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References
- 1 2 Doughty, Robert A. (March 14, 2006). ""Fighting The Wolves At The Door": From Advisor In Vietnam To Department Head At West Point" (Interview). Interviewed by Lance Betros. West Point, New York. Retrieved December 17, 2021.
- 1 2 "Doughty, Robert A. 1943–". Encyclopedia.com. Retrieved December 17, 2021.
- ↑ Kiesling, Eugenia C. (July 2007). "Illuminating Strange Defeat and Pyrrhic Victory : The Historian Robert A. Doughty". The Journal of Military History. 71 (3): 875–888. doi:10.1353/jmh.2007.0212. JSTOR 30052893. S2CID 159519771. ProQuest 195643894.
- ↑ "Annual War Studies Symposium". University of North Texas. Retrieved 16 December 2021.
- ↑ Doughty, Mike (January 28, 2012). The Book of Drugs . Boston, MA: Da Capo Press. pp. 252. ISBN 978-0-306-81877-6.
- ↑ "Paul Birdsall Prize Recipients". American Historical Association. Retrieved December 17, 2021.
- ↑ "Samuel Eliot Morison Prize". Society for Military History. Retrieved December 17, 2021.
- ↑ Reviews include of The Breaking Point include:
- Maurer, John H.; Doughty, Robert Allan (1992). "The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940". Naval War College Review. 45 (4).
- Cairns, John C. (April 1, 1991). "The Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940 by Robert Allan Doughty (Book Review)". The Journal of Military History. 55 (2): 265. doi:10.2307/1985921. JSTOR 1985921. ProQuest 1296638517.
- ↑ Reviews of Warfare in the Western World, Vol. I include:
- Cohen, Eliot A. (May–June 1997). "Warfare in the Western World by Robert A. Doughty, Ira D. Gruber". Foreign Affairs. 76 (3): 128. doi:10.2307/20048052. JSTOR 20048052.
- Cooper, Jerry (August 1998). "Warfare in the Western World. Volume I: Military Operations from 1600 to 1871 by Robert A. Doughty, Ira D. Gruber; Warfare in the Western World. Volume II: Military Operations Since 1871 by Robert A. Doughty, Ira D. Gruber". Journal of Southern History. 64 (3): 514–516. doi:10.2307/2587794. JSTOR 2587794.
- Showalter, D. E. (April 1, 1998). ""Warfare in the Western World", vol. 1, "Military Operations from 1600–1871"; by Robert Doughty et al. (Book Review)". The Journal of Military History. 62 (2): 388. doi:10.2307/120728. JSTOR 120728. ProQuest 1296703448.
- ↑ Reviews of Warfare in the Western World, Vol. 2 include:
- Cooper, Jerry (August 1998). "Warfare in the Western World. Volume I: Military Operations from 1600 to 1871 by Robert A. Doughty, Ira D. Gruber; Warfare in the Western World. Volume II: Military Operations Since 1871 by Robert A. Doughty, Ira D. Gruber". Journal of Southern History. 64 (3): 514–516. doi:10.2307/2587794. JSTOR 2587794.
- Showalter, D. E. (April 1, 1998). ""Warfare in the Western World", vol. 2, "Military Operations Since 1871", by Robert Doughty et al. (Book Review)". The Journal of Military History. 62 (2): 388. doi:10.2307/120728. JSTOR 120728. ProQuest 1296703473.
- ↑ Reviews of Pyrrhic Victory include:
- Smith, Leonard V. (April 2006). "Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in the Great War (review)". The Journal of Military History. 70 (2): 487–488. doi:10.1353/jmh.2006.0131. S2CID 159719489.
- Porch, Douglas (2007). "Learning That Fire Kills". The Review of Politics. 69 (1): 165–167. doi:10.1017/S0034670507000484. JSTOR 20452869. S2CID 143599133.
- Bach, André (2009). "Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in the Great War by Robert A. Doughty". Politique étrangère. 74 (3): 678–681. JSTOR 42715670.
- Implay, Talbot (June 2007). "Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in the Great War by Robert A. Doughty". The English Historical Review. 122 (497): 784–786. doi:10.1093/ehr/cem120. JSTOR 4493926.
- Young, Robert J. (2007). "Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in the Great War by Robert A. Doughty". The International History Review. 29 (1): 174–176. JSTOR 40109922.
- Mosier, John (2006). "Reviewed Work: Pyrrhic Victory: French Strategy and Operations in the Great War by Robert A. Doughty". The Historian. 68 (4): 872–873. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6563.2006.00169_46.x. JSTOR 24453793. S2CID 218495117.
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