Rosenberg v. Fleuti

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Rosenberg v. Fleuti
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Argued March 26, 1963
Decided June 17, 1963
Full case nameGeorge K. Rosenberg, District Director, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Petitioner, v. George Fleuti
Citations374 U.S. 449 ( more )
83 S. Ct. 1804, 10 L.Ed.2d 1000
Argument Oral argument
Case history
PriorFleuti v. Rosenberg, 302 F.2d 652 (CA9 1962)
Holding
It would be inconsistent with the general ameliorative purpose of Congress in enacting §101(a)(13) to hold that an innocent, casual and brief excursion by a resident alien outside this country's borders was "intended" as a departure disruptive of his resident alien status so as to subject him to the consequences of an "entry" into the country on his return.
Court membership
Chief Justice
Earl Warren
Associate Justices
Hugo Black  · William O. Douglas
Tom C. Clark  · John M. Harlan II
William J. Brennan Jr.  · Potter Stewart
Byron White  · Arthur Goldberg
Case opinions
MajorityGoldberg, joined by Warren, Black, Douglas, Brennan
DissentClark, joined by Harlan, Stewart, White

Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963), is a United States Supreme Court case concerning the interpretation of certain provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA). The case was decided in 1963, with Justice Arthur Goldberg writing the majority opinion. The Court held that when respondent George Fleuti, a Swiss national who had lived in the United States as a permanent resident since 1952, [1] had briefly traveled from the United States to Mexico and then returned, [2] he had not engaged in an "entry" within the meaning of the INA. [3] Accordingly, the Court concluded that Fleuti was ineligible for deportation "for a condition existing at that time but not at the time of his original admission before the 1952 Act became effective", which in Fleuti's case was homosexuality. [2] [4] [5]

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References

  1. Levin, Laurie A. (1982). "Deporation: Procedural Rights of Reentering Permanent Resident Aliens Subjected to Exclusion Hearings". Fordham Law Review. 51: 1339.
  2. 1 2 Gough, Arnold G. (1980). "Rosenberg v. Fleuti: Reentry of Aliens Remains Unsettled". Notre Dame Lawyer. 56: 696.
  3. Stroud, John (1964-01-01). "Aliens - Immigration and Nationality Act - Brief Excursion Outside Country's Borders by Resident Alien May Not Subject Him to Consequences of an Entry on His Return (Rosenburg v. Fleuti, United States Supreme Court 1963)". San Diego Law Review. 1 (1): 100. ISSN   0036-4037.
  4. Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963)
  5. Silvers, Samuel M. (1986). "Exclusion and Expulsion of Homosexual Aliens, The". Immigration and Nationality Law Review. 1986: 137.