Welch v. United States

Last updated
Welch v. United States
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Argued March 30, 2016
Decided April 18, 2016
Full case nameGregory Welch, Petitioner v. United States
Docket no. 15-6418
Citations578 U.S. ___ ( more )
136 S. Ct. 1257; 194 L. Ed. 2d 387
Related cases Johnson v. United States
Argument Oral argument
Opinion announcement Opinion announcement
Case history
PriorUnited States v. Welch, 683 F.3d 1304 (11th Cir. 2012); cert. denied, 568 U.S. 1112(2013); cert. granted, 136 S. Ct. 790 (2016).
Holding
Johnson v. United States announced a substantive rule change and is thus retroactive.
Court membership
Chief Justice
John Roberts
Associate Justices
Anthony Kennedy  · Clarence Thomas
Ruth Bader Ginsburg  · Stephen Breyer
Samuel Alito  · Sonia Sotomayor
Elena Kagan
Case opinions
MajorityKennedy, joined by Roberts, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor, Kagan
DissentThomas

Welch v. United States, 578 U.S. 120 (2016), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court ruled that the decision in Johnson v. United States [1] announced a substantive rule change and is therefore retroactive. [2]

Contents

Background

United States law prohibits convicted felons from possessing a firearm. [3] The maximum sentence for a felon convicted under this statute is 10 years, but the sentence is enhanced to a minimum of 15 years and a maximum of life imprisonment if the felon had three or more prior convictions for drug or violent felonies. [4] [5] The Armed Career Criminal Act defines "violent felony" as:

...any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year...that—any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . that— (i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or (ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. [6]

Gregory Welch pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm in 2010. The presentence report claimed that Welch had previously been convicted of three violent felonies, and thus was subject to the enhanced sentence of at least 15 years in prison under the Armed Career Criminal Act. The District Court overruled Welch's objection that one of the three offenses was not a violent offense, stating that it was a violent felony under both the element clause ((i) above) and the residual clause ((ii) above). Welch was then sentenced to 15 years in prison. Welch appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which ruled that the offense was a violent felony under the residual clause, but did not decide whether it qualified under the element clause. [7] The Supreme Court denied certiorari in 2013, making the sentence final. [8]

Welch then entered a habeas corpus challenge, claiming that the strong arm robbery conviction, one of the three prior felonies, was impermissibly vague, which the District Court denied. It further refused to grant a certificate of appealability. He then sought a certificate of appealability from the Court of Appeals, noting that Johnson was pending before the Supreme Court. The Court of Appeals denied the certificate. Three weeks later, the Supreme Court ruled in Johnson v. United States that the residual clause, under which Welch was sentenced, was unconstitutional. [1] Welch then submitted a motion to the Court of Appeals for more time to ask for reconsideration, but it was not filed as the time to seek reconsideration had passed. Continuing pro se (i.e., without a lawyer), Welch filed a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court. Welch later retained Supreme Court lawyer Amir H. Ali to represent him, and the Supreme Court granted review.[ citation needed ]

Oral argument

The Supreme Court expedited the briefing process so that the case could be heard and decided within the same term that certiorari was granted. [9] Ali presented oral argument on behalf of Welch, in his first Supreme Court argument. [10] Michael Dreeben, then Deputy Solicitor General of the United States, presented argument on behalf of the United States and conceded that Johnson is retroactive. As the United States had conceded error, the Supreme Court appointed Helgi C. Walker as an amicus curiae to argue in support of the lower court's ruling. [9]

At oral argument, Welch and the United States argued that Johnson should be considered retroactive. The Court has previously held that only "substantive" rule changes are considered retroactive while "procedural" changes are not. Welch argued that because the effect of the Johnson ruling was to change the sentence range, the law should be considered substantive (and thus retroactive). Walker, arguing against retroactivity as an amicus, advanced the argument that, since the source of the ruling was a procedural constitutional provision, Johnson should not be held as retroactive. [9]

Opinion of the Court

In a 7–1 decision authored by Associate Justice Anthony Kennedy, the Court ruled that Johnson announced a substantive rule change and was thus retroactive. The decision also held that the lower courts had erred in denying a certificate of appealability, as reasonable jurists could disagree on the outcome given the decision in Johnson.

The lone dissenter was Associate Justice Clarence Thomas, who wrote that the majority had undermined "any principled limitation on the finality of federal convictions".

Related Research Articles

Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385 (2005), was a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States involving 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which makes it illegal to possess a gun for individuals previously "convicted in any court" of crimes for which they could have been sentenced to more than one year in prison. The Court ruled, in a five to three decision, that "any court" does not include those in foreign countries. This decision resolved a circuit split on the issue, and reversed the lower ruling of the Third Circuit that the law did apply to foreign convictions.

<i>United States v. Stewart</i> (2003) United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit case

United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132 and 451 F.3d 1071, is a Ninth Circuit case involving a challenge to the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) under the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found against the defendant, ruling that possession of homemade machine guns can be constitutionally regulated by the United States Congress under the Commerce Clause.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Procedures of the Supreme Court of the United States</span>

The Supreme Court of the United States is the highest court in the federal judiciary of the United States. The procedures of the Court are governed by the U.S. Constitution, various federal statutes, and its own internal rules. Since 1869, the Court has consisted of one chief justice and eight associate justices. Justices are nominated by the president, and with the advice and consent (confirmation) of the U.S. Senate, appointed to the Court by the president. Once appointed, justices have lifetime tenure unless they resign, retire, or are removed from office.

Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), was a U.S. Supreme Court decision that filled in an important gap in the federal criminal law of sentencing. The federal criminal code does not contain a definition of many crimes, including burglary, the crime at issue in this case. Yet sentencing enhancements applicable to federal crimes allow for the enhancement of a defendant's sentence if he has been convicted of prior felonies. The Court addressed in this case how "burglary" should be defined for purposes of such sentencing enhancements when the federal criminal code contained no definition of "burglary." The approach the Court adopted in this case has guided the lower federal courts in interpreting other provisions of the criminal code that also refer to generic crimes not otherwise defined in federal law.

Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406 (2007), was a United States Supreme Court case about the application of the Confrontation Clause and whether Crawford v. Washington (2006) applied retroactively. Justice Samuel Alito, writing for a unanimous Court, ruled that Crawford did not apply retroactively.

Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008), is a United States Supreme Court case which held that felony driving while intoxicated is not a "violent felony" for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Armed Career Criminal Act</span> 1984 United States federal law

The Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 (ACCA) is a United States federal law that provides sentence enhancements for felons who commit crimes with firearms if they are convicted of certain crimes three or more times. Pennsylvania Senator Arlen Specter was a key proponent for the legislation.

Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009), was a case in which the Supreme Court of the United States held that failing to report for incarceration does not qualify as a "violent felony" for the purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act.

Abbott v. United States, 562 U.S. 8 (2010), is a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States that addressed the mandatory sentencing increase under federal law for the possession or use of a deadly weapon in drug trafficking and violent crimes. In an 8–0 decision, the Court ruled that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which required a minimum five-year prison sentence, was to be imposed in addition to any other mandatory sentence given for another crime, including the underlying drug-related or violent offense. The only exception to the five-year addition applied only when another provision required a longer mandatory term for conduct violating §924(c) specifically, rather than a mandatory sentence for another crime as the defendants had unsuccessfully argued.

Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court ruled the Residual Clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act was unconstitutionally vague and in violation of due process.

Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. ___ (2016), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that its previous ruling in Miller v. Alabama (2012), that a mandatory life sentence without parole should not apply to persons convicted of murder committed as juveniles, should be applied retroactively. This decision potentially affects up to 2,300 cases nationwide.

Nichols v. United States, 578 U.S. ___ (2016), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) does not require an individual to update his registration after departing a state.

Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. ___ (2016), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit's reliance on a requirement that defendants show "additional evidence" to show substantial harm arising from incorrect sentencing guidelines is impermissible.

Sessions v. Dimaya, 584 U.S. ___ (2018), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that 18 U.S.C. § 16(b), a statute defining certain "aggravated felonies" for immigration purposes, is unconstitutionally vague. The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) classifies some categories of crimes as "aggravated felonies", and immigrants convicted of those crimes, including those legally present in the United States, are almost certain to be deported. Those categories include "crimes of violence", which are defined by the "elements clause" and the "residual clause". The Court struck down the "residual clause", which classified every felony that, "by its nature, involves a substantial risk" of "physical force against the person or property" as an aggravated felony.

United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. ___ (2019), is a United States Supreme Court decision handed down June 24, 2019.

Stokeling v. United States, 586 U.S. ___ (2019), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the court held that state robbery offenses that involve overcoming victim resistance count as "violent felonies" under the definition of that term under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, even when only 'slight force' is required. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act, defendants with three or more violent felonies can face higher sentences when subsequently convicted of a federal firearms-related offense. This case upheld a ruling by the 11th Circuit.

Shular v. United States, 589 U.S. ___ (2020), is an opinion of the United States Supreme Court in which the Court held that, under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, the definition of “serious drug offense” only requires that the state offense involve the conduct specified in the statute. Unlike other provisions of the ACCA, it does not require that state courts develop “generic” version of a crime, which describe the elements of the offense as they are commonly understood, and then compare the crime being charged to that generic version to determine whether the crime qualifies under the ACCA for purposes of penalty enhancement. The decision states that offenses defined under the ACCA are "unlikely names for generic offenses," and are therefore unambiguous. This renders the rule of lenity inapplicable.

Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. ___ (2021), was a United States Supreme Court case involving the classification of prior convictions for "violent felony" in application of Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA); the ACCA provides for enhanced sentencing for convicted criminals with three or more such felonies in their history. In a 5–4 decision in June 2021, the Supreme Court ruled that crimes resulting from reckless conduct should not be considered as a "violent felony" for the purposes of the ACCA.

Cruz v. Arizona, 598 U.S. 17 (2023), was a United States Supreme Court case related to habeas corpus.

Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), was a United States Supreme Court case which considered whether criminal defendants ever have a right to the effective assistance of counsel in collateral state post-conviction proceedings. The Court held that a procedural default will not bar a federal habeas court from hearing ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel if there was no counsel or ineffective counsel in an initial-review collateral proceeding.

References

  1. 1 2 Johnson v. United States, No. 13-7120 , 576 U.S. 591 (2015).
  2. Welch v. United States, 578 U.S. 120 (2016)
  3. 18 U.S.C.   § 922(g) .
  4. 18 U.S.C.   § 924(a)(2) .
  5. 18 U.S.C.   § 924(e)(1) .
  6. 18 U.S.C.   § 924(e)(2)(B) .
  7. United States v. Welch, 683F.3d1304 ( 11th Cir. 2012).
  8. Welch v. United States, 568 U.S. 1112(2013).
  9. 1 2 3 Little, Rory (March 31, 2016). "Argument analysis: A likely decision in favor of retroactivity?". SCOTUSblog. Retrieved April 18, 2016.
  10. Lat, David (19 April 2016). "A Biglaw Associate's Big Supreme Court Victory". Above the Law. Retrieved 2019-12-20.