Vincent Cannistraro was Director of Intelligence Programs for the United States National Security Council (NSC) from 1984 to 1987; Special assistant for Intelligence in the Office of the Secretary of Defense until 1988; and Chief of Operations and Analysis at the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) Counterterrorist Center until 1991. [1] [2]
Before 1984, he was an officer with the CIA's Directorate of Operations in the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and Central America. [3] [4]
After leaving the CIA in 1991, Cannistraro worked as a consultant on terrorism and security issues for a number of corporate and government clients, including ABC News and The Vatican. [2]
He died on May 21, 2019.
Cannistaro has a B.A. and M.A. from Boston College. In 1989, he received the Secretary of Defense's Award for Meritorious Civilian Service. He has also received the CIA Medal for Distinguished Service. [2]
While at the CIA, Cannistraro ran the agency's Central American task force that supervised covert action in the region, including the Nicaraguan Contras (both the left wing guerillas in the South and the right wing contras in the North). He moved to the Reagan NSC by the direction of CIA Latin American Chief Duane Clarridge, who supported Col. Oliver North. [5] The Contra program was transferred in 1984 by President Ronald Reagan to the NSC, [6] and Cannistraro was made Director of Intelligence there later that year. [1] As director, he was responsible for monitoring the US intelligence community budget. [7] and coordinating the approval process for covert action. He also chaired the Afghanistan Working Group at the White House. [8]
In 1988, Cannistraro became Chief of Operations and Analysis at the CIA's Counterterrorism Center, [9] where he led the agency's investigation into the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie.
Cannistraro also alleged that Iraqi intelligence agent Farouk Hijazi had invited bin Laden to live in Iraq during a December 1998 meeting in Afghanistan, though he maintained that bin Laden refused the invitation and did not accept support from Saddam Hussein. [10]
According to Cannistraro, CIA Director George Tenet had arranged for the Department of Defense to be informed about Ahmed Chalabi's unrealiability and ties to Iranian intelligence in 2002, but the CIA had been blown off by the Pentagon. [11]
According to journalist Ronald Kessler, CIA officials believe that an August 17, 1998, story in the Washington Post citing a claim from Cannistraro that the United States was intercepting the phone calls of Osama bin Laden's associates triggered bin Laden's decision to stop using his satellite phone. Within a few days of the publication of Cannistraro's claim, bin Laden and his associates stopped using their phones. The CIA told Kessler that they believed bin Laden would have continued to use his phone if the intercepts had not been compromised. [12]
He reported on the forged Niger "yellowcake" uranium documents as an attempt by some Bush administration supporters to link Iraq with nuclear weapons development in order to increase public support for the Iraq war), and on the related disclosure of the identity of CIA case officer Valerie Plame. [13]
The front company, Brewster Jennings & Associates, apparently also was used by other CIA officers whose work now could be at risk, according to Cannistraro.
On September 12, 2001, Cannistraro stated that five of the hijackers had entered the United States in Maine from Canada via Yarmouth, Nova Scotia, and/or a remote border point near Jackman, Maine, several hundred kilometres southeast of Quebec City.