Hearing: April 13–14, 2011 Judgment: December 22, 2011
Full case name
In the Matter of a Reference by the Governor in Council concerning the proposed Canadian Securities Act, as set out in Order in Council P.C. 2010-667, dated May 26, 2010
Canadian securities regulation is unique in that the field is solely regulated by provincial and territorial governments. While those governments have worked to harmonize many of their policies, there is still enough variation that securities issuers must reconcile in order to have their securities trade among residents in each of the jurisdictions involved.
Since the 1930s, there has been debate about the desirability of establishing a single national securities regulator. In 2010, a draft Canadian Securities Act was published,[2] and a reference question was posed to the Supreme Court of Canada on its constitutionality.
Provincial references
The provincial governments of Alberta and Quebec had previously posed reference questions to their respective Courts of Appeal on the subject. In March 2011, the Alberta Court of Appeal ruled unanimously that the federal proposal in its entirety was an unconstitutional intrusion into provincial jurisdiction.[3][4]
In the same month, the Quebec Court of Appeal made a similar ruling in a 4-1 split decision, but stated that sections 148-152 and 158-168 of the proposed Act (dealing with orders for the production of information, criminal offences, prohibition orders and restitution orders) were valid under the criminal law power, and that there was no question that the Act would be constitutional if it focused solely on international and interprovincial regulation of securities transactions.[5][6] The Alberta Court had considered the criminal law provisions to be so incidental to the purpose of the Act that they could not stand on their own, and it did not discuss in detail the international and interprovincial questions.
Question posed
Is the proposed Canadian Securities Act within the legislative authority of the Parliament of Canada?[7]
Arguments offered at the hearing
At issue was the question of whether the regulation of the securities industry is a valid exercise of the federal trade and commerce power.[8] In that regard, arguments focused on the applicability of the five criteria for such an analysis that were previously identified in General Motors of Canada Ltd. v. City National Leasing:
the impugned legislation must be part of a regulatory scheme;
the scheme must be monitored by the continuing oversight of a regulatory agency;
the legislation must be concerned with trade as a whole rather than with a particular industry;
the legislation should be of a nature that provinces jointly or severally would be constitutionally incapable of enacting; and
the failure to include one or more provinces or localities in a legislative scheme would jeopardize the successful operation of the scheme in other parts of the country.
If the trade and commerce power does not apply, then securities regulation, being in pith and substance under the property and civil rights power, falls exclusively within provincial jurisdiction, as the double aspect and paramountcy doctrines would not come into play.
Both sides agreed that the first two General Motors criteria were met, and subsequent arguments revolved around the other three. Numerous submissions were presented to the Court on this question.[9]
Canada argued that securities law transcends all industries, and thus should be a valid exercise of the trade and commerce power, in the same way as for competition law. On the other side, it was argued that the securities industry should be viewed in the same manner as the insurance industry, which since Citizen's Insurance Co. v. Parsons has been held to fall under provincial jurisdiction.
Ability of the provinces to regulate jointly or severally
Canada noted that, while the provincial securities regulators efforts to operate a passport system have met with some success, there are still some significant constitutional limitations on their ability to regulate the securities industry in the modern age:
the provinces cannot apply their regulations extra-provincially;
the securities industry has become primarily international in scope;
provinces cannot regulate federally incorporated companies; and
provinces lack the ability to include criminal sanctions with their regulations
Alberta, among others, argued that there were no flaws in the present passport system that could not be fixed, and that the proposed Act contained nothing that could not be found in current provincial legislation.
Jeopardizing the successful operation of the scheme
As the proposed Act contains an opt-in clause (providing that it would only apply in provinces that choose to participate), it was argued that this shows that unanimous provincial involvement is not necessary and that therefore this should be considered an area that the provinces are more than capable of regulating without the involvement of the Federal Government. Canada responded that this represented an example of the current model of cooperative federalism that had already been employed in agricultural products marketing, and which was approved by the Court in Reference re Agricultural Products Marketing Act.
Opinion of the Supreme Court of Canada
The Court held that, as presently drafted, the proposed Act is not valid under the general branch of the federal power to regulate trade and commerce.[11][12] It is mainly focused on the day‑to‑day regulation of all aspects of contracts for securities within the provinces, including all aspects of public protection and professional competences. These matters remain essentially provincial concerns falling within property and civil rights in the provinces and are not related to trade as a whole.
[122] ... Canada’s problem is that the proposed Act reflects an attempt that goes well beyond these matters of undoubted national interest and concern and reaches down into the detailed regulation of all aspects of securities. In this respect, the proposed Act is unlike federal competition legislation, which has been held to fall under s. 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867. It would regulate all aspects of contracts for securities within the provinces, including all aspects of public protection and professional competence within the provinces. Competition law, by contrast, regulates only anti-competitive contracts and conduct — a particular aspect of economic activity that falls squarely within the federal domain. In short, the proposed federal Act overreaches the legislative interest of the federal government.
Specific aspects of the Act aimed at addressing matters of genuine national importance and scope going to trade as a whole in a way that is distinct from provincial concerns, including management of systemic risk and national data collection, appear to be related to the general trade and commerce power. With respect to these aspects of the Act, the provinces, acting alone or in concert, lack the constitutional capacity to sustain a viable national scheme.
[103] Systemic risks have been defined as “risks that occasion a ‘domino effect’ whereby the risk of default by one market participant will impact the ability of others to fulfill their legal obligations, setting off a chain of negative economic consequences that pervade an entire financial system” (M. J. Trebilcock, National Securities Regulator Report (2010), at para. 26). By definition, such risks can be evasive of provincial boundaries and usual methods of control. The proposed legislation is aimed in part at responding to systemic risks threatening the Canadian market viewed as a whole. Without attempting an exhaustive enumeration, the following provisions of the proposed Act would appear to address or authorize the adoption of regulations directed at systemic risk: ss. 89 and 90 relating to derivatives, s. 126(1) on short-selling, s. 73 on credit rating, s. 228(4)(c) relating to urgent regulations and ss. 109 and 224 on data collection and sharing.
In sum, the proposed Act overreaches genuine national concerns. While the economic importance and pervasive character of the securities market may, in principle, support federal intervention that is qualitatively different from what the provinces can do, they do not justify a wholesale takeover of the regulation of the securities industry which is the ultimate consequence of the proposed federal legislation. A cooperative approach that permits a scheme recognizing the essentially provincial nature of securities regulation while allowing Parliament to deal with genuinely national concerns remains available and is supported by Canadian constitutional principles and by the practice adopted by the federal and provincial governments in other fields of activities.
[128] To summarize, we accept that the economic importance and pervasive character of the securities market may, in principle, support federal intervention that is qualitatively different from what the provinces can do. However, as important as the preservation of capital markets and the maintenance of Canada’s financial stability are, they do not justify a wholesale takeover of the regulation of the securities industry which is the ultimate consequence of the proposed federal legislation. The need to prevent and respond to systemic risk may support federal legislation pertaining to the national problem raised by this phenomenon, but it does not alter the basic nature of securities regulation which, as shown, remains primarily focused on local concerns of protecting investors and ensuring the fairness of the markets through regulation of participants. Viewing the Act as a whole, as we must, these local concerns remain the main thrust of the legislation — its pith and substance.
[129] This is not a case of a valid federal scheme that incidentally intrudes on provincial powers. It is not the incidental effects of the scheme that are constitutionally suspect; it is rather the main thrust of the legislation that goes beyond the federal power. The federal government properly did not invoke the ancillary powers doctrine. To apply that doctrine, the proposed statute considered as a whole must be valid — which it is not. We further note that we have not been asked for our opinion on the extent of Parliament’s legislative authority over securities regulation under other heads of federal power or indeed the interprovincial or international trade branch of s. 91(2).
[130] While the proposed Act must be found ultra vires Parliament's general trade and commerce power, a cooperative approach that permits a scheme that recognizes the essentially provincial nature of securities regulation while allowing Parliament to deal with genuinely national concerns remains available.
[131] The various proposals advanced over the years to develop a new model for regulating securities in Canada suggest that this matter possesses both central and local aspects. The same insight can be gleaned from the experience of other federations, even if each country has its own constitutional history and imperatives. The common ground that emerges is that each level of government has jurisdiction over some aspects of the regulation of securities and each can work in collaboration with the other to carry out its responsibilities.
[132] It is not for the Court to suggest to the governments of Canada and the provinces the way forward by, in effect, conferring in advance an opinion on the constitutionality on this or that alternative scheme. Yet we may appropriately note the growing practice of resolving the complex governance problems that arise in federations, not by the bare logic of either/or, but by seeking cooperative solutions that meet the needs of the country as a whole as well as its constituent parts.
[133] Such an approach is supported by the Canadian constitutional principles and by the practice adopted by the federal and provincial governments in other fields of activities. The backbone of these schemes is the respect that each level of government has for each other’s own sphere of jurisdiction. Cooperation is the animating force. The federalism principle upon which Canada’s constitutional framework rests demands nothing less.
Addressing the nature of this question within the context of Canadian federalism, the Court noted:
[7] It is a fundamental principle of federalism that both federal and provincial powers must be respected, and one power may not be used in a manner that effectively eviscerates another. Rather, federalism demands that a balance be struck, a balance that allows both the federal Parliament and the provincial legislatures to act effectively in their respective spheres. Accepting Canada’s interpretation of the general trade and commerce power would disrupt rather than maintain that balance. Parliament cannot regulate the whole of the securities system simply because aspects of it have a national dimension.
[8] We therefore answer the reference question in the negative.
[9] It is open to the federal government and the provinces to exercise their respective powers over securities harmoniously, in the spirit of cooperative federalism. The experience of other federations in the field of securities regulation, while a function of their own constitutional requirements, suggests that a cooperative approach might usefully be explored, should our legislators so choose, to ensure that each level of government properly discharges its responsibility to the public in a coordinated fashion.
[10] At this juncture, it is important to stress that this advisory opinion does not address the question of what constitutes the optimal model for regulating the securities market. While the parties presented evidence and arguments on the relative merits of federal and provincial regulation of securities, the policy question of whether a single national securities scheme is preferable to multiple provincial regimes is not one for the courts to decide. Accordingly, our answer to the reference question is dictated solely by the text of the Constitution, fundamental constitutional principles and the relevant case law.
Significance
The immediate effect of the decision:
The real question at hand was about the nature of Canadian federalism in dealing with a matter that does not fall squarely within either federal or provincial jurisdiction.[13]
The trade and commerce power, as originally conceived in Parsons and clarified in General Motors, is still good constitutional law that does not need to be revisited.
The property and civil rights power is adequate for dealing with the day-to-day aspects of securities regulation, as they do not possess a national dimension.[14]
Certain aspects of the proposed Act would be valid, but only those with a national dimension, international and interprovincial elements, or that are related to the criminal law power.
The Federal Government has confirmed that it will not proceed with the proposed Act. There is currently[when?] extensive discussion as to the best manner for any reform to proceed.[15][16][17][18]
Certain observers agree that a national regulatory authority with a more focused brief is still possible under other heads of federal power,[19] as is the option of instituting a cooperative framework with the provinces.[20] There is debate as to the likelihood of the provinces' cooperation.[21][22] In January 2012, Minister of Finance Jim Flaherty stated that work is still continuing with the provinces to create a national regulator that would function within the bounds that the Court declared was within federal jurisdiction.[23]
There is also concern that, viewed on the general principles of the opinion with respect to the boundary between federal jurisdiction and the provincial property and civil rights power, the following recently enacted federal statutes may also be on constitutionally shaky ground:[24]
Canadian federalism involves the current nature and historical development of the federal system in Canada.
The Commerce Clause describes an enumerated power listed in the United States Constitution. The clause states that the United States Congress shall have power "to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes". Courts and commentators have tended to discuss each of these three areas of commerce as a separate power granted to Congress. It is common to see the individual components of the Commerce Clause referred to under specific terms: the Foreign Commerce Clause, the Interstate Commerce Clause, and the Indian Commerce Clause.
The legal system of Canada is pluralist: its foundations lie in the English common law system, the French civil law system, and Indigenous law systems developed by the various Indigenous Nations.
Canadian securities regulation is managed through the laws and agencies established by Canada's 10 provincial and 3 territorial governments. Each province and territory has a securities commission or equivalent authority with its own provincial or territorial legislation.
Pith and substance is a legal doctrine in Canadian constitutional interpretation used to determine under which head of power a given piece of legislation falls. The doctrine is primarily used when a law is challenged on the basis that one level of government has encroached upon the exclusive jurisdiction of another level of government.
Canadian constitutional law is the area of Canadian law relating to the interpretation and application of the Constitution of Canada by the courts. All laws of Canada, both provincial and federal, must conform to the Constitution and any laws inconsistent with the Constitution have no force or effect.
Citizens Insurance Co of Canada v Parsons is a major Canadian constitutional case decided by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, at that time the highest court of appeal for the British Empire. The case decided a significant issue of the division of powers between the federal Parliament and the provincial legislatures. The approach taken to provincial power, as advocated by Premier Oliver Mowat of Ontario, began to set the constitutional framework for broad provincial powers and a reduction in the centralist vision of Confederation espoused by Prime Minister John A. Macdonald.
Ontario (AG) v Canada (AG), also known as the Local Prohibition Case, is a significant Canadian constitutional decision by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, at that time the highest court in the British Empire, including Canada. It was one of the first cases to enunciate core principles of the federal peace, order and good government power.
The Canada Temperance Act, also known as the Scott Act, was an Act of the Parliament of Canada passed in 1878, which provided for a national framework for municipalities to opt in by plebiscite to a scheme of prohibition. It was repealed in 1984.
Toronto Electric Commissioners v Snider is a Canadian constitutional decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council where the Council struck down the federal Industrial Disputes Investigation Act, precursor to the Canada Labour Code. The Court identified matters in relation to labour to be within the exclusive competence of the province in the property and civil rights power under section 92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867. This decision is considered one of the high-water marks of the council's interpretation of the Constitution in favour of the provinces.
Caloil Inc v Canada (AG) is a leading constitutional decision of the Supreme Court of Canada on the Trade and Commerce power under section 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867. The Court upheld a federal law prohibiting the transport or sale of imported oil in a certain region of Ontario.
Reference Re Agricultural Products Marketing, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1198 is a landmark constitutional decision of the Supreme Court of Canada on cooperative federalism where the Court unanimously upheld the validity of various Acts passed by the Parliament of Canada and the Legislative Assembly of Ontario for establishing a national agricultural marketing scheme agreed upon by the federal and provincial governments.
Section 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867, also known as the criminal law power, grants the Parliament of Canada the authority to legislate on:
27. The Criminal Law, except the Constitution of Courts of Criminal Jurisdiction, but including the Procedure in Criminal Matters.
Section 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867, also known as the trade and commerce power, grants the Parliament of Canada the authority to legislate on:
2. The Regulation of Trade and Commerce.
Canada (AG) v Ontario (AG), also known as In re the Regulation and Control of Aeronautics in Canada and the Aeronautics Reference, is a decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council on the interpretation of the Canadian Constitution. Lord Sankey decided in the case that the federal government has the authority to govern the subject of aeronautics, including licensing of pilots, aircraft, and commercial services and regulations for navigation and safety.
Canadian Western Bank v Alberta [2007] 2 S.C.R. 3 is a landmark decision in Canadian constitutional law by the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) relating to the division of powers between Federal and Provincial legislative bodies.
Reference Re Assisted Human Reproduction Act is an appeal from the Quebec Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada on a reference question posed as to the constitutional validity of the Assisted Human Reproduction Act that had been passed by the Parliament of Canada.
Section 125 of the Constitution Act, 1867 is a provision of the Constitution of Canada relating to taxation immunities of the federal and provincial governments. The section provides that the property of the provincial and federal governments are not subject to taxation.
Canada (AG) v Ontario (AG)[1937] UKPC 6, [1937] A.C. 326, also known as the Labour Conventions Reference, is a landmark decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council concerning the distinct nature of federal and provincial jurisdiction in Canadian federalism.
Reference re Pan‑Canadian Securities Regulation, 2018 SCC 48 is a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, dealing with the Canadian doctrine of cooperative federalism and how it intersects with the power of the Parliament of Canada over trade and commerce, as well as discussing the nature of parliamentary sovereignty in Canada.
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