Differing perceptions of the Line of Actual Control

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Differing perceptions or areas of differing perceptions was a theory to explain why border conflicts have arisen between China and India, since the Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement, 1993 has been signed. It maintains that the two sides have different perception of where the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between the territories of the two countries lies. Further, the Chinese have their own understanding of where the Indians perceive their LAC to be, and vice versa. [1] For many decades India and China carried forward the differing perceptions theory.

Contents

India has called this as one of the causes for the loss of Indian territory to China's salami slicing. [2] [3] The existence of areas of differing perceptions resulted in "overlapping areas of influence, extending from a few hundred meters to tens of kilometers" and was "one of the reasons for Chinese to enhance their transgressions in Ladakh". [4]

Differing perceptions in the Depsang Bulge area in northern Ladakh: the leftmost line indicating China's perception and the rightmost line India's perception. The middle green line represents the prevailing LAC as per the contributors to OpenStreetMap and the red line is that marked by the US Office of the Geographer. Depsang-Bulge-LSIB-2020.jpg
Differing perceptions in the Depsang Bulge area in northern Ladakh: the leftmost line indicating China's perception and the rightmost line India's perception. The middle green line represents the prevailing LAC as per the contributors to OpenStreetMap and the red line is that marked by the US Office of the Geographer.

Overview

Written in the Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement, 1993: "When necessary, the two sides shall jointly check and determine the segments of the line of actual control where they have different views as to its alignment". [1] [5] This phrase, "differences on the alignment", also finds mention in the 1996 agreement. Further the 1996 agreement uses the phrase "different perceptions": [6]

Recognizing that the full implementation of some of the provisions of the present Agreement will depend on the two sides arriving at a common understanding of the alignment of the line of actual control in the India-China border areas, the two sides agree to [...] As an initial step in this process, they are clarifying the alignment of the line of actual control in those segments where they have different perceptions.

In the backdrop of the 2020–2021 China–India skirmishes, Defence Minister of India Rajnath Singh, used the phrase in a Lok Sabha statement, "...both (India, China) have different perceptions of LAC"; [7] [8] in the Rajya Sabha, "there is no common perception of the entire LAC", "there are some areas where the Chinese and Indian perceptions of LAC overlap". [9] A Chinese foreign ministry statement in September 2020 stated that "China-India border LAC is very clear, that is the LAC on November 7, 1959. China announced it in the 1950s". [10] In 2003 Asaphila as an area of differing perception was called out in the Parliament. [11]

Confidence building measures, clarification mechanisms, peace and tranquility building measures have been agreed upon by both countries to deal with the tensions arising from the areas of differing perceptions. [1] [9] According to commentators, the number of areas of differing perceptions range from 12 to 18 locations [1] [12] to no perceptional differences. [13]

Notes

  1. The red line is from "LSIB", or "Large-Scale International Boundaries", a data set published by the US Office of the Geographer and used widely for marking international boundaries, including in applications such as the Google Maps. The data set marked here is of Version 10, released in March 2020, visualised on OpenStreetMap at humdata.org.

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Daulat Beg Oldi Military Base in Ladakh, India

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Depsang Plains Plains at the north of Aksai Chin divided between China and India

The Depsang Plains represent a high-altitude gravelly plain at the northwest portion of the disputed Aksai Chin region of Kashmir, divided into Indian and Chinese administered portions across a Line of Actual Control. India controls the western portion of the plains as part of Ladakh, whereas the eastern portion is controlled by China and claimed by India. The Line of Control with Pakistan-administered Gilgit-Baltistan is 80 kilometres (50 mi) west of the Depsang Plains with the Siachen Glacier in-between. Ladakh's traditional trade route to Central Asia passed through the Depsang Plains, with the Karakoram Pass lying directly to its north.

Fukche

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The Sino-Pakistan Agreement is a 1963 document between the governments of Pakistan and China establishing the border between those countries.

2013 Depsang standoff Military standoff in Aksai Chin between China and India

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Galwan River River in disputed Aksai Chin region

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Chumar Village in Ladakh, India

Chumar is a village and a border patrol facility located in south-eastern Ladakh, India. It is in Rupshu block, south of the Tso Moriri lake, on the bank of the Parang River, close to Ladakh's border with Tibet. Since 2012, China disputes the border in this area, though the Chumur village itself is undisputed.

Demchok, Ladakh Village in Ladakh, India

Demchok , previously called New Demchok, and Parigas by the Chinese, is a village and military encampment in the Indian-administered Demchok sector that is disputed between India and China. It is administered as part of the Nyoma tehsil in the Leh district of Ladakh by India, and claimed by China as part of the Tibet Autonomous Region.

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Demchok sector Disputed region between China and India in Ladakh and Tibet

The Demchok sector is a disputed region named after the villages of Demchok, Ladakh and Demchok, Tibet, situated near the confluence of the Charding Nullah and Indus River. It is part of the greater Sino-Indian border dispute between China and India. Both India and China claim the disputed region, with a Line of Actual Control between the two nations situated along the Charding Nullah.

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Demchok (historical village) Historical village between Ladakh and Tibet

Demchok was described by a British boundary commission in 1847 as a village lying on the border between the Kingdom of Ladakh and the Tibet. It was a "hamlet of half a dozen huts and tents", divided into two parts by a rivulet which formed the boundary between two states. The rivulet, a tributary of the Indus River variously called the Demchok River, Charding Nullah or the Lhari stream, was set as the boundary between Ladakh and Tibet in the 1684 Treaty of Tingmosgang. By 1904–05, the Tibetan side of the hamlet was said to have had 8 to 9 huts of zamindars (landholders), while the Ladakhi side had two. The area of the former Demchok now straddles the Line of Actual Control, the effective border of the People's Republic of China's Tibet Autonomous Region and the Republic of India's Ladakh Union Territory.

In early May 2020, troops of the People's Liberation Army and Indian Army engaged in melee at locations along the notional Line of Actual Control (LAC), the disputed boundary between China and India. It escalated on 15/16 June 2020 resulting in deaths on both sides. Indian sources reported the deaths of 20 Indian soldiers and casualties of at least 45 Chinese soldiers. China reported 4 deaths. On 7 September, for the first time in 45 years, shots were fired along the LAC, with both sides blaming each other for the firing. Indian media also reported that Indian troops fired warning shots at the PLA on 30 August.

Depsang Bulge Disputed area between China and India in Aksai Chin

The Depsang Bulge or Burtsa Bulge is a 900 square kilometre area of mountain terrain in the disputed Aksai Chin region, which was conceded to India by China in 1960 but remains under Chinese occupation since the 1962 Sino-Indian War. The area is immediately to the south of Depsang Plains and encloses the basin of the Raki Nala, a stream originating in the Aksai Chin region and flowing west to merge with the Depsang Nala near the village of Burtsa in Ladakh, eventually draining into the Shyok River. The area is perceived to be of strategic importance to both the countries, sandwiched by strategic roads linking border outposts. Since 2013, China has made attempts to push the Line of Actual Control further west into the Indian territory, threatening India's strategic road.

Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement, 1993 Agreement between China and Indian regarding border management

The Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement is an agreement signed by China and India in September 1993, agreeing to maintain the status quo on their mutual border pending an eventual boundary settlement. The Agreement on Military Confidence Building Measures, 1996, pursuant to the 1993 agreement, incrementally details the military confidence building measures to be implemented that would ensure no-war. The Protocol for the Implementation of Military Confidence Building Measures, 2005 further discussed modalities to implement the confidence building measures.

Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question, 2005

The Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary Question is an agreement between the India and China signed on 11 April 2005. The agreement is a direct outcome of the Special Representative (SR) mechanism that had been set up through a 2003 agreement.

Border Defence Cooperation Agreement

The Agreement between India and China on Border Defence Cooperation (BDCA) covers border stability and security, information asymmetry, smuggling, socio-economic reconstruction, environment and disease transmission along the line of actual control. It is an incremental addition to the previous border agreements related to the Sino-Indian border dispute.

References

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  12. Claude Arpi (2016). The Case of Demchok. via— claudearpi.net. "the case of Demchok which is a case study of Chinese 'advances' which resulted in what today is called a ‘difference of perceptions’ on the LAC. [...] It is not only in Demchok, but in 11 other places, also that India’s and China’s views differ.[...]"
  13. Mahalingam, Brig V. (18 August 2014). "China: Differing Perceptions about the Line of Actual Control (LAC): A Hoax?". Center For Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS). Archived from the original on 2020-12-27. Retrieved 2021-03-15.