Schlude v. Commissioner

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Schlude v. Commissioner
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Argued December 10, 1962
Decided February 18, 1963
Full case nameSchlude, et ux. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
Citations372 U.S. 128 ( more )
83 S.Ct. 601; 9 L. Ed. 2d 633; 1963 U.S. LEXIS 2583
Case history
Prior32 T.C. 1271 (1959); 283 F.2d 234 (8th Cir. 1960)
Holding
Under the accrual method, taxpayers must include as income in a particular year advance payments by way of cash, negotiable notes, and contract installments falling due but remaining unpaid during that year.
Court membership
Chief Justice
Earl Warren
Associate Justices
Hugo Black  · William O. Douglas
Tom C. Clark  · John M. Harlan II
William J. Brennan Jr.  · Potter Stewart
Byron White  · Arthur Goldberg
Case opinions
MajorityWhite, joined by Warren, Black, Clark, Brennan
DissentStewart, joined by Douglas, Harlan, Goldberg
Laws applied
Internal Revenue Code

Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128 (1963), [1] is a decision by the United States Supreme Court in which the Court held that, under the accrual method, taxpayers must include as income in a particular year advance payments by way of cash, negotiable notes, and contract installments falling due but remaining unpaid during that year. In doing so, the Court tossed aside the matching principle in favor of the earlier-of test.

Income is the consumption and saving opportunity gained by an entity within a specified timeframe, which is generally expressed in monetary terms.

Cash Physical money

In economics, cash is money in the physical form of currency, such as banknotes and coins. In bookkeeping and finance, cash is current assets comprising currency or currency equivalents that can be accessed immediately or near-immediately. Cash is seen either as a reserve for payments, in case of a structural or incidental negative cash flow or as a way to avoid a downturn on financial markets.

Matching principle

In accrual accounting, the revenue recognition principle states that expenses should be recorded during the period in which they are incurred, regardless of when the transfer of cash occurs. Conversely, cash basis accounting calls for the recognition of an expense when the cash is paid, regardless of when the expense was actually incurred.

Contents

Facts

The petitioners operated ballroom dancing studios. They kept their books and completed income tax returns on a fiscal year accrual basis. Dancing lessons were offered under either of two basic contracts. The cash plan contract required the student to pay the entire down payment in cash at the time the contract was executed, with the balance due in installments thereafter. The deferred payment contract required only a portion of the down payment to be paid in cash, with the remainder of the down payment due in stated installments. The balance of the contract price was to be paid as designated in a negotiable note signed at the time the contract was executed.

The contracts included a specific number of lesson hours ranging from five to 1,200 hours. Some contracts even provided for lifetime courses that entitled the student to two hours of lessons per month plus two parties a year for life. Although the contracts designated the period during which the lessons had to be taken, there was no schedule of specific dates.

The Commissioner included in gross income for the years in question advance payments by way of cash, negotiable notes, and contract installments falling due but remaining unpaid during that year. The Tax Court and the Court of Appeals upheld the Commissioner. [2] [3]

Issue

Was it proper for the Commissioner, exercising his discretion under § 446(b) [4] to reject the studio’s accounting system, as not clearly reflecting income and to include as income in a particular year advance payments by way of cash, negotiable notes, and contract installments falling due but remaining unpaid during that year?

Holding

The Supreme Court holds that it was proper for the Commissioner to include in income advance payments by way of cash, negotiable notes, and contract installments falling due but remaining unpaid during that year. The Court holds that the problem is controlled by American Automobile Ass'n v. United States .

American Automobile Association v. United States, 367 U.S. 687 (1961), was an income tax case before the United States Supreme Court.

Rationale

In American Automobile Association v. United States, [5] the Court held that the Commissioner was correct in including in taxpayer’s gross income for each year the entire amount of membership dues actually received in the taxable calendar year without regard to expected future service expense in the subsequent year. The Court rejected the taxpayer’s system as artificial since the advance payments related to services which were to be performed only upon customers’ demands and not on fixed dates in the future.

The Court likened this case to American Automobile Association because the contracts did not provide for lessons on fixed dates after the taxable year. Instead, the lessons were to be arranged from time to time by the instructor and his student. Therefore, the student could arrange for some or all of the additional lessons or could simply allow their rights to lapse. As in American Automobile Association, the services were rendered solely on customers’ demands without relation to fixed dates in the future.

The Court also relied on Spring City Foundry v. Commissioner. [6] In Spring City Foundry, the Court held that, for an accrual basis taxpayer, “it is the right to receive and not the actual receipt that determines the inclusion of the amount in gross income.” The Court reasoned that in this case, the right to receive the advance payments had become fixed at least at the time they were due and payable.

Dissent

The dissent believes that the majority decision is in direct contrast to the most elementary principle of accrual accountingthat advances be considered reportable income only in the year in which they are earned by the taxpayer’s rendition of the services for which the payments were made. The dissent argues that this decision “completes the mutilation of a basic element of the accrual method of reporting income”a method which has been explicitly approved by Congress for almost half a century.

See also

Related Research Articles

For households and individuals, gross income is the sum all wages, salaries, profits, interest payments, rents, and other forms of earnings, before any deductions or taxes. It is opposed to net income, defined as the gross income minus taxes and other deductions.

Income taxes in the United States are imposed by the federal, most state, and many local governments. The income taxes are determined by applying a tax rate, which may increase as income increases, to taxable income, which is the total income less allowable deductions. Income is broadly defined. Individuals and corporations are directly taxable, and estates and trusts may be taxable on undistributed income. Partnerships are not taxed, but their partners are taxed on their shares of partnership income. Residents and citizens are taxed on worldwide income, while nonresidents are taxed only on income within the jurisdiction. Several types of credits reduce tax, and some types of credits may exceed tax before credits. An alternative tax applies at the federal and some state levels.

For federal income tax purposes, the doctrine of constructive receipt is used to determine when a cash-basis taxpayer has received gross income. A taxpayer is subject to tax in the current year if he or she has unfettered control in determining when items of income will or should be paid. Unlike actual receipt, constructive receipt does not require physical possession of the item of income in question.

IRS penalties

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<i>Cowden v. Commissioner</i>

Cowden v. Commissioner, 289 F.2d 20, outlined the factors used to determine whether something received is a cash equivalent, in other words, whether something received is taxable when it was received or when it was assigned. The court observed two main doctrines in determining when something is taxable. The court relied on the doctrines of constructive receipt and cash equivalence while reiterating that substance rather than form should control income tax laws.

<i>Flamingo Resort, Inc. v. United States</i>

Flamingo Resort, Inc. v. United States, 664 F.2d 1387, was a case decided before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that decided the question of when the right to receive income represented by "markers", or gambling credit lines, become "fixed" for tax purposes based on the "all events" test.

Basis of accounting

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Installment sales method

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<i>Gold Coast Hotel & Casino v. United States</i>

Gold Coast Hotel & Casino v. United States, 158 F.3d 484, was a court case that addressed whether a casino, using the accrual method of accounting, could deduct the value of slot club points earned by slot club members in the tax year in which the members accumulated the minimum points required to redeem a prize, or whether the casino had to wait to deduct the value of the slot club points until the members actually redeemed them.

Commissioner v. Indianapolis Power & Light Company, 493 U.S. 203 (1990), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court addressed whether customer deposits constituted taxable income to a public utility company.

<i>Grynberg v. Commissioner</i>

Grynberg v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 255 (1984) was a case in which the United States Tax Court held that one taxpayer's prepaid business expenses were not ordinary and necessary expenses of the years in which they were made, and therefore the prepayments were not tax deductible. Taxpayers in the United States often seek to maximize their income and decrease their tax liability by prepaying deductible expenses and taking a deduction earlier rather than in a later tax year.

<i>Veit v. Commissioner</i>

The United States Tax Court decided two cases, both titled Veit v. Commissioner, in 1947 and 1949. These cases deal with the doctrine of constructive receipt. In both cases, the taxpayer was an executive vice president of a corporation. He was entitled to a fixed salary plus a bonus of 10% of the corporation's profits for the years 1939 and 1940, with the bonus to be paid in 1941. However, his contract was revised in November 1940 to provide that the bonus from the 1939 profits would be paid in 1941, and the bonus from the 1940 profits would be paid in 1942.

<i>Artnell Company v. Commissioner</i>

Artnell Company v. Commissioner, 400 F.2d 981 is a decision by the 7th Circuit Court of Appeals, in which the court, distinguishing from the holding in Schlude v. Commissioner, held that accrual method taxpayers are not required to include prepayments in gross income when there is certainty as to when performance would occur.

<i>Warren Jones Co. v. Commissioner</i>

Warren Jones Company v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 524 F.2d 788 was a taxation decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

<i>Amend v. Commissioner</i>

Amend v. Commissioner, 13 T.C. 178 is a United States Tax Court decision concerning the timing of the realization of gains.

References

  1. Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128 (1963)
  2. Schlude v. Commissioner, 32T.C.1271 (T.C.1959).
  3. Schlude v. Commissioner, 283F.2d234 (8th Cir.1960).
  4. 26 U.S.C.   § 446(b)
  5. American Automobile Ass'n v. United States , 367 U.S. 687 (1961)
  6. Spring City Foundry v. Commissioner, 292 U.S. 182 (1934)

Further reading

Text of Schlude v. Commissioner, 372 U.S. 128(1963) is available from:   Cornell    CourtListener    Findlaw    Justia    Library of Congress    Oyez (oral argument audio)