Read v Great Eastern Railway | |
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Court | High Court of Justice (Queen's Bench Division) |
Full case name | Read v The Great Eastern Railway Company |
Decided | 25 June 1868 |
Citation(s) | |
Cases cited |
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Legislation cited | Fatal Accidents Act 1846 1 2 |
Court membership | |
Judges sitting | Blackburn J Lush J |
Keywords | |
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Read v Great Eastern Railway (1868) LR 3 QB 555 [5] was an English tort law case which created a strong authority [6] enshrining the principle that if a deceased person has settled a damages claim discharging all the claims and causes of action against the defendant in full satisfaction within their lifetime, [7] [4] no further action can be brought by their representatives if the injured person subsequently dies from the same injuries. [8] [9] It was held that a claim for loss of dependency under section 1 of the Fatal Accidents Act 1846, also known as "Lord Campbell's Act", [10] could not be brought if a person died from the effects of an injury for which they had settled a claim during their lifetime, as they would not be capable of any fresh cause of action. [11]
The plaintiff was the wife of D. Read, a railway passenger, [12] who was wounded as a result of negligence by the defendant, the Great Eastern Railway Company. During his lifetime, he brought an action for damages where he accepted a sum in full and final settlement of the injuries caused by the defendant's negligence. He subsequently died of the same injuries. [7] As executrix of D. Read, his widow then brought an action for loss of dependency under Section 1 of the Fatal Accidents Act 1846. [13]
Her claim for loss of support was dismissed. The injured party would not have been able to maintain an action, irrespective of his subsequent death, because he had already received full satisfaction of his claim during his lifetime, [1] so no new right of action was capable of arising. [12]
According to Blackburn J, before the Fatal Accidents Act 1846, a person who suffered a personal injury but survived its consequences would be permitted to bring an action to recover damages for that injury. [2] However, if they then died from the effects of the same injuries, no action could be brought. Blackburn J went on to explain that the statute (the FAA 1846) was passed "to meet this state of the law". [14]
I think the whole structure of the first section shows that the object of the Legislature was not to make the wrongdoer pay twice over, or to give the executor of the deceased person a new cause of action, but merely to give the executor a right to sue for the benefit of the family of the deceased where the axiom actio personalis moritur cum persona formerly prevented his doing so. It points only to cases where the person injured has not already obtained satisfaction, and although it gives a different measure of damages when the action is brought by the representative of the deceased, that does not affect the question of the right to bring a fresh action where the deceased person has in his lifetime received compensation for the injuries which he has sustained.
Mr. Justice Lush,Read v. Great Eastern Railway Company (1868), L. R. 3 Q. B. 555 [13]
The damages awarded to the injured party during their lifetime would "debar further recovery" if a new action by the executor was attempted. Lush J clarified that the intention behind the new statute was not to charge the wrongdoer twice. [15] The compromised settlement accepted by D. Read had the effect of precluding him, even if death had not ensued, from further recovery, which in turn meant that his widow, under the provision of the statute (FAA 1846), "could have no better right". [16]
In Reader & Ors v Molesworths Bright Clegg Solicitors [2017] EWCA Civ 169, Read v Great Eastern Railway Company was described as the "oldest authority" [17] In Thompson & Ors v Arnold [2007] EWHC 1875 (QB), Langstaff J made the point in citing Read v Great Eastern Railway (1868) that the case law had been established for well over a hundred years and that he would have expected any reasonably proficient personal injury practitioner to be aware of the well-known authority which had been followed and recognised "at appellate level" ever since. [18]
Although this authority has never been decided in the House of Lords, [6] the principle has been accepted as the right one in a number of subsequent cases. [19] It was expressed by their Lordships in Pickett v British Rail Engineering Ltd [1980] AC 136 that any sum accepted by the plaintiff in full settlement has the effect of precluding their dependents from making a claim for loss of dependency under the Fatal Accidents Act. [20]
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Read v The Great Eastern Railway Company (1868) LR 3 QB 555
Blackburn J said: "Before that statute, the person who received a personal injury and survived its consequences, could bring an action and recover damages for the injury; but if he died from its effects, then no action could be brought."
...and notwithstanding the language of the court in Blake v. Midland Railway Company (1852), 18 Q. B. 93, to the effect that the Act does not transfer the decedent's right of action to his representative, but gives a totally new right of action; the Court of Queen's Bench (in which also the latter case arose), held in Read v. Great Eastern R'y Co. (1868), L. R. 3 Q. B. 555, that a settlement made by the decedent in his lifetime, with the company responsible for the injury, was a bar to an action under the statute, after his death.
In Read v. Great Eastern R. W. Co., L. R 3 Q. B. 555 41 86 8) an action by a widow to recover damages for the death of her husband, it was held that the action was answered by a plea of satisfaction to the deceased in his life-time...
...the dependants had no right of action if the deceased accepted compensation in full settlement for the negligence prior to his death from the injuries in the accident (...) Read v. Great Eastern Railway Co. (1868) L.R. 3 Q.B. 555
Although the point has never been considered by your Lordships' House, it is generally assumed that should the plaintiff accept a sum in settlement of his claim or obtain judgment for damages in respect of the defendant's negligence, his dependants will have no cause of action under the Fatal Accidents Acts after his death. This assumption is supported by strong authority; see Read v. Great Eastern Railway Company (1868) L.R. 3 Q.B. 555.
Declaration by a widow against a railway company for negligence, whereby her husband, a passenger, was injured, and in consequence died. Plea, that in his lifetime the company paid him and he accepted a sum of money in satisfaction and discharge of all claims and causes of action which he had against them...
If an injured person receives compensation during his lifetime, in full satisfaction of all his claims, and subsequently dies from the effect of his injuries, his representatives cannot then claim damages in respect of his death; for the death gives no fresh rights of action (a). Read v. Great Eastern Railway Company, L.R., 3 Q. B. 555; 9 B. & S. 714; 18 L. T., N. S. 82; 37 L. R., Q. B. 278; 16 W. R. 1040.
If the deceased has settled his claim in his lifetime, no further action can be brought on his dying through the same injuries. Read v. Great Eastern Railway Co.
Against this there was the unquestioned authority of Read v. Great Eastern Railway Company, L. R. 3 Q. B. 555, in which case it was held that an action can only be maintained under Lord Campbell's Act in a case where the deceased could have maintained an action if he had survived.
This was an action brought by the plaintiff (widow of D. Read), as executrix of D. Read, deceased, under Lord Campbell's Act (9 & 10 Vict. c. 93), to recover damages for injuries sustained by the deceased through the negligence of the defendants, owing to which injuries he died.
Blackburn J... ...Before that statute, the person who receives a personal injury, and survived its consequences, could bring an action and recover damages for the injury; but if he died from its effects, then no action could be brought. To meet this state of the law, 9 & 10 Vict. chap. 93. was passed, and whenever the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act, as would (if death had not ensued) have entitled the party injured to maintain an action and recover damages in respect thereof, (...)
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: CS1 maint: date and year (link)His widow brought suit under Lord Campbell's Act to recover damages which she had sustained by his death. The Court held that, since the settlement made by the husband would have precluded him from recovering "if death had not ensued," the widow by the terms of the statute could have no better right.
The above argument appears well founded and has been accepted as correct in a number of cases although it has not been determined by the House of Lords. Read v. Great Eastern Railway Co. (1868) L.R. 3 Q.B. 555; Williams v. Mersey Docks and Harbour Board [1905] 1 K.B. 804; Murray v. Shuter [1976] Q.B. 927.
In Pickett Lord Wilberforce expressed the generally held view that, once a claimant had successfully brought an action for his injuries while he was alive, this prevented his dependants from suing for loss of dependency under the fatal accidents legislation, even if death was the result of the original tort.