Vincent Cannistraro was an American intelligence officer.
Cannistaro has a B.A. and M.A. from Boston College. In 1989, he received the Secretary of Defense's Award for Meritorious Civilian Service. He has also received the CIA Medal for Distinguished Service. [1]
Before 1984, he was an officer with the CIA's Directorate of Operations in the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and Central America. [2] [3]
From 1984 to 1987, Cannistraro was Director of Intelligence Programs at the National Security Council (NSC), then a Special Assistant for Intelligence in the Office of the Secretary of Defense until 1988. [4] [1]
Cannistraro was a witness for the defense during former White House aide Oliver North's trial over his role in the Iran–Contra affair. On April 4, 1989, Cannistraro testified that he felt North could not be trusted to tell the truth and had gained the reputation of a prevaricator at the NSC. On May 4, 1989, a jury found North guilty on three felony counts, including altering and destroying NSC documents, aiding and abetting the obstruction of a Congressional inquiry into the affair, and of illegally accepting a gift. [5]
While at the CIA, Cannistraro ran the agency's Central American task force that supervised covert action in the region, including the Nicaraguan Contras (both the left wing guerillas in the South and the right wing contras in the North). He moved to the Reagan NSC by the direction of CIA Latin American Chief Duane Clarridge, who supported Col. Oliver North. [6] The Contra program was transferred in 1984 by President Ronald Reagan to the NSC, [7] and Cannistraro was made Director of Intelligence there later that year. [4] As director, he was responsible for monitoring the US intelligence community budget. [8] and coordinating the approval process for covert action. He also chaired the Afghanistan Working Group at the White House. [9]
From October 1988 until his retirement in September 1990, Cannistraro was Chief of Operations and Analysis at CIA's Counterterrorist Center, where he oversaw U.S. intelligence collection and analysis on terrorist groups and ran covert actions. He did not have a role in determining counterterrorism policy in his roles either at CIA, the White House, or at the Department of Defense, where he monitored and coordinated intelligence operations. [10] In this role, he led CIA's investigation into the 1988 bombing of Pan Am Flight 103. [11]
Shortly after his retirement from CIA, Cannistraro claimed in November 1990 that the U.S. government applied a double standard to state sponsors of terrorism in the Middle East, overlooking acts by Syria under Hafez al-Assad while criticizing Iran and Iraq. According to the New York Times , Cannistraro was the first former counterterrorism official to publicly raise the issue of Washington's counterterrorism policy. [10]
After leaving the CIA in 1991, Cannistraro worked as a consultant on terrorism and security issues for a number of corporate and government clients, including ABC News and The Vatican. [1]
According to journalist Ronald Kessler, CIA officials believed that an August 17, 1998, story in the Washington Post citing a claim from Cannistraro that the United States was intercepting the phone calls of Osama bin Laden's associates triggered bin Laden's decision to stop using his satellite phone. Within a few days of the publication of Cannistraro's claim, bin Laden and his associates stopped using their phones. The CIA told Kessler that they believed bin Laden would have continued to use his phone if the intercepts had not been compromised. [12]
The day after the September 11 attacks, Cannistraro claimed that five of the 9/11 hijackers had entered the United States in Maine via Yarmouth, Nova Scotia, and/or a remote border point near Jackman, Maine, several hundred kilometres southeast of Quebec City. Cannistraro never admitted that his claim, birthing the "9/11 myth" that several of the hijackers had entered America from Canada, was mistaken. [13]
Cannistraro observed in 2002 that the U.S. had successfully met its objectives upon the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, but had subsequently failed to assist in the country's stabilization. Cannistraro's view was supported by Pakistani General Hamid Gul, former head of the Pakistani ISI, who described the U.S. departure as a crime. [14]
Cannistraro also alleged that Iraqi intelligence agent Farouk Hijazi had invited bin Laden to live in Iraq during a December 1998 meeting in Afghanistan, though he maintained that bin Laden refused the invitation and did not accept support from Saddam Hussein. [15]
According to Cannistraro, CIA Director George Tenet had arranged for the Department of Defense to be informed about Ahmed Chalabi's unrealiability and ties to Iranian intelligence in 2002, but the CIA had been blown off by the Pentagon. [16]
He reported on the forged Niger "yellowcake" uranium documents as an attempt by some Bush administration supporters to link Iraq with nuclear weapons development in order to increase public support for the Iraq war), and on the related disclosure of the identity of CIA case officer Valerie Plame. [17]
The front company, Brewster Jennings & Associates, apparently also was used by other CIA officers whose work now could be at risk, according to Cannistraro.
He died on May 21, 2019.[ citation needed ]