 15 (2): 165–194. doi:10.1023/a:1021814416688. ISSN   0929-1261. S2CID   153838670.
  2. "Public interest", Random House Dictionary .
  3. 1 2 den Hertog, Johan (2012). "Economic Theories of Regulation". In Roger J. Van den Bergh; Alessio M. Pacces (eds.). Regulation and Economics. Edward Elgar Publishing. ISBN   978-1-84720-343-4 via Research Papers in Economics.
  4. Jørgen Grønnegaard Christensen (2010). "Public Interest regulation reconsidered" (PDF). Universitat Pompeu Fabra. S2CID   31420855.
  5. Dialnet, Universidad de La Rioja (2002-06-30). "Dialnet (Servicio de Difusión de Alertas en la Red)". Contextos Educativos. Revista de Educación (5): 276. doi: 10.18172/con.519 . ISSN   1695-5714.
  6. Pigou, A. C. (1932) The Economics of Welfare. London: Macmillan and Co.
  7. Deegan, C., Unerman, J. (2011) Financial Accounting Theory. Maidenhead: McGraw-Hill Education.
  8. Richard A. Posner, Theories of Economic Regulation, The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Autumn, 1974), pp. 335-358
  9. 1 2 Smyth, Russell; Söderberg, Magnus (December 2010). "Public interest versus regulatory capture in the Swedish electricity market". Journal of Regulatory Economics. 38 (3): 292–312. doi:10.1007/s11149-010-9129-9. ISSN   0922-680X. S2CID   154923316.