United States v. Davis (1962)

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United States v. Davis
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Argued March 28, 1962
Decided June 4, 1962
Full case nameUnited States v. Thomas Crawley Davis, et al.
Citations370 U.S. 65 ( more )
82 S. Ct. 1190; 8 L. Ed. 2d 335
Case history
PriorDavis v. United States, 287 F.2d 168 (Ct. Cl. 1961); cert. granted, 368 U.S. 813(1961).
Holding
A taxpayer recognizes a gain on the transfer of appreciated property in satisfaction of a legal obligation
Court membership
Chief Justice
Earl Warren
Associate Justices
Hugo Black  · Felix Frankfurter
William O. Douglas  · Tom C. Clark
John M. Harlan II  · William J. Brennan Jr.
Potter Stewart  · Byron White
Case opinion
MajorityClark, joined by unanimous
Frankfurter, White took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Overruled by
I.R.C. § 1041

United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962), is a federal income tax case argued before the United States Supreme Court in 1962, holding that a taxpayer recognizes a gain on the transfer of appreciated property in satisfaction of a legal obligation. [1]

Contents

In 1984, "having heard criticism of the Davis/Farid rule for many years," [2] Congress overruled the main holding: Under § 1041(a), no gain or loss shall be recognized by the transferor-spouse (or former spouse, but "only if the transfer is incident to divorce"); as a corollary, §1041(b) provides that transferor's basis shall carry over into the hands of the transferee-spouse. (Thus, for transfers between spouses, §1041(b) overrules the lower-of-cost-or-market rule for determining loss on subsequent sale of a gift, in §1015.) [2]

Facts

Pursuant to a separation agreement, the taxpayer's (ex-)wife agreed to relinquish any potential claims or marital rights, in exchange for which he transferred to her 1,000 shares of stock in DuPont. These shares had cost him $74,775.37, and had appreciated to $82,250 at the time of the transfer.

The government argued that the appreciation should be included in the taxpayer's gross income, viewing the transfer of property as an exchange for the release of an independent legal obligation. The taxpayer argued that the appreciation should not count as gross income, since the transfer was more like a division of property between co-owners than a sale that resulted in gain. [3]

Holding

The Supreme Court held that the $7,000 appreciation should count as gross income, as "the 'amount realized' from the exchange is the fair market value of the released marital rights, which in this case would be equal to the value of the stock transferred." [4] [5]

Further Reasoning

The court bolstered its position by arguing that the lower court's ruling (that the value of the released marital rights is indeterminable and therefore, not included in gross income) could prejudice the taxpayer's spouse, as her basis in the shares would not include the $7,000 appreciation, and she would have to include this in her gross income if she decided to sell the shares.

Overruled by Congress

In response to this decision, Congress enacted Internal Revenue Code § 1041. [6] This statute provides that, generally, "no gain or loss shall be recognized on a transfer of property from an individual to...(2) a former spouse, but only if the transfer is incident to divorce."

While this statute overrules the specific holding of Davis, it does not change the general rule—that "a taxpayer recognizes a gain on the transfer of appreciated property in satisfaction of a legal obligation." [7]

These legislative changes were regarded by most tax specialists as overdue and welcome, because the Davis/Farid rule had a number of weaknesses: [8]

  • transferor-spouses sometimes seemed not to know about Davis or to find it counter-intuitive, and hence often omitted to report their taxable gain when property was transferred.
  • By contrast, transferee-spouses, well aware of Farid, almost invariably computed their gain(loss) on subsequent sale by using a basis equal to fair market value at time of receipt.

See also

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References

  1. ↑ United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
  2. 1 2 Chirelstein, Marvin (2005). Federal Income Taxation: A Law Student's Guide to the Leading Cases and Concepts (Tenth ed.). New York, NY: Foundation Press. p. 92. ISBN   1-58778-894-2.
  3. ↑ Davis, 370 U.S. at 69.
  4. ↑ Donaldson, Samuel A. (2007). Federal Income Taxation of Individuals: Cases, Problems and Materials (Second ed.). St. Paul, MN: Thompson-West. p. 135. ISBN   978-0-314-17597-7.
  5. ↑ See Philadelphia Park Amusement Co. v. United States , 126 F.Supp. 184 (U.S. Court of Claims, 1954), determining that the fair market value of consideration of indeterminable value is equal to the value of the property exchanged for it, assuming arms-length transaction.
  6. ↑ 26 U.S.C.   § 1041
  7. ↑ Donaldson (2007), 136.
  8. ↑ Chirelstein (2005), 93.

Further reading

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