Revisionist just war theory is a development of just war theory that, unlike traditional just war theory, seeks to integrate jus ad bellum and jus in bello , therefore rejecting many traditional beliefs such as moral equality of combatants. [1] [2] Revisionists argue that international law is at best a pragmatic fiction—it lacks deeper moral foundations. [3]
Several contemporary philosophers have advanced the revisionist just war theory by citing several limitations associated with the traditional interpretation of just war theory. Included among them are Jeff McMahan, who argues against the "moral equality of combatants" by asserting that combatants who participate in an unjust cause are morally culpable for perpetuating an unjust threat and can therefore never meet the requirements embodied within the jus in bello stipulation by pointing toward "liability justifications for inflicting harm. [4] [5]
The New Zealand philosopher David Rodin calls attention to a "lesser evil obligation" and that a "right bearer is all things considered obligated to behave in a certain way toward a person despite the fact that they have the right with respect to that party to behave otherwise." Consequently, moral considerations require that the application of the principles of justice to the practice of war must be consistent and continuous with the application of ethical principles to other forms of violence. In this manner, he argues against the application of the rules of justice as a separate set of independent principles in any analysis of the morality of war. [6]
The Australian philosopher Seth Lazar suggests a restructuring of the just war theory based upon "Command Ethics" which govern the morality of war as a whole" as distinct from "Combatant Ethics" which "governs the morality of specific actions". [7] He rejects the suggestion that this distinction corresponds to the familiar distinction of jus ad bellum and jus in bello. [8]
An early critic of the Just War theory, Robert L. Holmes questioned the use of the principle of double effect and utilitarian consequnentialist calculations by nation states to defend the taking of innocent lives in order to protect the lives of noncombatants. [9] In his view, while the functions of the nation state may be a "necessary" abstract prerequisite to the promotion of human happiness, the existence of a particular nation state which facilitates the deaths of innocents in the pursuit of its self interest is morally repugnant. His criticism is based upon an analysis of the "internalism" which is embodied within the Just War theory itself, whereby the principle of "military necessity" is utilized to elevate the ethical considerations of jus ad bellum in order to override the considerations of jus in bello. [10] This distortion arises in so far as the traditional Just War theory is improperly framed within a limited Machiavellian analysis of "means-ends" relations to the exclusion of a contextural analysis which is based upon "part-whole" relations. In this view, the entirety of war cannot be morally justified unless its constituent parts are themselves justified first. As Holmes observed, "To justify going to war, then, that is, to establish jus ad bellum in the first place, requires showing that what one would be doing by waging it is justified", in accordance with an apriori deontological presumption against killing innocent human life. [11] [12] .