Morrison v. Olson

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Morrison v. Olson
Seal of the United States Supreme Court.svg
Argued April 26, 1988
Decided June 29, 1988
Full case nameAlexia Morrison, Independent Counsel v. Theodore Olson, et al.
Citations487 U.S. 654 ( more )
108 S. Ct. 2597; 101 L. Ed. 2d 569; 1988 U.S. LEXIS 3034; 56 U.S.L.W. 4835
Case history
PriorIn re Sealed Case, 838 F.2d 476 (D.C. Cir. 1988); probable jurisdiction noted, 484 U.S. 1058(1988).
Holding
The Independent Counsel Act's restriction on the power of the Attorney General to remove an inferior officer only for good cause does not violate the Appointments Clause. The Independent Counsel Act is constitutional, as it does not increase the power of the judiciary or legislative branches at the expense of the executive branch.
Court membership
Chief Justice
William Rehnquist
Associate Justices
William J. Brennan Jr.  · Byron White
Thurgood Marshall  · Harry Blackmun
John P. Stevens  · Sandra Day O'Connor
Antonin Scalia  · Anthony Kennedy
Case opinions
MajorityRehnquist, joined by Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Connor
DissentScalia
Kennedy took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
Laws applied
U.S. Const. art. II

Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), was a Supreme Court of the United States decision that determined the Independent Counsel Act was constitutional. Morrison also set important precedent determining the scope of Congress's ability to encumber the President's authority to remove Officers of the United States from office. In Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (2020), the Supreme Court distinguished Morrison as a narrow exception applying only to inferior officers.

Contents

Background

The Ethics in Government Act of 1978

The Office of Independent Counsel was established by Congress after the Watergate scandal. When needed, the statute allowed for an independent counsel to be appointed by a special judicial panel. [1]

Reagan administration

The case involved subpoenas from two subcommittees of the United States House of Representatives that directed the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to produce documents relating to the efforts of the EPA and the Land and Natural Resources Division of the Justice Department to enforce the Superfund law. President Ronald Reagan ordered the Administrator of the EPA to withhold the documents on the grounds that they contained "enforcement sensitive information." This led to an investigation by the House Judiciary Committee that later produced a report suggesting that Theodore Olson, the Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel, had given false and misleading testimony before a House subcommittee during the early parts of the investigation.

The Chairman of the Judiciary Committee forwarded a copy of the report to the Attorney General with a request that he seek the appointment of an independent counsel to investigate the allegations against Olson and two others. Alexia Morrison was named independent counsel and given jurisdiction to investigate whether Olson had violated federal law. Olson moved to quash the subpoenas and sued Morrison in her official capacity.

Olson argued that the Office of the Independent Counsel took executive powers away from the office of the President of the United States and created a hybrid "fourth branch" of government that was ultimately answerable to no one. He argued that the broad powers of an independent counsel could be easily abused or corrupted by partisanship. Morrison in turn argued that her position was necessary in order to prevent abuses by the executive branch, which historically operated in a closed environment.

Supreme Court

Majority

The Court held that the independent counsel provision of the Ethics in Government Act did not violate the principle of separation of powers because it did not increase the power of one branch at the expense of another.

While applying the structural principles of Humphrey's Executor v. United States the Supreme Court did not rely on that decision's reasoning. [2] Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion has been labelled "functionalist" by supporters of the so-called unitary executive theory. [3] [4] [5]

The Court had decided only two years earlier in Bowsher v. Synar that interpreting statutes to implement their requirements is "the very essence of 'execution' of the law". [6] Reaffirming Bowsher's interpretation of Myers v. United States , Chief Justice Rehnquist allowed an exception for inferior officers, finding that an independent counsel appointed by the Special Division to investigate high-level misconduct would not "impermissibly burden" the President's responsibility under Article II to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed". [7] [8]

Justice Scalia's dissent

Justice Scalia, the lone dissenter, said that the law should be struck down because (1) criminal prosecution is an exercise of "purely executive power" and (2) the law deprived the president of "exclusive control" of that power. [9]

In his opinion, Scalia predicted how the law might be abused in practice, writing, "I fear the Court has permanently encumbered the Republic with an institution that will do it great harm." [10]

Reactions

Conservatives like Senator Bob Dole shared similar concerns when Lawrence Walsh announced the re-indictment of former defense secretary Caspar Weinberger on charges related to the Iran–Contra affair four days before the 1992 U.S. presidential election. [11] Critics[ who? ] also sensed partisan politics when Walsh's office leaked a note suggesting President Bush Sr. had lied about his connections to the affair.

Concerns were also raised, in line with Scalia's dissent, when independent counsel Kenneth Starr spent $40 million and more than four years investigating President Clinton's land deals and extramarital affairs. [12] Writing in The New York Times while Starr's work was ongoing, legal journalist Linda Greenhouse reported that Scalia's dissent, formerly disregarded by liberals, was instead being "cited and passed around in liberal circles like samizdat." [13]

Subsequent developments

Congress let the Independent Counsel Act expire in 1999. Then-Judge Samuel Alito said the decision hit the separation of powers doctrine 'about as hard as heavy-weight champ Mike Tyson usually hits his opponents.'" [14] It seemingly "drove a stake into the heart of" Myers v. United States , the controlling case on presidential removal powers at that time. [15] In 2013, Justice Scalia described Morrison v. Olson as the most wrenching case in which he had participated:

Probably the most wrenching was Morrison v. Olson, which involved the independent counsel. To take away the power to prosecute from the president and give it to somebody who's not under his control is a terrible erosion of presidential power. And it was wrenching not only because it came out wrong—I was the sole dissenter—but because the opinion was written by Rehnquist, who had been head of the Office of Legal Counsel, before me, and who I thought would realize the importance of that power of the president to prosecute. And he not only wrote the opinion; he wrote it in a manner that was more extreme than I think Bill Brennan would have written it. That was wrenching." [16]

In April 2006, a court citing Morrison rejected I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby's argument that Special Counsel Patrick J. Fitzgerald lacked the legal authority to bring charges against him. [17] Morrison was distinguished in Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (2020) as being an exception to the President's generally unencumbered authority to remove officers of the United States at will. [15] The Court held that Morrison's holding was a narrow exception only applying to inferior officers. [15]

See also

References

  1. "Special Counsels, Independent Counsels and Special Prosecutors: Legal Authority and Limitations on Independent Executive Investigations" (PDF). Congressional Research Service. April 12, 2018.
  2. Strauss, Peter L. (2011). "On the Difficulties of Generalization – PCAOB in the Footsteps of Myers, Humphrey's Executor, Morrison and Freytag". Cardozo Law Review. 32: 2265-2266.
  3. Harriger, Katy Jean (2000). The Special Prosecutor in American Politics. United States: University Press of Kansas. pp. 115–116.
  4. Eskridge, William N. Jr. (1998). "Relationships Between Formalism and Functionalism in Separation of Powers Cases". Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy. 22: 24–27.
  5. Peterson, Todd D. (June 1991). "Prosecuting Executive Branch Officials for Contempt of Congress". New York University Law Review. 66 (3): 588–591.
  6. Goldsmith, Jack; Manning, John F. (2016). "The Protean Take Care Clause". University of Pennsylvania Law Review. 164 (7): 1841.
  7. Entin, Jonathan L. (2015). "The Curious Case of the Pompous Postmaster: Myers v. United States". Case Western Reserve Law Review. 65 (4): 1078.
  8. Golove, David M. (1998). "Against Free-Form Formalism". New York University Law Review. 73: 1845–1846.
  9. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 705-06 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
  10. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 733 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
  11. "Dole wants investigation of Walsh, others pardoned". Detroit Free Press. Detroit, Michigan. November 9, 1992. p. 5 via Newspapers.com.
  12. Wittes, Benjamin (August 16, 1998). "A Kiss of Death for Independent Counsels". Clarion-Ledger . Jackson, Mississippi. p. 73 via Newspapers.com.
  13. Greenhouse, Linda (February 1, 1998). "Blank Check; Ethics in Government: The Price of Good Intentions". The New York Times . Archived from the original on May 6, 2023. Retrieved December 18, 2024.
  14. Hulse, Carl; Kirkpatrick, David D. (December 2, 2005). "After Memo, Democrats Are Taking Firmer Stance Against Alito Nomination". The New York Times.
  15. 1 2 3 Mashaw, Jerry (August 27, 2020). "Of Angels, Pins, and For-Cause Removal: A Requiem for the Passive Virtues". The University of Chicago Law Review Online. Retrieved November 30, 2021.
  16. Senior, Jennifer (October 6, 2013). "In Conversation: Antonin Scalia". New York . Retrieved October 20, 2017.
  17. "United States of America, v. I. Lewis Libby" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on June 1, 2006.

Further reading