United Brands Company v Commission of the European Communities

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United Brands v Commission
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Submitted 15 March 1976
Decided 14 February 1978
Full case name United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v Commission of the European Communities
Case27/76
CelexID 61976J0027
ECLI ECLI:EU:C:1978:22
Nationality of partiesNetherlands
Court composition
President
H. Kutscher
Judges
Advocate General
H. Mayras
Instruments cited
EEC Treaty
Keywords
Competition; Abuse of a Dominant Position

United Brands v Commission (1976) Case 27/76 is an EU competition legal case concerning abuse of a dominant position in a relevant product market. The case involved the infamous "green banana clause". It is one of the most famous cases in European competition law, which seeks to curb cartels, collusion and other anti-competitive practices, [1] and to curb abuse of dominant market positions. [2]

Contents

Facts

United Brands Company (UBC) was the main supplier of bananas in Europe, using mainly the Chiquita brand. UBC forbade its distributors/ripeners to sell bananas that UBC did not supply. Also, UBC fixed pricing each week; charging a higher price in different Member States, and imposed unfair prices upon customers in Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union, Denmark, The Netherlands and Germany. [3]

The Commission viewed United Brands' action as a breach of Article 86 of the Treaty of Rome (now Art 102 of the TFEU). [4] Article 86 prohibits "abuse of a dominant position" of a relevant market. The case was referred for a Preliminary Ruling to the European Court of Justice under Article 177 (now Art 267).

Judgement

Agreeing with the Commission, the ECJ held that United Brands' behaviour was unlawful:

See also

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References

  1. Art 101 TFEU
  2. Art 102 TFEU
  3. Case report
  4. The relevant articles were originally numbered 85 & 86, then 81 & 82, and finally 101 & 102
  5. M.A.G. van Meerhaeghe, Protection of competition in Belgium, Economia delle Scelte Pubbliche (Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice), Vol. VIII, 1990-2/3, p. 100.