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Raffi Indjejikian is the Robert L. Dixon Collegiate Professor of Accounting at the Stephen M. Ross School of Business at the University of Michigan. [1] His research is primarily focused on the development of models and theories illustrating the role of managerial accounting in decision-making through the basis of agency theory. [1]
Indjejikian holds a Bachelor of Commerce and Diploma of Public Accountancy from McGill University in Montreal, an M.B.A. from the University of Western Ontario, and a Ph.D. from the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania. Before gaining a full professorship position at the University of Michigan in September 2000, Indjejikian held Associate Professor positions at the University of Michigan and University of Chicago from July 1992 to August 2000. He was also Assistant Professor, Instructor, and Lecturer at the University of Chicago, University of Pennsylvania, and McGill University, respectively. [2]
Raffi Indjejikian's research on two-tiered financial reporting pertains to the differences between sophisticated and unsophisticated users. Unsophisticated users may lack knowledge and technology to be able to analyze such complicated financial statements and reports. Therefore, a competitive advantage is created for the sophisticated users while unsophisticated users are left with an “information overload”. Two-tiered reporting can be damaging to unsophisticated users specifically in situations where important information is being eliminated or when too much information is being extracted. [3]
Another focus of Indjejikian's research is the responsibilities and compensation of CEOs and CFOs of public and private corporations. Several of his papers have examined how firms design their bonus plans for the CFO and CEO and contrast those plans to decision making. The research of these papers was through surveys of members of the American Institute of CPA's. The main findings of these papers were that bonuses are based on the length of executive tenure, size of the firm, and length of the product development and life cycle. The papers also found public companies, relative to private companies have reduced the percentage of bonus based on financial reporting to the extent that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has made firms much more concerned about the integrity of their financial reports and increased the costs of noncompliance. [4] [5]
With Nanda, Indjejikian argues that incentive problems are a crucial aspect of responsibility accounting. Due to the Ratchet effect, the employer would be better off if both parties can agree on a multi-period contract without subsequent revisions. Two responsibility center structures are analyzed: Consolidated structures are produced when managers are attributed to multiple activities. These structures imply less ratcheting but at the loss of comparative performance information. Specialized structures mean managers are responsible for one activity thus providing a higher level of comparative performance information but also a higher level of ratcheting. Performance evaluation in firms with specialized structures is more informative because of the use of comparative measurements. [6]
Corporate governance refers to the mechanisms, processes, practices, and relations by which corporations are controlled and operated by their boards of directors, managers, shareholders, and stakeholders.
In general, incentives are anything that persuade a person or organization to alter their behavior to produce the desired outcome. The laws of economists and of behavior state that higher incentives amount to greater levels of effort and therefore higher levels of performance. For comparison, a disincentive is something that discourages from certain actions.
The principal–agent problem refers to the conflict in interests and priorities that arises when one person or entity takes actions on behalf of another person or entity. The problem worsens when there is a greater discrepancy of interests and information between the principal and agent, as well as when the principal lacks the means to punish the agent. The deviation from the principal's interest by the agent is called "agency costs".
Personnel economics has been defined as "the application of economic and mathematical approaches and econometric and statistical methods to traditional questions in human resources management". It is an area of applied micro labor economics, but there are a few key distinctions. One distinction, not always clearcut, is that studies in personnel economics deal with the personnel management within firms, and thus internal labor markets, while those in labor economics deal with labor markets as such, whether external or internal. In addition, personnel economics deals with issues related to both managerial-supervisory and non-supervisory workers.
An agency cost is an economic concept that refers to the costs associated with the relationship between a "principal", and an "agent". The agent is given powers to make decisions on behalf of the principal. However, the two parties may have different incentives and the agent generally has more information. The principal cannot directly ensure that its agent is always acting in its best interests. This potential divergence in interests is what gives rise to agency costs.
Positive accounting is the branch of academic accounting research that seeks to explain and predict actual accounting practices. This contrasts with normative accounting, that seeks to derive and prescribe "optimal" accounting standards.
Michael Cole Jensen was an American economist who worked in the field of financial economics. From 1967-1988, he was on the University of Rochester's faculty. Between 2000 and 2009 he worked for the Monitor Company Group, a strategy-consulting firm which became "Monitor Deloitte" in 2013. Until 2000, he held the position of Jesse Isidor Straus Professor of Business Administration at Harvard University.
The term clawback or claw back refers to any money or benefits that have been given out, but are required to be returned due to special circumstances or events, such as the monies having been received as the result of a financial crime, or where there is a clawback provision in the executive compensation contract.
Executive compensation is composed of both the financial compensation and other non-financial benefits received by an executive from their employing firm in return for their service. It is typically a mixture of fixed salary, variable performance-based bonuses and benefits and other perquisites all ideally configured to take into account government regulations, tax law, the desires of the organization and the executive.
Dhananjay "Dan" Gode is a Clinical Associate Professor of Accounting, Taxation, and Business law at New York University Stern School of Business. He teaches courses in corporate financial accounting, and also teaches for the TRIUM Global Executive MBA Program, an alliance of NYU Stern, the London School of Economics and HEC School of Management.
Kevin James Murphy is a professor at the University of Southern California. Since 2006, Murphy has held the Kenneth L. Trefftzs Chair in Finance at the USC Marshall School of Business. He is also a Professor of Law at the USC Gould School of Law and Professor of Economics at USC's College of Letters, Arts & Science.
Compensation and benefits refer to remuneration to employees from employers. Which is the payments or rewards provided to an individual for the work that has been completed.
Campbell Russell "Cam" Harvey is a Canadian economist, known for his work on asset allocation with changing risk and risk premiums and the problem of separating luck from skill in investment management. He is currently the J. Paul Sticht Professor of International Business at Duke University's Fuqua School of Business in Durham, North Carolina, as well as a research associate with the National Bureau of Economic Research in Cambridge, Massachusetts. He is also a research associate with the Institute of International Integration Studies at Trinity College Dublin and a visiting researcher at the University of Oxford. He served as the 2016 president of the American Finance Association.
In the United States, the compensation of company executives is distinguished by the forms it takes and its dramatic rise over the past three decades. Within the last 30 years, executive compensation or pay has risen dramatically beyond what can be explained by changes in firm size, performance, and industry classification. This has received a wide range of criticism leveled against it.
Ole-Kristian Hope is a Norwegian economist, and Professor of Accounting at the Rotman School of Management, particularly known for his work on accounting standards and disclosure practices.
Ashish Nanda is a business economist and professor who is the former Director of the Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad (IIMA).
Luca Maestri is an Italian businessman. He is the chief financial officer (CFO) of Apple Inc. until the end of 2024.
Thomas C. Naratil is an American business executive in the financial industry. After serving as president of both UBS Wealth Management Americas and UBS Americas since early 2016, Naratil was appointed CEO of UBS Americas Holding LLC and became co-president of Global Wealth Management of UBS Group AG and UBS AG in early 2018.
Taylor R. Randall is an American educator and academic administrator. Since September 2021, he has served as the 17th President of the University of Utah, where he has helped raise the university to a top 10 public ranking. Prior to his appointment as president, he was dean of the David Eccles School of Business (2009-2021).
Anup Agrawal is a professor of Finance and Powell Chair of Finance at the University of Alabama. He is known for his research in Corporate Finance and Investments, including Corporate Governance, Mergers and Acquisitions, Executive Compensation, Corporate Innovation, Corporate Fraud, Insider Trading, Security Analysts, and Market Efficiency.