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Epiphenomenalism is a position on the mind–body problem which holds that subjective mental events are completely dependent for their existence on corresponding physical and biochemical events within the human body, yet themselves have no influence over physical events. The appearance that subjective mental states influence physical events is merely an illusion, consciousness being a by-product of physical states of the world. For instance, fear seems to make the heart beat faster, but according to epiphenomenalism the biochemical secretions of the brain and nervous system —not the experience of fear—is what raises the heartbeat. Because mental events are a kind of overflow that cannot cause anything physical, yet have non-physical properties, epiphenomenalism is viewed as a form of property dualism.
Consciousness Explained is a 1991 book by the American philosopher Daniel Dennett, in which the author offers an account of how consciousness arises from interaction of physical and cognitive processes in the brain. Dennett describes consciousness as an account of the various calculations occurring in the brain at close to the same time. He compares consciousness to an academic paper that is being developed or edited in the hands of multiple people at one time, the "multiple drafts" theory of consciousness. In this analogy, "the paper" exists even though there is no single, unified paper. When people report on their inner experiences, Dennett considers their reports to be more like theorizing than like describing. These reports may be informative, he says, but a psychologist is not to take them at face value. Dennett describes several phenomena that show that perception is more limited and less reliable than we perceive it to be.
In the philosophy of mind, functionalism is the thesis that each and every mental state is constituted solely by its functional role, which means its causal relation to other mental states, sensory inputs, and behavioral outputs. Functionalism developed largely as an alternative to the identity theory of mind and behaviorism.
David John Chalmers (;) is an Australian philosopher and cognitive scientist specializing in the areas of philosophy of mind and philosophy of language. He is a professor of philosophy and neural science at New York University, as well as co-director of NYU's Center for Mind, Brain and Consciousness. In 2006, he was elected a Fellow of the Australian Academy of the Humanities. In 2013, he was elected a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences.
In the philosophy of mind and consciousness, the explanatory gap is the difficulty that physicalist philosophies have in explaining how physical properties give rise to the way things feel subjectively when they are experienced. It is a term introduced by philosopher Joseph Levine. In the 1983 paper in which he first used the term, he used as an example the sentence, "Pain is the firing of C fibers", pointing out that while it might be valid in a physiological sense, it does not help us to understand how pain feels.
Eliminative materialism is a materialist position in the philosophy of mind. It is the idea that the majority of mental states in folk psychology do not exist. Some supporters of eliminativism argue that no coherent neural basis will be found for many everyday psychological concepts such as belief or desire, since they are poorly defined. The argument is that psychological concepts of behavior and experience should be judged by how well they reduce to the biological level. Other versions entail the nonexistence of conscious mental states such as pain and visual perceptions.
The knowledge argument is a philosophical thought experiment proposed by Frank Jackson in his article "Epiphenomenal Qualia" (1982) and extended in "What Mary Didn't Know" (1986).
In philosophy of mind, the hard problem of consciousness is to explain why and how humans and other organisms have qualia, phenomenal consciousness, or subjective experiences. It is contrasted with the "easy problems" of explaining why and how physical systems give a (healthy) human being the ability to discriminate, to integrate information, and to perform behavioral functions such as watching, listening, speaking, and so forth. The easy problems are amenable to functional explanation—that is, explanations that are mechanistic or behavioral—since each physical system can be explained purely by reference to the "structure and dynamics" that underpin the phenomenon.
A philosophical zombie is a being in a thought experiment in philosophy of mind that is physically identical to a normal person but does not have conscious experience.
Frank Cameron JacksonFBA is an Australian analytic philosopher and Emeritus Professor in the School of Philosophy at Australian National University (ANU) where he had spent most of the latter part of his career. His primary research interests include epistemology, metaphysics, meta-ethics and the philosophy of mind. In the latter field he is best known for the "Mary's room" knowledge argument, a thought experiment that is one of the most discussed challenges to physicalism.
Property dualism describes a category of positions in the philosophy of mind which hold that, although the world is composed of just one kind of substance—the physical kind—there exist two distinct kinds of properties: physical properties and mental properties. In other words, it is the view that at least some non-physical, mental properties exist in, or naturally supervene upon, certain physical substances.
In philosophy of mind, Cartesian materialism is the idea that at some place in the brain, there is some set of information that directly corresponds to our conscious experience. Contrary to its name, Cartesian materialism is not a view that was held by or formulated by René Descartes, who subscribed rather to a form of substance dualism.
Type physicalism is a physicalist theory in the philosophy of mind. It asserts that mental events can be grouped into types, and can then be correlated with types of physical events in the brain. For example, one type of mental event, such as "mental pains" will, presumably, turn out to be describing one type of physical event.
Philosophy of mind is a branch of philosophy that deals with the nature of the mind and its relation to the body and the external world.
Sweet Dreams: Philosophical Obstacles to a Science of Consciousness is a 2005 book by the American philosopher Daniel Dennett, based on the text of the Jean Nicod lectures he gave in 2001.
In philosophy of mind, qualia are defined as instances of subjective, conscious experience. The term qualia derives from the Latin neuter plural form (qualia) of the Latin adjective quālis meaning "of what sort" or "of what kind" in relation to a specific instance, such as "what it is like to taste a specific apple — this particular apple now".
The Amygdaloids, an American rock band from New York City, contains three New York University scientists: Joseph LeDoux, vocals and guitar, Tyler Volk, lead guitar and vocals, Colin Dempsey, bass, and Daniela Schiller, drums. LeDoux is a professor of neuroscience and Volk a professor of biology. Schiller is a postdoctoral researcher in cognitive neuroscience. Their name is a reference to the amygdala in the brain.
Anindya Chatterjee is an Indian Bengali film director, music director, singer, lyricist, actor and producer based in Kolkata, West Bengal, India. He is the singer-lyricist of Bengali band Chandrabindoo. In recent times he has composed multifarious songs in Bengali mainstream films as an independent music director.
Icarus the Owl is an American alternative rock band based in Portland, Oregon formed in 2009. The band currently consists of vocalist Joey Rubenstein, lead guitarist Tim Brown, percussionist Rob Bernknopf, and bassist Jake Thomas-Low. The band has self-released 5 studio albums titled The Spotless Mind (2009), Love Always, Leviathan (2012), Icarus the Owl (2014), and Pilot Waves (2015), Rearm Circuits (2017) and one EP titled Qualia (2011). The band has participated on the Vans Warped Tour in 2013 and has toured with bands such as A Lot Like Birds, Hail the Sun, Stolas, Eidola, Artifex Pereo, and The Ongoing Concept. In 2015, the band signed with Blue Swan Records and released Pilot Waves, their debut album with the label.
Zombie Blues is a rock band founded by the Australian philosopher and cognitive scientist David Chalmers, who serves as the lead singer of the band. Its name comes from Chalmers' philosophical zombie thought experiment—a hypothetical creature that looks like humans but lacks consciousness.
References
- 1 2 Kaminer, Ariel (December 9, 2012). "Where Theory and Research Meet to Jam About the Mind". The New York Times . Retrieved January 27, 2015.
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