Water privatization in Guinea

Last updated

Urban water supply in Guinea was privatized from 1989 until 2003 during the presidency of Lansana Conte. His government initiated water privatization for two reasons: First, the World Bank had made private sector participation in urban water supply a condition for a new credit, after the public water utility had been unable to improve service quality under a previous World Bank credit. Second, the government wanted to reduce the budgetary burden from the national public water utility, which was overstaffed and had been unable to collect bills.

Contents

In the five years after privatization water tariffs quadrupled. The increase even exceeded the tariff increases that had originally been planned. This eased pressure on the government budget. Consumers also benefited when a bulk water pipeline and water treatment plant, both financed by the World Bank credit, were completed in 1994 resulting in improved service quality. But the tariff increase also imposed a burden on the minority of Guineans who were connected to a piped water supply system. Most of the poor in Guinea were not affected by water privatization, since they remained without access to a piped water supply system.

After the private sector contract expired in 2000 and an interim period, the sector reverted to public management. Tariffs were frozen in 1994 and inflation eroded the real value of tariffs. Service quality deteriorated and in 2003 the situation was similar to the low tariff-poor service equilibrium before privatization. [1] [2]

The privatization covered Conakry as well as 16 other smaller urban centers. Little is known about the effects of privatization in the smaller centers, since the literature focuses on Conakry, where the national water utility has about 80% of its customers.

Water resources and water use in Conakry

Conakry as seen from space. Sat image of conakry 2004.jpg
Conakry as seen from space.

Conakry is located on a peninsula with limited local water availability. Groundwater is brackish and contaminated with bacteria. Most of the piped water distributed in Conakry comes via pipeline from a large reservoir behind a dam used for hydropower generation at Grandes Chutes 60 km northeast of Conakry. The water flows by gravity to the Yessoulou treatment plant halfway between the dam and the capital. It then continues to flow through a treated water pipeline by gravity to the city where it is distributed to house connections and standpipes throughout the city. [3]

In response to a 1999 survey, 70% of the poor in Conakry said that shallow wells and polluted, temporary streams were their main source of water for non-potable uses. 18% of the poor said these were their main sources of drinking water. Other important sources of drinking water for the poor were the resale of piped water (41%), standpipes (13%) and piped water connections in their homes (28%). [4] Rainwater harvesting is also common for non-potable uses during the rainy season. [3]

Map of Guinea showing the location of Conakry. GN-Conakry.png
Map of Guinea showing the location of Conakry.

Standpipes. Standpipes are an effective option to supply the urban poor with clean water, in the absence of house connections to the piped network. However, in 1997 there were only 170 standpipes in Conakry, some of which were not working. The municipality of Conakry managed the standpipes.

The municipality was supposed to pay a fee to the water company for the water it received from the company. The municipality was also supposed to collect fees from standpipe users through caretakers that sold water by the bucket to residents. However, customers expected water from standpipes to be free and the caretakers in charge of the standpipes often provided it for free.

The local government, which did not receive any significant revenues from the standpipes, did not pay the water company for the water supply to the standpipes. As a result, the operator cut off water supply to standpipes. Neither the municipality nor the operator was interested in seeing more standpipes being built under this dysfunctional arrangement. The number of standpipes thus remained limited, although they could potentially have provided a large number of poor with clean water at lower costs than house connections.

Evolution of privatization

Prior to privatization

During colonial time, piped drinking water in urban areas of Guinea was provided by a French private company, the Compagnie Africaine de Service Public. After independence the company was nationalized in 1961 as part of the policy of African socialism promoted by Sekou Toure. At the time the World Bank supported the public water utility, but results were disappointing.

In the mid-1980s only 10 of the 33 urban centers had piped water supply. Water was unsafe to drink and service was intermittent. In 1985 the first studies were conducted in preparation of a possible privatization. The government, confronted with coup attempts and not wanting to stir up opposition, waited four years before taking a decision. The World Bank held back a new loan until a decision was taken.

Choice of the lease model

The government looked at various options for private sector participation in urban water supply, including a long-term concession (up to 30 years), a mid-term lease (10 years) and a short-term management contract (about 5 years). It chose a lease (affermage) in part because a lease contract in neighboring Ivory Coast was widely considered in West Africa as being a success.

Like in Ivory Coast, the reforms in Guinea included a single lease contract for water supply in all urban centers of the country. As for all lease contracts, ownership of assets remained with the state. Like in Ivory Coast, the government took a minority stake in the private company that held the lease contract. The 51% majority stake was to be held by a private consortium to be selected via an international competitive bid.

While in Ivory Coast the state owned the infrastructure directly, in Guinea the state created a public holding company called SONEG for that purpose. SONEG owned all assets and was in charge of investment planning. In addition, SONEG operated the transmission pipeline and water treatment plant that provided bulk water to the capital Conakry, because they were considered strategic assets. Only the distribution network and the billing of customers were to be managed by the private company.

Under this new institutional arrangement, investments continued to be mostly financed by external donors. Only a fraction of total investments were financed by the private operator. Customers paid their bills to the private operator, who in turn paid a lease fee (redevance) to the asset holding company. The asset holding company in turn was in charge of debt service, asset renewal and extension. Government subsidies were to be phased out during the period of the lease contract. This was to be achieved through a combination of tariff increases and improved efficiency.

The competitive bid for the lease contract was won by a consortium consisting of two French companies, SAUR and Vivendi (today Veolia Environnement). The winning consortium was selected based on the lowest bid in terms of remuneration per unit of water. SAUR and Vivendi bid lowest, a full 30% lower than the consultants’ estimate. However, their initial low price proved to be of little benefit for customers since tariffs increased sharply during the first years of the lease.

Implementation

During the first five years of the contract the government regularly approved requests for tariff increases from the private company without much questions asked. There was no independent regulatory agency that could give a professional opinion about whether a request for tariff increases was justified or not. There was also no financial model that could have served as a tool to help analyze of requests to increase tariffs. According to the World Bank the regulatory capacity of the asset holding company remained weak throughout the contract.

Most importantly, the asset holding company was not independent, since it received itself a significant share of tariff revenues. Both the public and the private company had strong incentives to increase tariffs, since they both received a share of the water sales. After tariffs had quadrupled in five years, the government finally imposed a tariff freeze in 1994. Afterewards, it did not grant any more tariff increases.

The relationship between the public asset holding company SONEG and the private operating company SEEG was not smooth. The companies blamed each other for lack of progress. [5] For example, when the company was told at one time that it could not disconnect non-paying customers, it reduced its lease payments to the government accordingly, although this had not been foreseen in the lease contract. [6] According to a World Bank report, the private contractor was also "frustrated" by the slow pace of investments by SONEG. The private company thus arranged for "bilateral financing" so that it could build infrastructure under contracts awarded to itself on a sole source basis. [7]

The private company received as much raw water from the asset holding company as it needed for free. While higher efficiency was an objective of the privatization, the private operator had no incentives to improve operating efficiency by reducing water losses because of the free availability of water.

During the last years of the contract governance in Guinea deteriorated and donors were increasingly frustrated with the government and reluctant to commit new funds to an increasingly authoritarian government that was accused of corruption and human rights violations. [1] Under these circumstances it was doubtful if the lease contract would be renewed. As a result, the private company had few incentives to make efforts to improve or even maintain service quality during the last years of the contract.

Return to public management

When the term of the 10-year lease contract came to a close the government and the private company negotiated about a possible new lease contract. But the negotiations failed and in December 2000 the private operator withdrew. According to the Minister of Water in charge at the time, the government wanted to go beyond a lease and had asked the private operator to take on more investment obligations while limiting tariff increases. Disagreements about investments and tariff levels led the negotiations to fail. [8] The government promised to the World Bank that it would launch a bid for a new private sector contract, but it failed to do so. After an interim period with an interim management contract, the sector reverted to public management in 2003. [9]

Impact of privatization

Tariff increase

Tariffs increased substantially, starting with an increase right at the beginning of the contract from 60 to 150 Guinean franc (GF)/m3 ($0.12/m3 to $0.25/m3). By 1994 the tariff had increased to 880 GF/m3 ($0.90/m3), having increased "far more quickly than originally planned", according to the World Bank. The increased revenues were used to reduce government subsidies and to repay debt. In 1994 tariffs were frozen and due to inflation the real value of the tariff had declined to $0.63/m3 by 1999. Due to high levels of inflation real water tariffs declined to $0.21/m3 in 2005, which was below their level at the beginning of the lease contract. [9] [10]

Improvements in terms of access, service quality and public revenues

Remaining challenges

Impact on the electricity sector and on water privatization in Senegal

The government of Guinea decided to reform the electricity sector along the same lines as the water sector a few years after the water lease contract was signed. The electricity lease contract also was not renewed after it ended.

The Senegalese government sent a fact-finding mission to Guinea in 1994 to assess the results of the reform. Subsequently, it embarked on a national 10-year lease contract for water supply in Senegal. However, it learned from the mistakes in Guinea. For example, it made tariff increases conditional on a well-justified proposal based on a financial model showing that costs had increased. It also included incentives for the reduction of non-revenue water in the contract.

Related Research Articles

Water privatization is short for private sector participations in the provision of water services and sanitation. Water privatization has a variable history in which its popularity and favorability has fluctuated in the market and politics. One of the common forms of privatization is public–private partnerships (PPPs). PPPs allow for a mix between public and private ownership and/or management of water and sanitation sources and infrastructure. Privatization, as proponents argue, may not only increase efficiency and service quality but also increase fiscal benefits. There are different forms of regulation in place for current privatization systems.

Access to at least basic water increased from 94% to 97% between 2000 and 2015; an increase in access to at least basic sanitation from 73% to 86% in the same period;

In 2020, 97.7% of Indians had access to the basic water and sanitation facilities. India faces challenges ranging from sourcing water for its megacities to its distribution network which is intermittent in rural areas with continuous distribution networks just beginning to emerge. Non-revenue water is a challenge.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Water supply and sanitation in Rwanda</span> Water supply and sanitation in Rwanda

Water supply and sanitation in Rwanda is characterized by a clear government policy and significant donor support. In response to poor sustainability of rural water systems and poor service quality, in 2002 local government in the Northern Byumba Province contracted out service provision to the local private sector in a form of public–private partnership. Support for public-private partnerships became a government policy in 2004 and locally initiated public-private partnerships spread rapidly, covering 25% of rural water systems as of 2007.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Water privatisation in Jakarta</span>

Water privatisation in Jakarta began when the British water company Thames Water entered into an agreement with the son of then-President Suharto in 1993 to obtain a water concession. Under the influence of the French water company Suez, however, the government decided to split the city's service area between the two companies. The government awarded Thames Water and Suez each a concession for one half of the city without competitive bidding. The contracts foresaw water charge increases that would allow the companies to earn a comfortable 22 percent rate of return. However, only two months after the contracts were signed, the Indonesian rupiah massively lost in value due to the East Asian financial crisis, and President Suharto was toppled. The concessions survived, but the government imposed a tariff freeze and the contracts had to be renegotiated to reduce their targets. In 2006 Suez sold half and Thames Water all its shares to Indonesian investors.

Water privatization in Metro Manila began when the then President of the Philippines, Fidel Ramos, instructed the government in 1994 to solve what he called the water crisis in Manila by engaging with the private sector. In 1997, two concession contracts for the Eastern and Western halves of Metro Manila were awarded after an open competition. The concessions represent the largest population served by private operators in the developing world. Both winning companies, Maynilad Water Services in West Manila and especially Manila Water in East Manila, submitted bids with extremely low water tariffs. The tariffs proved to be too low to finance the investments needed to improve performance, especially after the East Asian financial crisis and the devaluation of the Philippine Peso.

Water privatisation in Ghana has been discussed since the early 1990s as a reaction to poor service quality and low efficiency of the existing urban water utility. The World Bank supported the process of private sector participation in the urban water sector from the beginning. After many tribulations a 5-year management contract was awarded in 2006. When the contract expired in 2011, the government decided not to extend it, saying that the private operator had not lived up to expectations.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Water supply and sanitation in Uganda</span>

The Ugandan water supply and sanitation sector made substantial progress in urban areas from the mid-1990s until at least 2006, with substantial increases in coverage as well as in operational and commercial performance. Sector reforms from 1998 to 2003 included the commercialization and modernization of the National Water and Sewerage Corporation (NWSC) operating in cities and larger towns, as well as decentralization and private sector participation in small towns.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Water supply and sanitation in Mozambique</span>

Water supply and sanitation in Mozambique is characterized by low levels of access to at least basic water sources, low levels of access to at least basic sanitation and mostly poor service quality. In 2007 the government has defined a strategy for water supply and sanitation in rural areas, where 62% of the population lives. In urban areas, water is supplied by informal small-scale providers and by formal providers.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Water supply and sanitation in Zambia</span>

Water supply and sanitation in Zambia is characterized by achievements and challenges. Among the achievements are the creation of regional commercial utilities for urban areas to replace fragmented service provision by local governments; the establishment of a regulatory agency that has substantially improved the availability of information on service provision in urban areas; the establishment of a devolution trust fund to focus donor support on poor peri-urban areas; and an increase in the access to water supply in rural areas.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Water supply and sanitation in Senegal</span>

Water supply and sanitation in Senegal is characterized by a relatively high level of access compared to most of Sub-Saharan Africa. One of its interesting features is a public-private partnership (PPP) that has operatedin Senegal since 1996, with Senegalaise des Eaux (SDE), a subsidiary of Saur International, as the private partner. It does not own the water system but manages it on a 10-year lease contract with the Senegalese government. Between 1996 and 2014, water sales doubled to 131 million cubic meters per year and the number of household connections increased by 165% to more than 638,000. According to the World Bank, "the Senegal case is regarded as a model of public-private partnership in sub-Saharan Africa". Another interesting feature is the existence of a national sanitation company in charge of sewerage, wastewater treatment and stormwater drainage, which has been modeled on the example of the national sanitation company of Tunisia and is unique in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Drinking water supply and sanitation in Egypt is characterized by both achievements and challenges. Among the achievements are an increase of piped water supply between 1998 and 2006 from 89% to 100% in urban areas and from 39% to 93% in rural areas despite rapid population growth; the elimination of open defecation in rural areas during the same period; and in general a relatively high level of investment in infrastructure. Access to an at least basic water source in Egypt is now practically universal with a rate of 98%. On the institutional side, the regulation and service provision have been separated to some extensions through the creation of a national Holding Company for Water and Wastewater in 2004, and of an economic regulator, the Egyptian Water Regulatory Agency (EWRA), in 2006. , many challenges remain. Only about one half of the population is connected to sanitary sewers. Partly because of low sanitation coverage about 50,000 children die each year because of diarrhea. Another challenge is low cost recovery due to water tariffs that are among the lowest in the world. This in turn requires government subsidies even for operating costs, a situation that has been aggravated by salary increases without tariff increases after the Arab Spring. Poor operation of facilities, such as water and wastewater treatment plants, as well as limited government accountability and transparency, are also issues.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Water supply and sanitation in Morocco</span>

Water supply and sanitation in Morocco is provided by a wide array of utilities. They range from private companies in the largest city, Casablanca, the capital, Rabat, Tangier, and Tetouan, to public municipal utilities in 13 other cities, as well as a national electricity and water company (ONEE). The latter is in charge of bulk water supply to the aforementioned utilities, water distribution in about 500 small towns, as well as sewerage and wastewater treatment in 60 of these towns.

Water privatization in Armenia – or, more accurately, the participation of private companies in the provision of water supply under contract with the government of Armenia – has been prepared since the mid-1990s. The first management contract for water supply in Armenia, covering the capital Yerevan, was signed in 1999 with financial support from the World Bank. As of 2010, almost 2.1 million people or about two thirds of the population of Armenia, including its entire urban population, received their drinking water from private companies. Sanitation is not included in the private sector contracts and remains a public responsibility.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Water supply and sanitation in Burkina Faso</span>

Water supply and sanitation in Burkina Faso are characterized by high access to water supply in urban areas, while access to an at least basic water sources in rural areas – where three quarters of the population live – remains relatively low. An estimated one third of water facilities in rural areas are out of service because of a lack of maintenance. Access to at least basic sanitation lags significantly behind access to water supply.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Water supply and sanitation in Turkey</span> Overview of water supply and sanitation in Turkey

Water supply and sanitation in Turkey is characterized by achievements and challenges. Over the past decades access to drinking water has become almost universal and access to adequate sanitation has also increased substantially. Autonomous utilities have been created in the 16 metropolitan cities of Turkey and cost recovery has been increased, thus providing the basis for the sustainability of service provision. Intermittent supply, which was common in many cities, has become less frequent. In 2004, 61% of the wastewater collected through sewers was being treated. In 2020 77% of water was used by agriculture, 10% by households and the rest by industry.

Water supply and sanitation in Malaysia is characterised by numerous achievements, as well as some challenges. Universal access to water supply at affordable tariffs is a substantial achievement. The government has also shown a commitment to make the sector more efficient, to create a sustainable funding mechanism and to improve the customer orientation of service providers through sector reforms enacted in 2006. The reform creates a modern institutional structure for the water sector, including an autonomous regulatory agency, an asset management company and commercialised state water companies that have to reach certain key performance indicators that will be monitored by the regulatory agency. The government has also stated its intention not to embark on new private sector contracts for water provision, after a bout of such contracts during the 1990s showed mixed results.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Water supply and sanitation in sub-Saharan Africa</span>

Although access to water supply and sanitation in sub-Saharan Africa has been steadily improving over the last two decades, the region still lags behind all other developing regions. Access to improved water supply had increased from 49% in 1990 to 68% in 2015, while access to improved sanitation had only risen from 28% to 31% in that same period. Sub-Saharan Africa did not meet the Millennium Development Goals of halving the share of the population without access to safe drinking water and sanitation between 1990 and 2015. There still exists large disparities among sub-Saharan African countries, and between the urban and rural areas. The MDGs set International targets to reduce inadequate Water Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) coverage and now new targets exist under the Sustainable Development Goals. The MDGs called for halving the proportion of the population without access to adequate water and sanitation, whereas the SDGs call for universal access, require the progressive reduction of inequalities, and include hygiene in addition to water and sanitation. Particularly, Sustainable Development Goal SDG6 focuses on ensuring availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all.

Water supply and sanitation in Nairobi is characterised by achievements and challenges. Among the achievements is the expansion of infrastructure to keep pace with population growth, in particular through the construction of the Thika Dam and associated water treatment plant and pipelines during the 1990s; the transformation of the municipal water department into an autonomous utility in 2003; and the more recent reduction of water losses – technically called non-revenue water – from 50 to 40%.

Water supply and sanitation in Vietnam is characterized by challenges and achievements. Among the achievements is a substantial increase in access to water supply and sanitation between 1990 and 2010, nearly universal metering, and increased investment in wastewater treatment since 2007.

References

  1. 1 2 IRIN News:GUINEA: Water and power shortages blamed on drought, 5 June 2003
  2. IRIN News:GUINEA: Water, water everywhere but not a drop to drink, 13 October 2005
  3. 1 2 George R. G. Clarke, Claude Menard:A Transitory Regime Water Supply in Conakry, Guinea, November 1999, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2362, p. 13
  4. Ahmadou Koré Bah et al.:Approvisionnement en eau des ménages de Conakry, in: Afrique contemporaine, 2007/1 (n° 221)
  5. Penelope Brooke Cowen:Lessons from the Guinea Water Lease, World Bank, Public Policy for the Private Sector Note No. 78, April 1999
  6. 1 2 World Bank:Guinea - Second Water Supply Project, Implementation Completion and Results Report, March 1998
  7. Philippe Marin:Public-Private Partnerships for Urban Water Utilities, World Bank/Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility, 2009, p. 60
  8. World Investment News: Interview avec Monsieur Nyankoye Fassou Sagno, Ancien Ministre de l’Hydraulique et de l’Energie
  9. 1 2 World Bank:Guinea - Third Water Supply and Sanitation Project, June 2006
  10. 1 2 3 World Bank, Operations Evaluation Department:Performance Audit Report, Republic of Guinea, Second Water Supply Project, June 12, 2000
  11. George R. G. Clarke, Claude Menard:A Transitory Regime Water Supply in Conakry, Guinea, November 1999, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2362, p. 34
  12. George R. G. Clarke, Claude Menard:A Transitory Regime Water Supply in Conakry, Guinea, November 1999, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2362, p. 11
  13. George R. G. Clarke, Ana Maria Zuluaga, Claude Menard:The Welfare Effects of Private Sector Participation in Guinea's Urban Water Supply, November 1999, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 2361, p. 11