Paradox of fiction

Last updated
The paradox of fiction asks why people experience strong emotions when, for example, they are watching Prince Hamlet on stage, while at the same time knowing that it is not really Hamlet but merely an actor. Bernhardt Hamlet2.jpg
The paradox of fiction asks why people experience strong emotions when, for example, they are watching Prince Hamlet on stage, while at the same time knowing that it is not really Hamlet but merely an actor.

The paradox of fiction, or the paradox of emotional response to fiction, is a philosophical dilemma that questions how people can experience strong emotions to fictional things. The primary question asked is the following: How are people moved by things which do not exist? The paradox draws upon a set of three premises that seem to be true prima facie but upon closer inspection produce a contradiction. Although the emotional experience of fictional things in general has been discussed in philosophy since Plato, [1] the paradox was first suggested by Colin Radford and Michael Weston in their 1975 paper "How Can We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?". [2] Since Radford and Weston's original paper, they and others have continued the discussion by giving the problem slightly differing formulations and solutions. [3]

Contents

The paradox

The basic paradox is as follows: [1]

  1. People have emotional responses to characters, objects, events etc. which they know to be fictitious.
  2. In order for people to be emotionally moved, they must believe that these characters, objects, or events, truly exist.
  3. No person who takes characters or events to be fictional at the same time believes that they are real.

The paradox is that all three premises taken individually seem to be true, but can not all be true at the same time. If any two points (e.g. 1 and 3) are taken to be true, then the third (e.g. 2) must either be false or else produce a contradiction.

Origin

In 1975, philosophers Colin Radford and Michael Weston published their paper "How Can We Be Moved by the Fate of Anna Karenina?" [2] In it, Radford and Weston discuss the idea of emotional responses to fiction, drawing upon the titular character from Leo Tolstoy's novel Anna Karenina . [2] Their central inquiry is how people can be moved by things that do not exist. In their paper, they concluded that people's emotional responses to fiction are irrational. [2] In 1978, American philosopher Kendall Walton published the paper "Fearing Fictions", in which he addresses Radford and Weston's paradox. [4] This paper served as the impetus for Walton's make-believe theory, his major contribution to philosophy. The conversation that Radford, Weston, and Walton started on the topic of emotional responses to fiction has continued and evolved to this day.

Developments

The debate about the paradox of fiction has evolved immensely since its introduction by Radford and Walton. When the paradox was first formulated, the cognitive theory of emotions was a dominant force in philosophical thought. [4] For cognitivists, emotions involve judgments or beliefs. For example, one's anger at somebody involves the judgment or belief of wrongdoing by that somebody. [4] Similarly, premise 2 involves the judgment that fictitious characters truly exist. [4] Therefore, for cognitivists, premise 2 seems just as true as the other premises and subsequently there is a true paradox, which is resolved by rejecting premise 1. [4]

However, nowadays, cognitivism is not as influential and very few people accept premise 2. [5] This is in part due to the strong nature of the premise that results from the phrase "truly exists". [5] People are emotionally moved by things and people from the past as well as the hypothetical future, including things that have not happened and may not ever happen. [5] Also, people seem to be capable of being moved by irrational emotions caused by phobias. [5] These disprove the "truly exists" phrase. [5] Instead of cognitivist ideas, academics advocate other theories such as appraisal, perceptual, and feeling theories. [4] In these theories, emotions do not involve judgments or beliefs and consequently premise 2 is not true prima facie, nullifying the paradox of fiction entirely. [4]

Some academics who propose solutions to the paradox that involve the denial of premise 1 or 3 even deny premise 2 as well. [5] For example, although Walton argues for the denial of premise 1 because the reader does not literally pity the character Anna, he also questions the truthfulness of premise 2 because of cases of irrational emotion. [5]

Despite the popular rejection of premise 2, academics are still interested in the paradox and seriously consider other solutions. [5] Robert Stecker argues that studying the paradox is nevertheless important for understanding people's emotional responses to fiction. [5]

Future areas of research include the paradox of fiction in video games. [4] Important questions include the following. "How does this idea challenge the truism that one cannot interact with fictional characters?" "Are emotional responses to videogame characters different from emotional responses to traditional fiction characters?"

Responses and proposed solutions

The various proposed solutions to the paradox can be divided into three basic groups: [1] [3]

Pretense theory

First is the pretend or the simulation theories, proposed by Kendall Walton in his seminal paper "Fearing Fictions" (1978) and built upon in subsequent works.

The pretend theory denies premise 1, that people have emotional responses to fictitious things. [6] The theory argues that people do not experience real emotions with fiction but rather something less intense. [6] People experience quasi-emotions that they imagine to be real emotions. [6] For example, when watching a horror movie where the monster makes an attack towards the viewer (towards the camera), the viewer can be startled but does not truly fear for their life. [6]

Walton's view takes the assumption that one who experiences genuine emotion towards an "entity" must believe that said entity both exists and has features such that the emotion is warranted. [6] For example, if one is to genuinely display fear towards an entity, one must believe that the entity exists and has features such as being dangerous, warranting the emotion of fear. [6] However, since people consuming fiction usually do not believe in the genuine existence of the fictitious things or events, one cannot feel genuine emotion. [6]

Thought theory

Second is the thought theories, for example from Peter Lamarque, Noël Carroll, and Robert J. Yanal.

The thought theories deny premise 2 and claim that people can have genuine emotions from things even if they do not believe them to exist. [7]

Illusion theory

Third is the illusion or realist theories, for example from Alan Paskow.

The illusion theories deny premise 3 and claim that, in a way, the fictional characters are real. They suggest that Samuel Taylor Coleridge was right in saying that fiction involves a "willing suspension of disbelief", i.e. believing in the fiction while engaging with it.

Scientific investigations

The paradox of fiction has also been investigated under the framework of affective neuroscience. Several studies reported a decreased emotional response for emotional stimuli believed to be fictional (e.g., involving actors and stuntmen, movie makeup or CGI), suggesting a quantitative, rather than qualitative, modulation of emotion by fiction. [8] [9] In his doctoral thesis, Dominique Makowski denies the three premisses of the paradox and suggests reframing the issue in the context of emotion regulation, as a regulatory mechanism referred to as fictional reappraisal. [10]

See also

Related Research Articles

Ad hominem, short for argumentum ad hominem, refers to several types of arguments, most of which are fallacious. Typically this term refers to a rhetorical strategy where the speaker attacks the character, motive, or some other attribute of the person making an argument rather than attacking the substance of the argument itself. This avoids genuine debate by creating a personal attack as a diversion often using a totally irrelevant, but often highly charged attribute of the opponent's character or background. The most common form of this fallacy is "A" makes a claim of "fact," to which "B" asserts that "A" has a personal trait, quality or physical attribute that is repugnant thereby going entirely off-topic, and hence "B" concludes that "A" has their "fact" wrong -without ever addressing the point of the debate.

In metaphilosophy and ethics, metaethics is the study of the nature, scope, and meaning of moral judgment. It is one of the three branches of ethics generally studied by philosophers, the others being normative ethics and applied ethics.

Non-cognitivism is the meta-ethical view that ethical sentences do not express propositions and thus cannot be true or false. A noncognitivist denies the cognitivist claim that "moral judgments are capable of being objectively true, because they describe some feature of the world". If moral statements cannot be true, and if one cannot know something that is not true, noncognitivism implies that moral knowledge is impossible.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Suspension of disbelief</span> Allowing imagination when reading or viewing a fictional story

Suspension of disbelief is the avoidance—often described as willing—of critical thinking and logic in understanding something that is unreal or impossible in reality, such as something in a work of speculative fiction, in order to believe it for the sake of enjoying its narrative. Historically, the concept originates in the Greco-Roman principles of theatre, wherein the audience ignores the unreality of fiction to experience catharsis from the actions and experiences of characters. The phrase was coined and elaborated upon by the English poet and philosopher Samuel Taylor Coleridge in his 1817 work Biographia Literaria.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Sorites paradox</span> Logical paradox from vague predicates

The sorites paradox is a paradox that results from vague predicates. A typical formulation involves a heap of sand, from which grains are removed individually. With the assumption that removing a single grain does not cause a heap to become a non-heap, the paradox is to consider what happens when the process is repeated enough times that only one grain remains: is it still a heap? If not, when did it change from a heap to a non-heap?

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Expectation (epistemic)</span> Anticipation that a future event or consequence is likely

In the case of uncertainty, expectation is what is considered the most likely to happen. An expectation, which is a belief that is centered on the future, may or may not be realistic. A less advantageous result gives rise to the emotion of disappointment. If something happens that is not at all expected, it is a surprise. An expectation about the behavior or performance of another person, expressed to that person, may have the nature of a strong request, or an order; this kind of expectation is called a social norm. The degree to which something is expected to be true can be expressed using fuzzy logic. Anticipation is the emotion corresponding to expectation.

Cognitivism is the meta-ethical view that ethical sentences express propositions and can therefore be true or false, which noncognitivists deny. Cognitivism is so broad a thesis that it encompasses moral realism, ethical subjectivism, and error theory.

Psychological horror is a subgenre of horror and psychological fiction with a particular focus on mental, emotional, and psychological states to frighten, disturb, or unsettle its audience. The subgenre frequently overlaps with the related subgenre of psychological thriller, and often uses mystery elements and characters with unstable, unreliable, or disturbed psychological states to enhance the suspense, horror, drama, tension, and paranoia of the setting and plot and to provide an overall creepy, unpleasant, unsettling, or distressing atmosphere.

Self-deception is a process of denying or rationalizing away the relevance, significance, or importance of opposing evidence and logical argument. Self-deception involves convincing oneself of a truth so that one does not reveal any self-knowledge of the deception.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Microexpression</span> Innate result of voluntary, involuntary, and conflicting emotional responses

A microexpression is a facial expression that only lasts for a short moment. It is the innate result of a voluntary and an involuntary emotional response occurring simultaneously and conflicting with one another, and occurs when the amygdala responds appropriately to the stimuli that the individual experiences and the individual wishes to conceal this specific emotion. This results in the individual very briefly displaying their true emotions followed by a false emotional reaction.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Nathan Salmon</span> American philosopher

Nathan U. Salmon is an American philosopher in the analytic tradition, specializing in metaphysics, philosophy of language, and philosophy of logic.

Projectivism or projectionism in philosophy involves attributing (projecting) qualities to an object as if those qualities actually belong to it. It is a theory for how people interact with the world and has been applied in both ethics and general philosophy. It is derived from the Humean idea that all judgements about the world derive from internal experience, and that people therefore project their emotional state onto the world and interpret it through the lens of their own experience. Projectivism can conflict with moral realism, which asserts that moral judgements can be determined from empirical facts, i.e., some things are objectively right or wrong.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Suspense</span> State of mental uncertainty

Suspense is a state of mental uncertainty, anxiety, being undecided, or being doubtful. In a narrative work, suspense is the audience's excited anticipation about the plot or conflict, particularly as it affects a character for whom the audience feels sympathy. However, suspense is not exclusive to narratives.

An object of the mind is an object that exists in the imagination, but which, in the real world, can only be represented or modeled. Some such objects are abstractions, literary concepts, or fictional scenarios.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Kendall Walton</span> American philosopher

Kendall Lewis Walton is an American philosopher, the Emeritus Charles Stevenson Collegiate Professor of Philosophy and Professor of Art and Design at the University of Michigan. His work mainly deals with theoretical questions about the arts and issues of philosophy of mind, metaphysics, and philosophy of language. His book Mimesis as Make Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts develops a theory of make-believe and uses it to understand the nature and varieties of representation in the arts. He has also developed an account of photography as transparent, defending the idea that we see through photographs, much as we see through telescopes or mirrors, and written extensively on pictorial representation, fiction and the emotions, the ontological status of fictional entities, the aesthetics of music, metaphor, and aesthetic value.

Modal fictionalism is a term used in philosophy, and more specifically in the metaphysics of modality, to describe the position that holds that modality can be analysed in terms of a fiction about possible worlds. The theory comes in two versions: Strong and Timid. Both positions were first exposed by Gideon Rosen starting from 1990.

Affective disposition theory (ADT), in its simplest form, states that media and entertainment users make moral judgments about characters in a narrative which in turn affects their enjoyment of the narrative. This theory was first posited by Zillmann and Cantor (1977), and many offshoots have followed in various areas of entertainment. Entertainment users make constant judgments of a character's actions, and these judgments enable the user to determine which character they believe is the "good guy" or the "villain". However, in an article written in 2004, Raney examined the fundamental ADT assumption that viewers of drama always form their dispositions toward characters through moral judgment of motives and conduct. Raney argued that viewers/consumers of entertainment media could form positive dispositions toward characters before any moral scrutinizing occurs. He proposed that viewers sometimes develop story schemas that provide them "with the cognitive pegs upon which to hang their initial interpretations and expectations of characters". The basic idea of the affective disposition theory is used as a way to explain how emotions become part of the entertainment experience.

<span class="mw-page-title-main">Music and emotion</span> Psychological relationship between human affect and music

Research into music and emotion seeks to understand the psychological relationship between human affect and music. The field, a branch of music psychology, covers numerous areas of study, including the nature of emotional reactions to music, how characteristics of the listener may determine which emotions are felt, and which components of a musical composition or performance may elicit certain reactions.

Drama theory is one of the problem structuring methods in operations research. It is based on game theory and adapts the use of games to complex organisational situations, accounting for emotional responses that can provoke irrational reactions and lead the players to redefine the game. In a drama, emotions trigger rationalizations that create changes in the game, and so change follows change until either all conflicts are resolved or action becomes necessary. The game as redefined is then played.

Aesthetic cognitivism is a methodology in the philosophy of art, particularly audience responses to art, that relies on research in cognitive psychology. Although the term is used more in humanistic disciplines, the methodology is inherently interdisciplinary due to its reliance on both humanistic and scientific research.

References

  1. 1 2 3 Paskow, Alan (2004). The Paradoxes of Art : A phenomenological investigation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN   0-521-82833-3.
  2. 1 2 3 4 Radford, Colin; Weston, Michael (January 1975). "How can we be moved by the fate of Anna Karenina?". Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes. 49: 67–93. doi:10.1093/aristoteliansupp/49.1.67. JSTOR   4106870.
  3. 1 2 Schneider, Steven. "The Paradox of Fiction". Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Retrieved 27 June 2012.
  4. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Konrad, Eva-Maria; Petraschka, Thomas; Werner, Christiana (2018-09-15). "The Paradox of Fiction – A Brief Introduction into Recent Developments, Open Questions, and Current Areas of Research, including a Comprehensive Bibliography from 1975 to 2018" (PDF). JLT Articles (in German). 12 (2): 193–203. doi:10.1515/jlt-2018-0011. ISSN   1862-8990. S2CID   149464237.
  5. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Stecker, R. (2011). "Should We Still Care about the Paradox of Fiction?". The British Journal of Aesthetics. pp. 295–308. doi:10.1093/aesthj/ayr019 . Retrieved 2020-02-19.
  6. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Stock, Kathleen (August 2006). "Thoughts on the 'Paradox' of Fiction". Postgraduate Journal of Aesthetics. 3: 37–58 via philarchive.
  7. Podgorski, Daniel (November 13, 2015). "Why Stories Make Us Feel: Colin Radford's So-called 'Paradox of Fiction' and How Art Prompts Human Emotion". The Gemsbok. Your Friday Phil. Retrieved February 22, 2016.
  8. Sperduti, M.; Arcangeli, M.; Makowski, D.; Wantzen, P.; Zalla, T.; Lemaire, S.; Dokic, J.; Pelletier, J.; Piolino, P. (March 2016). "The paradox of fiction: Emotional response toward fiction and the modulatory role of self-relevance". Acta Psychologica. 165: 53–59. doi:10.1016/j.actpsy.2016.02.003. PMID   26922617.
  9. Makowski, D.; Sperduti, M.; Pelletier, J.; Blondé, P.; La Corte, V.; Arcangeli, M.; Zalla, T.; Lemaire, S.; Dokic, J.; Nicolas, S.; Piolino, P. (January 2019). "Phenomenal, bodily and brain correlates of fictional reappraisal as an implicit emotion regulation strategy". Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience. 19 (4): 877–897. doi: 10.3758/s13415-018-00681-0 . PMID   30610654.
  10. Makowski, Dominique (28 November 2018). Cognitive neuropsychology of implicit emotion regulation through fictional reappraisal (PhD). Université de Paris. pp. 617–638.