United States v. Jackson

Last updated
United States v. Jackson
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Argued December 7, 1967
Decided April 8, 1968
Full case nameUnited States v. Jackson et al.
Citations390 U.S. 570 ( more )
88 S. Ct. 1209; 20 L. Ed. 2d 138
Case history
Prior262 F. Supp. 716 (D. Conn. 1967)
SubsequentClarified in Brady v. United States
Holding
The Federal Kidnapping Act unconstitutionally coerces defendants from exercising their right to a trial by jury.
Court membership
Chief Justice
Earl Warren
Associate Justices
Hugo Black  · William O. Douglas
John M. Harlan II  · William J. Brennan Jr.
Potter Stewart  · Byron White
Abe Fortas  · Thurgood Marshall
Case opinions
MajorityStewart, joined by Warren, Douglas, Harlan, Brennan, Fortas
DissentWhite, joined by Black
Marshall took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Laws applied
U.S. Const. amends. V, VI, Federal Kidnapping Act

United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968), was a United States Supreme Court decision that ruled part of the Federal Kidnapping Act unconstitutional. [1]

Contents

Background

In the wake of the Lindbergh kidnapping Congress decided to adopt a federal kidnapping statute. It was designed to allow federal authorities to step in during kidnappings. Congress believed that federal agents would be more effective than local authorities. The act held that anyone who knowingly transports any person who is unlawfully kidnapped and held for ransom shall be punished by death if the kidnapped person is not liberated unharmed and the jury recommends it. On October 10, 1966 a federal grand jury in Connecticut returned an indictment charging the defendant under the Act. The District Court for the District of Connecticut dismissed this count of the indictment, holding that the Federal Kidnapping Act is unconstitutional because it makes the risk of death the price for asserting the right to a jury trial. [2]

Opinion of the Court

The decision of the court was delivered by Justice Stewart. The court partially agreed with the District Court. The court objected to the fact the Act stated the defendant "shall be punished...by death...". Under the law the trial judge is obliged to sentence the defendant to death if the jury recommends it. Sentencing in American courts has long been the right of the sitting judge and not the jury. While the jury may make recommendations the court found that the Congress has overstepped when it gave that power solely to the jury.

The court also objected, as the District Court had, that the Act could punish a defendant for asserting their right to a jury trial. Under the Act, a defendant who pleads guilty cannot be sentenced to death, since no jury has the chance to recommend the death penalty. However, if the defendant attempted an acquittal by going to trial, he would be risking his life if the jury found him guilty. The majority found that the "inevitable effect of any such provision is, of course, to discourage assertion of the Fifth Amendment right not to plead guilty and to deter exercise of the Sixth Amendment right to demand a jury trial."

However, the majority disagreed with the District Court’s assertion that the Federal Kidnapping Act fails entirely because its penalty clause is deficient. The court determined that the part of the Act which details punishment is severable from the rest of the act. The judgment of the District Court was reversed and sent back for further proceedings. [1]

Dissent

Justice White dissented, with Justice Black joining. While he agreed that some defendants would be coerced by the law, Justice White argued that because not every defendant would be coerced by the law it should not be ruled unconstitutional. He argues that pleas of guilt should be carefully examined before being accepted to make sure that they have been not coerced by the threat of capital punishment. [3]

Subsequent developments

The Court revisited the issue of the Federal Kidnapping Act in Brady v. United States , in which the Court reinforced its decision that not all guilty pleas entered under the Act were invalid. [4]

See also

Related Research Articles

Double jeopardy is a procedural defence that prevents an accused person from being tried again on the same charges following an acquittal and in rare cases prosecutorial and/or judge misconduct in the same jurisdiction. A variation in civil law countries is the peremptory plea, which may take the specific forms of autrefois acquit or autrefois convict. These doctrines appear to have originated in ancient Roman law, in the broader principle non bis in idem.

Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 1791 amendment enumerating rights related to criminal prosecutions

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution sets forth rights related to criminal prosecutions. It was ratified in 1791 as part of the United States Bill of Rights. The Supreme Court has applied the protections of this amendment to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), held that, in the context of mandatory sentencing guidelines under state law, the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial prohibited judges from enhancing criminal sentences based on facts other than those decided by the jury or admitted by the defendant. The landmark nature of the case was alluded to by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who characterized the decision as a "Number 10 earthquake".

Gregg v. Georgia, Proffitt v. Florida, Jurek v. Texas, Woodson v. North Carolina, and Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), reaffirmed the United States Supreme Court's acceptance of the use of the death penalty in the United States, upholding, in particular, the death sentence imposed on Troy Leon Gregg. Referred to by a leading scholar as the July 2 Cases and elsewhere referred to by the lead case Gregg, the Supreme Court set forth the two main features that capital sentencing procedures must employ in order to comply with the Eighth Amendment ban on "cruel and unusual punishments". The decision essentially ended the de facto moratorium on the death penalty imposed by the Court in its 1972 decision in Furman v. Georgia 408 U.S. 238 (1972).

Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880), was a landmark decision of the Supreme Court of the United States about racial discrimination and United States constitutional criminal procedure. Strauder was the first instance where the Supreme Court reversed a state court decision denying a defendant's motion to remove his criminal trial to federal court pursuant to Section 3 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.

<i>Reynolds v. United States</i> United States Supreme Court case

Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), was a Supreme Court of the United States case that held that religious duty was not a defense to a criminal indictment. Reynolds was the first Supreme Court opinion to address the First Amendment's protection of religious liberties, impartial juries and the Confrontation Clauses of the Sixth Amendment.

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed that there are no constitutional barriers in place to prevent a judge from accepting a guilty plea from a defendant who wants to plead guilty while still protesting his innocence under duress as a detainee status. This type of plea has become known as an Alford plea, differing slightly from the nolo contendere plea in which the defendant agrees to being sentenced for the crime, but does not admit guilt. Alford died in prison in 1975.

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), is a United States Supreme Court decision on criminal sentencing. The Court ruled that the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial requires that other than a prior conviction, only facts admitted by a defendant or proved beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury may be used to calculate a sentence exceeding the prescribed statutory maximum sentence, whether the defendant has pleaded guilty or been convicted at trial. The maximum sentence that a judge may impose is based upon the facts admitted by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.

Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 (1985), is a case in which the United States Supreme Court ruled that, because of the doctrine of "dual sovereignty", the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution does not prohibit one state from prosecuting and punishing somebody for an act of which they had already been convicted of and sentenced for in another state.

Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court upheld a life sentence with the possibility of parole under Texas' three strikes law for a felony fraud crime, where the offense and the defendant's two prior offenses involved approximately $230 of fraudulent activity.

The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb..." The four essential protections included are prohibitions against, for the same offense:

Cormac J. Carney American judge

Cormac Joseph Carney is a United States District Judge of the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

Plea bargaining in the United States is very common; the vast majority of criminal cases in the United States are settled by plea bargain rather than by a jury trial. They have also been increasing in frequency—they rose from 84% of federal cases in 1984 to 94% by 2001. Plea bargains are subject to the approval of the court, and different States and jurisdictions have different rules. Game theory has been used to analyze the plea bargaining decision.

A citizen’s right to a trial by jury is a central feature of the United States Constitution. It is considered a fundamental principle of the American legal system.

Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court refused to hold that large sentencing discounts and threats of the death penalty are sufficient evidence of coercion.

United States constitutional criminal procedure United States constitutional criminal procedure

The United States Constitution contains several provisions regarding the law of criminal procedure.

North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), is a United States Supreme Court case that forbids judicial “vindictiveness” from playing a role in the increased sentence a defendant receives after a new trial. In sum, due process requires that a defendant be “free of apprehension” of judicial vindictiveness. Time served for a new conviction of the same offense must be “fully credited,” and a trial judge seeking to impose a greater sentence on retrial must affirmatively state the reasons for imposing such a sentence.

Criminal law in the Taney Court

The Taney Court heard thirty criminal law cases, approximately one per year. Notable cases include Prigg v. Pennsylvania (1842), United States v. Rogers (1846), Ableman v. Booth (1858), Ex parte Vallandigham (1861), and United States v. Jackalow (1862).

United States v. Haymond, 588 U.S. ___ (2019), is a case in which the U.S. Supreme Court struck down 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k)'s five-year mandatory minimum prison sentence for certain sex offenses committed by federal supervised releasees as unconstitutional unless the charges are proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined Gorsuch's plurality opinion, while Breyer provided the necessary fifth vote with his narrow concurrence that began by saying he agreed with much of Justice Alito's dissent, which was joined by Justices Roberts, Thomas, and Kavanaugh.

In the United States, the trial penalty refers to the difference between the smaller sentence offered to a defendant in a plea bargain prior to a criminal trial versus the larger sentence the defendant could receive if they elect to go to trial. It sits at the center of a legal debate over whether trial penalties abridge defendants' Sixth Amendment right to trial.

References

  1. 1 2 United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968).
  2. United States v. Jackson, 262F. Supp.716 ( D. Conn. 1967).
  3. Jackson, 390 U.S. at 591-92 (White, J., dissenting).
  4. Brady v. United States , 397 U.S. 742 (1970).